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1. Introduction  
Sierra Leone’s long and violent war in the 1990s caught the imagination of the 
outside world with its pictures of inconceivable cruelty and viciousness. 
Declared officially over in January 2002, the deep physical and emotional scars 
it  left on the people and their communities and the destruction of the country’s 
socio-economic and institutional foundations are still  visible today. But Sierra 
Leoneans have also shown an extraordinary ability to deal with the painful and 
violent past and to move on. This does not mean that the victims would be able 
to easily forget the suffering they endured or that the return and (re)integration 
of the former combatants into the society would always go smoothly and 
effortlessly. Yet, if you ask around in the vil lages across the country, people 
almost always answer the same: “We have reconciled”. What do they mean by 
that? And how have they achieved it?  
As other societies emerging from war, one of the major challenges Sierra Leone 
faced in i ts aftermath was to find ways for the people to live together again – 
those who kil led and maimed and those who suffered in their hands,  those who 
left to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, those who were displaced and 
those who stayed behind. In an effort to deal with the legacy of the conflict, the 
Sierra Leonean Government with the assistance of the international  community 
established two insti tutions to deliver justice, reconciliation and healing to the 
nation and its people – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The TRC was charged with “creat[ing]  
an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict, address[ing]  
impunity,  respond[ing] to the needs of the victims, promot[ing] healing and 
reconciliation and prevent[ing] a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered” (TRC Act 2000:Art.6). The SCSL was set  up to prosecute those “who 
bear the greatest  responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law” during the war (SCSL Statute 
2000:Art.1).  The work of these transitional justice institutions has been subject 
to much debate (e.g. Evenson 2004, Dougherty 2004, Hoffman 2007, Kelsall 
2005, 2009, Schabas 2003, Shaw 2005, 2007, Stovel 2006). One of the questions 
raised in the discussions was a concern over the impact of these institutions on 
the lives of ordinary Sierra Leoneans and their meaningfulness in the local 
context. It  seems that especially in many rural areas, the TRC and SCSL have 
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made little impression. This may be both because of practical deficiencies and 
financial constraints,  but also, and more importantly, because they failed to take 
into account the conceptions of healing, reconciliation and justice rooted in the 
Sierra Leonean cultural  context (cf. Coulter 2009, Hoffman 2004, 2007, Jackson 
2004, Kelsall 2005, 2009, Shaw 2005, 2007). While the national transitional  
justice insti tutions have attracted considerable attention, there are only a few 
studies that focus on the process of reconciliation as it  unfolded, both 
independent from and alongside, the official mechanisms in villages across the 
country.   
This study aims to do just that. It  seeks to explore the process of reconciliation 
and restoration of relationships at village level in Sierra Leone, with a 
particular focus on the role of local ceremonies. It  also endeavours to elucidate 
the ways in which the national transitional justice inst itutions were perceived 
and reflected on a local level. The study brings an empirically based research on 
community coexistence and reconciliation, striving to develop an understanding 
of the complex world of lived experience in a post-war setting from the 
perspective of those who live it .  While the study is conducted because of an 
intrinsic interest  in the case, there also is  a broader – albeit  not explicitly 
pursued – aim to contribute to the debates in transitional justice and peace-
building fields regarding the ‘local’ practices of reconciliation and dealing with 
violent past in African post-conflict  societies.   
 
1.1 Research problem and background 
Post-conflict peacebuilding has gained a prominent place in the conflict 
resolution field in the past  decade (Ramsbotham et.  al .  2008).  But in spite of i ts 
frequent use both in practice and in academic writing, there is little consensus 
about the meaning of the term ‘peacebuilding’, the activities it  encompasses or 
about when during the l ife cycle of the conflict it  is  to be initiated or ended. 
There is a wealth of literature on peacebuilding and a great  number of debates 
on each of these issues that are beyond the scope and focus of the present study. 
At least three broad areas, or processes,  associated with peacebuilding can be 
identified: state-building, economic development and social reconciliation and 
justice (Swedlund 2011:5 quoted in Millar 2011:177). The third area - social  
reconciliation and justice – is  of central  concern to the present study.  
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The concepts of reconciliation and justice are not only referred to in 
peacebuilding literatures (e.g.  Ramsbotham et al. 2008, Lederach 1997, Galtung 
n.d. , Rothstein 1999, Reychler and Paffenholz 2001) but are also broadly 
discussed in the transitional just ice field (e.g. Rigby 2001, Clark 2008, Prager 
and Govier 2003). In academic writing, peacebuilding (and the broader field of 
conflict resolution) and transitional  just ice are distinctive fields, the former 
firmly established within social sciences and the latter often gravitating towards 
legal research. However, even a cursory look at the post-conflict situations 
around the world,  in practice transitional justice has become a cri tical  
component of liberal  peacebuilding, the dominant approach to peacebuilding (cf. 
Sriram 2007, Shaw and Waldorf 2010:3). They go hand in hand in the externally 
driven post-war intervention as they share a “liberal  vision of history as 
progress” and a number of fundamental assumptions concerning the desirability 
of certain institutional arrangements and policies for repairing the harms of the 
past , addressing the violent conflict and safeguarding its non-recurrence (Shaw 
and Waldorf 2010:3, cf. Sriram 2007, Kayser-Whande and Schell-Faucon 2010).  
Both the international liberal  peacebuilding and transitional justice practice also 
share a common perception (and self-perception) as universal and culturally 
neutral,  or acultural, undertakings. In this respect,  when culture is at  all 
considered, it  is rather as an ‘add-on’, as a residual category.  As Viktorova-
Milne writes:  “The prevalent perception among the agents of l iberal 
peacebuilding is  that culture, while important, is an auxiliary consideration, 
which can follow, but not precede, the cornerstones of peacebuilding identified 
as the spread of democracy, respect for human rights, good governance and so 
on” (2009:95). Culture is  seen as a characteristic feature of – even as a property 
of – ‘the Other ’ (Said 1985), which is the subject of the liberal peacebuilding 
and transitional justice projects (Chandler 2010).   
In broad terms, culture is featured as either being part of the problem that 
brought about the violence and thus as something that the “technocratic project 
of building the rule of law in post-conflict peacebuilding” can resolve (Park 
2010a:413, cf. Viktorova-Milne 2009) or as a resource, or a tool, that can be 
‘applied’ to assist  in these peacebuilding and justice efforts.   
This second understanding of ‘culture as a resource’ merits  further attention 
here. It  has gained prominence in recent years as part of the growing attention 
to ‘local’ participation and ownership in international peacebuilding and 
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transitional justice activities. One of the avenues along this path has been the 
exploration of African ‘traditional’ conflict management and reconciliation 
practices, which could be used for the purpose of securing accountability and 
reintegration of perpetrators and fostering social cohesion after violent conflict.  
In an illustrative statement, Bloomfield states: “One increasingly acknowledged 
role that culture can play is to act as a rich resource for finding home-grown 
tools to use in the reconciliation process” (2003:46). Understood this way, 
‘culture’ fits well with the current design of peacebuilding and transitional 
justice interventions that have developed standard ‘toolkits’ for use in post-
conflict societies all over the world (cf. Shaw and Waldorf 2010).   
Together with the increased emphasis on the local ownership and participation, 
the ‘traditional’ conflict management mechanisms are apt for being included in 
this ‘toolkit’. Thus, for example, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Report 
on The rule of  law and transit ional justice in conflict and post-confl ict  societies 
acknowledges that “due regard must be given to indigenous and informal 
traditions for administering justice or settling disputes,  to help them to continue 
their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international 
standards and local tradition” (UNSC 2004:12).  This approach to ‘culture’ and 
‘tradition’ (which are indeed often perceived as synonymous) in peacebuilding 
and transitional justice practice essentialises culture, limiting it  into a fixed and 
static set of practices that are “naturally the property of spatial ly localized 
people” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:3, cited in Shaw and Waldorf 2010:6). It  is 
also viewed in a dichotomous opposition to the universal (international  
standards in the above) and can only complement it  in certain situations. At the 
same time, while ‘cultural’ or ‘tradit ional’ approaches to conflict management, 
peacebuilding and reconciliation may be viewed in these rather narrow terms, 
they have become popular in recent years with many international 
peacebuilders. It  sometimes led to romanticised ideas about these ‘traditional’ 
mechanisms as a heri tage from the authentic pre-modern African past that can be 
employed to better its future (cf. MacGinty 2008). This can also be attributed to 
the way in which the subjects of liberal  peacebuilding and transitional justice 
interventions – the conflict-ridden ‘Others’ - are constructed and understood. 
Blagg neatly sums up the preceding argument: “Through the Orientalist lens,  
distinctive and historically embedded cultural practices are essentialised, 
reduced to a series of discrete elements, then reassembled and repackaged to 
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meet the requirements of the dominant culture” (2001:230, cited in Cunneen 
2008).   
But a critique of the essentialist views of ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’ mechanisms 
for resolving conflict and seeking justice and reconciliation in its aftermath is  
not and should not be the same as saying that ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ do not 
matter. There are several  conflict resolution scholar-practi tioners who move 
beyond such narrow notions of culture to consider it  in broader contextual 
terms. One of the chief proponents of this thinking - referred to as 
‘transformative’ or ‘elicitive’ peacebuilding - is John Paul Lederach (1997:107). 
He suggests that “peacebuilding initiatives and solutions […] must be rooted in 
the soil where the conflict rages and must be built on contextualized 
participation of people from that setting if  reconciliation is to be sustained” 
(Lederach 1997:107). Transformative peacebuilding is a last ing process rather 
than just a practical activity. Its central component is reconcil iation understood 
as relationship building (Lederach 2000).  The transformative approach does not 
bring any specific prescriptive guide for action or a roadmap to follow in each 
case. Rupeshinghe points to the contextualized nature of transformative 
peacebuilding and recognizes the need for particular strategies for particular 
conflicts  because “each conflict  situation or context should dictate how the 
process is designed (Rupesinghe 1995:83). The present study subscribes to this 
line of thinking believing that sustainable peace is to be built from below 
(Ramsbotham et. al.  2008: 215, Lederach 1997). It  builds on two central tenets 
of transformative peacebuilding: first,  that  successful conflict transformation 
must come from within the society, second, that the transformative process 
includes the entire society but its emphasis lays on the grassroots level actors 
and strategies (Lederach 1997, 2000, Rupesinghe 1995). While this literature 
has been essential in challenging the universalist assumptions of much thinking 
on conflict resolution and peacebuilding, it  stays short of providing a consistent 
framework for studying the local processes of building peace, reconciliation and 
justice outside the organized conflict resolution intervention.  
In recent years, more studies started to emerge, mainly done by anthropologists 
that brought a deeper consideration of ‘the local’ and its cultural context in the 
post-conflict interventions (e.g. Shaw 2005, 2007, 2010, Kelsall 2005, 2009, 
Finnstrom 2010). They emphasise the lived experience in the post-conflict 
situations and seek to bring “a nuanced understanding of what justice, redress 
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and social reconstruction look like from place-based standpoints” (Shaw and 
Waldorf 2010:6). The local is not a bounded, “residual space” but rather “the 
shifted centre from which the rest of the world is viewed” (ibid.). This is an 
approach that also adopted in the present study.  
 
1.2 Research questions and selection of the case 
This research developed and changed its direction and focus a few times as I 
went along with the fieldwork. Initially, I came to Sierra Leone to look for 
‘traditional’ mechanisms of dispute settlement and the role they played in 
building peace in the country in the aftermath of the civil war. My approach was 
modelled on the above mentioned dominant understandings of ‘traditional’ 
conflict management practices in the peace-building and transitional justice 
literatures. Once in the field, I realized that my framework was very limited for 
understanding the complex ways, in which reintegration, reconciliation and 
social reconstruction has been happening at a local level.  Not only were the 
local practices and techniques of reconciliation and reintegration more diverse 
than the ‘toolbox’ approach allows to understand, but more importantly, their 
meaningfulness was shaped by the way reconciliation, reintegration, justice and 
forgiveness were understood by the people who ‘performed’ them. Instead of 
focusing on a single ‘tradit ional’ mechanism or practice, the research brings a 
more holistic picture of the process of reconciliation and social reconstruction 
in the Sierra Leonean villages.  It  sti ll  retains a primary interest in the 
ceremonial and ritual expressions of reconciliation but studies them in the 
broader context of the local narratives on reconciliation.  
Specifically,  this study seeks to explore the following main questions:  
How is reconciliation understood in Sierra Leone? 
In what ways do local ‘traditional’ ceremonies and ri tuals contribute to post-
war reconciliation? 
How are the national justice and truth-telling mechanisms experienced on the 
village level? 
Sierra Leone was selected as a case study for a number of reasons: 
First,  the war was not fought along ethnic or religious cleavages. Although some 
authors (Pettersson 2004, Kandeh 1992) suggest that certain tensions between 
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the dominant Mende and Temne should be acknowledged,
1
 none of the fighting 
factions had an ethnically or religiously defined membership base and no 
specific part of population was targeted. This factor could be improving the 
prospects of successful reconciliation as there are no deep-seated enemy images 
established among clearly identifiable groups among the population. However,  
there are other sources of division in the society that could negatively affect the 
reconciliation process. Among them, one between the youth and the country’s 
elites both at local  and national levels is most prominent, also because it  
contributed to the conflict  in the first  place. As Shaw observes:  “Young Sierra 
Leoneans are keenly aware of the institutional structures and hierarchies that 
perpetuate their marginalization” (2010:118).   
Second, the war was characterised by brutal violence and cruelty committed by 
all the warring factions that intentionally targeted the civilians. In many 
communities, those who were hurt live next to those who brought the violence 
upon them. At the same time, those who carried out much of the killings, 
mutilations and other atrocit ies were often (albeit  not  always) themselves 
abducted. Similarly,  considering the conflict was precipitated by the decades of 
structural violence,  the line between those who we call ‘victims’ and 
‘perpetrators’ can thus at times be fairly blurred (Shaw and Waldorf 2010:8). 
This fact, while rarely taken into consideration in the internationally driven 
mechanisms, can also be expected to be reflected in the reconciliation process. 
Third, Sierra Leone has been often presented as a peacebuilding success. UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon praised the country in 2010 as “one of the 
world’s most successful cases of post-conflict recovery,  peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding” (UNSG 2010). It  also was the first country where a truth 
commission - the Truth and Reconciliation Commission - and a criminal tribunal 
– the Special Court for Sierra Leone – worked alongside each other - an 
experiment considered by a many as successful  (Schabas 2003). But the decision  
on  the  kind  of  t ransitional   justice  mechanisms  to  be  used  in  a  post-
conflict  country  lies  usually  in  the  hands  of  the  eli tes -  the  governments, 
the international community, the top representatives of a few civil society 
                                                 
1
 The Mende, the dominant group in the south and east of the country, traditionally dominate the Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP), while the predominantly Temne and Limba north is the All People’s Congress (APC) 
stronghold. The RUF leader Foday Sankoh was a ‘Northerner’ and a Temne, although the first fighting took place in 
the heartland of Mende territory (Eastern Province). Some Mende therefore perceived the war as an invasion by the 
Temne from the north of the country. Meanwhile, the Temne often see the war as a south-eastern plot initiated by 
Sankoh as a paid agent, with the purpose of destabilizing the APC government (Alie 2006:135). 
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groups. The views on justice and reconciliation of the ordinary people are rarely 
considered, the majority that bore the brunt of the violence is rarely consulted. 
The question of how they see the role of these mechanisms in their own efforts 
to come together after the war and how these coexist with the local  
understanding of justice, truth and reconciliation is therefore important but 
rarely explored. Therefore also in this l ight, Sierra Leone presents an interesting 
case study. 
Fourth, while much interest has been given to the exploration of the local 
practices of conflict  management and justice in African countries that could be 
used in and adapted to the process of restoring war-torn societies and building 
peace, Sierra Leone has not attracted – with a few notable exceptions (Shaw 
2005, 2007, Kaidaneh and Rigby 2010) - much attention in this respect.  
Currently, there is a local organization, Fambul Tok running a project of 
supporting villages in organizing reconciliation ceremonies rooted in the local 
traditional practice which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.6. Their 
experience shows that there are local techniques of reconcil iation, healing and 
reintegration that are relevant for the post-war needs for social recovery. But 
little is known about what role these played when there was no outside support 
or encouragement.  Also this makes the Sierra Leonean case interesting for 
research.  
Existing research on post-war peacebuilding and transitional justice in Sierra 
Leone has focused on three main areas. First, it  is the broad issue of ex-
combatant reintegration. Initially, studies in this area analysed the disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration programmes (i.a. Hoffman 2003, 2005, 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, Leff 2008).  Specific at tention has been given to 
the problems of children associated with fighting forces (i.a. Denov 2010, 
McIntyre and Thusi 2003, Williamson and Cripe 2002, Williamson 2006), and to 
a lesser extent also to girls and women (i.a. Coulter 2009, Stark 2006, Utas 
2009). Attention was also given to ex-combatants post-war circumstances (i .e. 
Peters 2006, Hoffman 2011). Second, as briefly mentioned in the introductory 
passage above, there are a number of diverse studies focusing on the work of the 
national transitional  justice institutions – the TRC and the SCSL (i.a. Evenson 
2004, Dougherty 2004, Hoffman 2007, Kelsall 2005, 2009, Kerr and Lincoln 
2008, Schabas 2003, Shaw 2005, 2007). The research focus of these studies 
ranges from the functioning and coexistence of both insti tutions SCSL (i.a.  
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Evenson 2004, Dougherty 2004, Kerr and Lincoln 2008, Schabas 2003) to 
discussing the impact of these institutions on the lives of ordinary Sierra 
Leoneans and their meaningfulness in the local cultural  context (i.a. Coulter 
2009, Hoffman 2004, 2007, Jackson 2004, Kelsall 2005, 2009, Shaw 2005, 
2007).  Third, a few studies have emerged that focus on the issue of ‘traditional’ 
practices and mechanisms of forge reconciliation in the local  communities (i.a.  
Alie 2008, Kaindaneh and Rigby 2010, Stark 2006, Utas 2009). Most recently 
the focus of many of these contributions has been on community ceremonies 
supported by Fambul Tok (i.a. Graybill 2010, Hoffman 2008).  The present study 
mainly builds on the research in the second and third categories but aims to fill  
a certain gap identified in these bodies of research. The review of the existing 
literature established that our understanding of the ways in which the local  
traditional techniques of reconciliat ion and reintegration inform the 
communities’ post-war recovery remains limited. The present thesis seeks to 
partially remedy this by exploring some of the tradit ional ceremonies and 
practices that were performed in the vil lages without any external support or 
initiative and by discussing the role these played in the efforts of the people to 
deal with the challenges of post-war reintegration and reconciliation in their 
village. 
 
1.3 Research design and methodology 
The presents study seeks to achieve a deep understanding of the role of local  
ceremonies and other practices of social  recovery in the process of 
reconciliation and restoration of relationships at village level in Sierra Leone. It 
also attempts to understand how these interacted with, converged with and 
diverged from the nation-wide transitional justice institutions.  This necessitates 
an exploration of the perceptions and subjective experiences of the individuals 
and communities involved in this process. It  was this “interest in subjectivity 
and the authenticity of human experience” (Silverman 2010:6) that directed the 
choice of qualitative research approach – both in the collection and analysis of 
data.   
Criticism against  qualitative research is  well known (e.g. Silverman 2010 or 
Bryman 2008). It  is often labelled as being ‘unscientific’, with the most 
common objections charging qualitative research as too subjective, difficult to 
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replicate, unable to provide generalizations and lacking in transparency 
(Bryman 2008). According to critics, the often inductive approach to data and 
analysis characterist ic of qualitative approaches means that i ts findings heavily 
rely on “researcher 's often unsystematic views about what is significant and 
important, and also upon the close personal relationships that the researcher 
frequently strikes up with the people studied” (Bryman 2008:391).  
The question of generalization is particularly contentious. Indeed, the critical 
role that the context of the studied research problem plays in qualitative studies 
limits the applicabil ity of the findings to other contexts. However,  as Williams 
(2000) has argued, it  is often possible to make moderatum  generalizations, 
“ones in which aspects of the focus of enquiry .. .  can be seen to be instances of 
a broader set  of recognizable features” as well as “draw with findings by other 
researchers relating to comparable groups” (p.  215, cited in Bryman 2008:392). 
In this respect , this study represents an effort to draw attention to the local 
conception of reconciliation and the related needs and how they sit with the 
internationally preferred transitional just ice agenda.  
Concerning reliabili ty and validity of the research, two different criteria 
specific for assessing qualitative research have been proposed – those of 
trustworthiness and authenticity (Bryman 2008:377). To achieve research rigour, 
this study strives to stand the test of both of these criteria.   
Trustworthiness consists of four cri teria: credibility, transferabil ity, 
dependability,  and confirmabili ty. Credibility “entails both ensuring that  
research is carried out according to the canons of good practice and submitting 
research findings to the members of the social world who were studied for 
confirmation that the investigator has correctly understood that social world” 
(ibid.). While there was no opportunity to present final version of the study to 
any Sierra Leoneans, the preliminary findings from the data analysis and 
observations were consulted with local  expert informants,  gatekeepers, and 
other contacts.  Furthermore, data triangulation was employed which entails 
comparing and gathering data through several methods, at different times and 
social situations (Denzin 1978). In-depth one-on-one or tandem interviews, 
focus groups, participant observation and secondary sources analysis were all 
used to ensure a better consistency of the data. The aim in transferability is to 
produce what Geertz (1973) called a thick description, a contextually rich and 
detailed account of the environment or group under study. This then “provides 
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others with what they refer to as a database for making judgements about the 
possible transferabil ity of findings to other milieux” (Bryman 2008:378).  To 
meet the criteria of dependability,  all records including field notes,  recordings, 
coded datasets etc. are kept and the analysis decisions and process are described 
in detail below. Personal values and theoretical inclinations have been 
controlled to assure confirmability (ibid.). Authenticity concerns “wider 
political impact of research” (ibid.),  among them fairness is  of highest  relevance 
for the present research. It  questions whether diverse viewpoints of the different 
members are fairly represented. To achieve this, the interviews and focus groups 
in the communities included people of different age groups and both genders as 
well as people with various war experiences - former fighters,  victims of crimes,  
returnees and those who stayed etc. 
The aim of the study led the choice of an intrinsic case study as a research 
design. As Stake (2000) writes, an intrinsic case study is undertaken because the 
case “in all  its  particularity and ordinariness” is of interest and “the researcher 
wants better understanding” of it  (p. 237). The choice of an intrinsic case study 
is premised upon certain epistemological and ontological positions. The focus 
on understanding the complex social world of the lived experience and the 
subjective meanings people assign to it  characterises an epistemological 
position described as interpretivist (Bryman 2008). Constructionist  ontology 
implies that  social reality is a creation of social  actors (ibid.).  
Chabal and Daloz (2006) write: “Unravelling what makes sense to the actors . . .  
is to enter the realm of the interpretation of meaning: that is  to make the effort 
to decode the significance of such events from the others’ viewpoint. To do that 
is inescapably to address the issues of culture” (p.4). But while culture is a 
complex and contested concept in the social sciences (Viktorova-Milne 
2009:12), for the purpose of the present study “culture is  not to be defined 
exhaustively, by reference to all the particular elements that might come to 
represent what it  is at a particular (and inevitably frozen) point in time” (Chabal 
and Daloz 2006:21). Instead, it  is more usefully conceived of as “an 
environment, a constantly evolving setting, within which human behaviour 
follows a number of particular courses – many of which are contradictory” 
(ibid.). This is best captured in the classical Geertz’s classical premise “.. .  that 
man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun” and 
culture is taken to be those webs.  (Geertz 1973:5). We cannot simply ‘enrich’ 
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our peacebuilding and transitional justice ‘toolbox’ with culturally-sensitive 
tools but we must strive “to disentangle the relevant webs of significance” that 
impinge on the process of post-war reconstruction and reconcil iation.  
 
1.4 Data collection 
The case study is primarily based on interviews conducted during my two field 
trips to Sierra Leone. During the first  one,  between January and June 2008, I 
came to the country to volunteer for a local non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) and devoted only part of my time to fieldwork for the study. I conducted 
8 formal interviews in Freetown mainly with academic staff at  Fourah Bay 
College, local NGOs’ and other civil society staff, community and religious 
leaders. I also spent a lot of time talking to ordinary people in Freetown, people 
I worked with, I l ived with as well  as casual  acquaintances on public transport, 
at the market or in cookery shops and elsewhere. I also visited three district 
headquarter towns in the provinces - Kabala in the Northern and Kenema and 
Kailahun in the Eastern Province where I also discussed my research project 
with a number of people from different walks of life. All these conversations, 
both formal and informal, have profoundly shaped my ideas about the research. I 
also made my first contact with Fambul Tok in 2008, a local organization that 
had just launched a nationwide initiat ive supporting villages in organizing 
reconciliation ceremonies rooted in local  traditional practice.  I was offered the 
opportunity to attend and observe a ceremony in Kissy-Kama Chiefdom in 
Kailahun District. Overall ,  the first visit to Sierra Leone was invaluable for 
making contacts and clarifying the focus of the research. The six months I spent 
living in Sierra Leone was an opportunity to start getting to know the country, 
the everyday concerns of the people,  their stories, frustrations and aspirations.  
The majority of the interviews for this thesis were conducted during my second 
trip to the country in January and February 2010. I spent twelve days in 
Freetown and travelled the rest of the time across the country. I visited two 
districts in the Northern – Port Loko and Koinadugu – and the Southern - 
Moyamba and Bo - Provinces and one - Kailahun - in the Eastern Province. I 
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spent seven to ten days in each district town and visited two to four surrounding 
villages; 18 villages in total .
2
 
My choice of villages was guided by several  considerations. I chose not to focus 
only on one village but decided to conduct research in several villages. This was 
partly motivated by time and resource constraints; I did not have enough of 
either to carry out an ethnographic research by spending an extended period of 
time in one place.  It  was also motivated by the aim of the research to provide 
an understanding of the role of local ceremonies and other techniques of social 
recovery in the post-war reconciliation process at village level to which an 
effort to record the experiences in multiple locations was seen as beneficial. 
However,  the goal was not to compare the findings between different  villages 
and regions but rather to identify common themes across the data that would 
speak to the stated research questions. The choice of the part icular villages was 
also based on the questions of accessibility and availabili ty of local contacts 
and ‘gatekeepers’ who assisted me with accessing the sites. I found my 
gatekeepers in different  ways. Some of them were relatives or family members 
of my friends and acquaintances that I met already in 2008 in Freetown, some I 
only made contact with once I arrived in the district headquarter towns. They 
were usually teachers, religious leaders or local NGO staff. They usually 
assisted me with gaining access to the villages through their personal relations. 
This often proved to be an important way of gaining some init ial degree of trust. 
Sometimes there were several people assisting in selecting the villages for 
interviews. In Port Loko, for example, a local NGO leader guided me to one of 
the villages as well as introduced me to the Paramount Chief who then helped 
me with access to another village. The use of multiple gatekeepers decreased the 
risk of producing biased samples connected to the snowball sampling technique. 
In selecting the people to be interviewed in the villages, I did not attempt to 
proportionately reflect the exact age and gender structure of the population. I 
instead aimed at gaining insights from a wide range of people both young (under 
35s) and old,  men and women. I also tried to look for people with various war 
experiences - former fighters, victims of crimes, returnees and those who stayed 
etc.  
Altogether, I recorded a total of 105 interviews during my 2010 visit.  55 of 
these were one-on-one or tandem interviews (INT) with people in the 
                                                 
2
 For  an overview of the research s i tes see Annex 1 .  
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communities – chiefs, victims, ex combatants, bystanders.  Another 30 were 
community focus groups (FG) with between 3 and 12 participants. 
In addit ion to the in-depth interviews and group discussions with the villagers, I 
interviewed religious leaders, NGO staff, and academics in Freetown and the 
district headquarter towns of Port Loko, Makeni, Kabala,  Bo, Kailahun and 
Moyamba.
3
 I had 19 individual interviews with experts (E) -  NGO staff, civil 
society members, rel igious leaders, academics – and 1 expert focus group. The 
expert interviews were done to obtain a broader range of perspectives and 
perceptions and to consult the preliminary findings from the villages. In total 
261 people participated in the research, which resulted in nearly 160 hours of 
recorded interviews. As in 2008 when I lived in Freetown, also this time around 
during the travelling interactions and conversations with Sierra Leoneans in the 
‘ordinary’ daily situations provided me with much contextual insight as many 
people shared their opinions and observations, their concerns and everyday 
struggles as well  as their joys and dreams.  
I used multiple methods for collecting the data: in-depth one-on-one or tandem 
interviews, focus groups, part icipant observation and secondary sources 
analysis.  In-depth interviewing is a good method to learn the subjective 
perspectives of individuals on the issues under study. I started with a list of 
semi-structured questions covering the major themes such as ceremonies, 
reconciliation and return of ex-combatants. Then, depending on what my 
informants were saying, each interview took “different twists and turns and 
follow[ed] its own winding path” (Brounéus 2011:130). This gave my 
informants the space to speak for themselves and emphasise the issues they 
considered important . At the same t ime, I followed up their responses with new 
questions and eventually returned to my l ist of questions. In this way, I was able 
to gather a rich narrative data while at  the same t ime keep in line with my 
research aims. The atmosphere of the interviews and, more importantly,  the 
nature of answers, can be seriously influenced by trust , or lack of it .  As I did 
not have the possibil ity of staying in the villages for an extended period of time 
in order to build close relationships, I depended to a large extent on my 
gatekeepers for presenting me to the communities and helping me gain initial  
trust . This indeed worked better in some places than in others.   
                                                 
3
 The full list of interviews including indexing can be found in Annex 2. 
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Initially,  I did not plan to use focus group interviews. But early on, it  turned out 
that i t  was sometimes difficult to isolate individuals from a village for one-on-
one interviews without creating situations in which those individuals may have 
fel t uncomfortable or singled out. It  also turned out that in a more open 
conversation people encouraged each other, reacted to each other and 
complemented each other with their own observations,  experiences and 
perspectives on what was being said or corrected each other in details.  Indeed, 
“the contrasting and comparing among the participants help to better elucidate 
motivations and reasoning, especially if the topic at hand has been a group 
experience” (Söderström 2011:147).  In fact, the participant observations of the 
dynamics of such groups, the type of reactions, behaviours and attitudes, and 
body language – nodding, disagreeing, and cheering – also became a very 
valuable source of data. Following the experience with the first such generically 
grown discussion group, I insisted that there were separate groups with men and 
women, as the women’s voices were overshadowed by men’s.  
The individual in-depth interviews lasted usually about one hour, the group 
discussions slightly longer. I tape-recorded most of my interviews, always with 
the consent of my informants. Only in a two cases – both in interviews with 
experts,  a lawyer who formerly worked with the SCSL and a member of a local 
council in Kailahun District – the men did not feel comfortable with being 
recorded and I therefore only made written notes.  
 
1.5 Data analysis   
I started transcribing the interviews and analysing the data already during the 
fieldwork. This preliminary analysis of the interviews was an opportunity to 
reflect on the init ial questions, their formulation and the kind of responses they 
were yielding. Furthermore, it  sometimes provided new directions that I initially 
did not think of. This was, for example, the case with the frequent references to 
a changing relationship between chiefs and youth in the village,  a direction that 
I did not consider to include but that often came up in conversations about (re-
)building relat ionships in the community.  The on-going analysis also highlighted 
several issues that I then raised with some of my expert informants, in order to 
get their feedback on my preliminary interpretations and findings. Lastly, it  also 
gave me and my interpreters the opportunity to fill  in gaps they might have 
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missed earl ier in their interpretat ion and give context or explanation to local 
customs as well  as to improve the interviewing and interpreting technique. 
However, due to time and practical constraints, as transcribing usually took 
three times longer than recording the interview, and as lacking electricity supply 
sometimes made charging my laptop difficult ,  only about 25% of the interviews 
were transcribed during the fieldwork and the rest was finished upon my return 
home. The 160 hours of interviews translated in over 400 pages of typed out 
narrative data, which were complemented by my notes related to observations 
that  I had made while in the field. 
The key patterns and themes for analysis were developed inductively from the 
collected data (Bryman 2008:390). But as Srivastava and Hopwood (2009) note,  
they do not emerge on their own (p. 77). Rather, the analysis is “a loop-like 
pattern of multiple rounds of revisiting the data as additional  questions emerge, 
new connections are unearthed, and more complex formulations develop along 
with a deepening understanding of the material. Qualitative analysis is 
fundamentally an iterative set of processes” (Berkowitz 1997, in Srivastava and 
Hopwood 2009:77). In addition those that came out from the interviews, I also 
identified important themes in the existing anthropological l iterature on Sierra 
Leone and examined my data through this framework. 
The objective of analysing quali tative data is to determine the categories, 
relationships and assumptions that inform the respondents’ view of the world in 
general, and of the topic – here local reconciliation - in particular (McCracken 
1988 quoted in Bassit 2003:143). I determined the categories and their 
relationships through a process of coding. Coding – or sometimes categorising, 
tagging or labelling – is  a qualitative research process in which one defines 
what is happening in the data and in which one “begins to grapple with what it  
means” (Charmaz 2006:46). Simply speaking, the idea of coding is  that you 
label or tag chunks of data with a code representing the theme, so if a theme is 
identified in a later interview, you can then go back to previous interviews to 
see if that theme or process can be used to explain those as well (Charmaz 
2006).   
The process started with carefully reading and re-reading all the data that I had 
collected with an aim to divide the data into categories. I spent much time 
redefining or renaming the categories until I came to a set of categories that I 
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found satisfactory. As Dey noted about the importance of finding the right 
categories before start ing the actual analysis: “devising a category is making 
decisions about how to organise the data in ways which are useful for the 
analysis, and we have to take some account of how this category will ‘fit’ into 
this wider analytic context” (Dey 1993:103). After I had my init ial  list  of 
categories I commenced the process of dividing the data into excerpts. But 
rather than breaking my data up into the smallest  possible data, I often chose to 
keep a few lines or a paragraph together so it  would not lose its contextual  
meaning.    
After defining categories, the process of coding started. By coding the actual  
analysis of the data starts . The codes are links between “locations in the data 
and sets of concepts or ideas, and they are in that sense heuristic devices, which 
enable the researcher to go beyond the data” (Coffey and Atkinson 1996:27). I 
had kept some of the excerpts quite long, as I wanted to make sure to allow all 
the detail in the data to be captured. For the same reason, often two (or where 
necessary three or four) codes were assigned to a single excerpt.  Once that was 
done, I could start interpreting the data and weaving the narrative along the key 
patterns and themes that emerged from the data. The case study is therefore 
presented in a narrative form along excerpts from the interviews, complemented 
with my interpretation and analysis and with accounts from other studies. 
 
1.6 Researching other cultures. Some reflections on being an outsider. 
The specific problems related to this kind of interview-based research are 
manifold, most obviously linguistic, ethical, interpretational and cultural. Being 
European and female does not always make things easier.   
 
Access to informants 
As mentioned above, for the introduction to my informants I relied heavily on 
local contacts – be it  NGO workers, interpreters/assistants or school teachers.  
More importantly, even my contacts had mostly to accept interference in the 
selection of informants by the village chief. Although I have persistently tried 
to influence the selection in a sensitive way so to speak to people most relevant 
for the research, it  has certainly influenced my sample. In some places my 
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choice of informants was not always entirely free but people were asked by the 
chiefs to talk to me, in others I could freely walk around the village and chose 
my informants. 
Interviewing in Sierra Leonean villages presents additional challenges. Both in 
one on one interviews and in focus groups I tried to find a private place to speak 
– however,  it  turned out that many people and particularly chiefs preferred 
speaking to me on their front porch surrounded (despite my requests for 
privacy) by villagers. Although interruption by locals could lead to interesting 
discussions, worryingly the answers of the chiefs could influence what other 
informants would say in individual interviews taking place later. Only in one 
village all interviews took place in the chief 's house, in the other communities I 
could interview people in their own dwellings or other place of choice and 
without the presence of the chiefs. But the limited time I spent in the villages 
make it hard to understand the power relations within the village and the 
position of my informants within these structures (with the exception of the 
chiefs) and to establish how these may have affected the interviews or motivated 
informants to provide ‘socially acceptable’ answers to my questions. 
Furthermore, as Utas (2009) points out, due to the familiari ty with outside 
NGOs and other institutions,  informants at  times give responses that they 
believe are desired by the researcher.  Less common in the more remote villages 
where I undertook my research was what he calls ‘research fat igue’. Only in one 
village it  turned out,  that my contact person had brought other researchers to the 
same village and people were very tired of answering to questions of strangers 
without ever seeing anything back for it .  Fanthorpe (2005) warns that  the 
familiarity with post-war intervention by aid agencies has raised expectations 
when foreigners visit local communities and informants often stress that  
material needs would go a long way in restoring local relationships.  
Recognising this “use of grievance as rhetorical  device” (p. 40) particularly 
from my visits in communities in the Northern Province, I strived to distinguish 
in my research between the requests for help and the emphasis people put on 
material  needs and redress as important  factors in reconciliation.  
Adjusting one’s way of questioning to what is culturally acceptable while still  
getting to the bottom of issues is a skill  that needs to grow through experience. 
Changing interpreters, which was necessary as the geographic spread of the 
research resulted in interviews in English, Krio, Temne, Koranko, Mende and 
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Kissi , did not contribute to making this task any easier. Just  as Stark (2006),  I 
noticed that  interpreters sometimes tended to turn open-ended questions into 
closed-ended ones (p. 209).  Although the respondent might just have nodded in 
approval to the interpreter ’s statement, the interpreter gave a several  minutes’ 
long and detailed answer. When I noticed this was happening I tried to rephrase 
the question and ask it  again,  or return to the topic later on in the interview. At 
times interpreters ‘manipulated’ my questions so that the informant would give 
the answer that the interpreter believed I was looking for.  Listening back to 
recorded interviews with a third person revealed a lot of new information that at  
times even contradicted my original notes from the interpreter and thus helped 
to ‘clean’ the data. 
I worked with six different interpreters,  all of which were men. Five of them 
were school teachers and the sixth a social worker at an NGO. The social  and 
communication skills of the teachers were often helpful in interviews; however, 
at times their tendency to ‘teach’ the informants interfered with getting a 
spontaneous and genuine response. The social worker both arranged the 
interviews in and around Kabala, where he had worked as a reintegration officer 
just after the war. His intimate knowledge with the local  culture helped in 
getting a better understanding some of the responses. The downside of his 
experience with what took place in these communities directly after the war was 
that  he would phrase questions so that they would produce the desired outcome.  
Although American or European researchers are all but a new phenomenon in 
Sierra Leonean rural areas, they are mostly conceived as being linked to an 
NGO. The concept of pure academic research without direct influence on policy 
or projects is - quite understandably - often harder to grasp.  Informants would 
frequently ask about the benefit of my research and also answer the questions in 
terms of local development needed in the hope that this would be reported to 
those with the means to deploy projects. The frequent response that only 
assistance from outside could improve reconciliation can for a part be explained 
by the hope that the interviewer would actually be able to honour such 
suggestions.  
Another sensit ive issue to be aware of – also noted by Utas (2009:11) – is the 
connotation of tradition as being backward or in conflict  with Christ ianity. 
There is abundant proof that traditional beliefs and world rel igions go hand-in-
hand in local communities. However, in public and to an outsider, a Christian 
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informant will often deny his participation or belief in the former. Comments 
such as “that is something only traditionalist do”, or “we don’t believe in that 
any longer” were not uncommon.
4
  
The reason that we are not practising it  . . .  let’s assume you are passing on the 
way and some[one]  witnesses you worshipping this Nomoli
5
,  this false cause, 
worshipping them, the moment they drink pojo (palmwine), they will say “I met 
your brother worshipping another god, he has created another god for himself. I 
will never eat in this house or drink water here”. So i f  that happens to go 
around the town, youth will be shy and not feel happy over it .  But we would 
want to practice, but  because of this mockery and other what people might think 
makes us ashamed.  (FG19) 
 
Time 
Placing the ceremonies and other events on a t imeline proved quite challenging. 
First of all,  the war in Sierra Leone was a rather fluid concept. Not always did 
all parts of the country experience war violence at the same time. Displaced 
persons returned to their homes at various times, some before the signing of the 
official peace,  some long afterwards. Talking about the time ‘when the war was 
over ’ with different  informants did not always mean talking about the exact  
same space in time. Some communities could have performed ceremonies during 
what officially was still  war, others waited several years until they had gathered 
all the resources needed to perform the required rituals. Additionally, in the two 
years before my second field trip to Sierra Leone Fambul Tok has launched its 
work first throughout Kailahun and later also in Moyamba and Kambia Districts . 
As Fambul Tok strongly emphasises local participation and ownership of the 
programme and leaves the design of the ceremonies in the hands of the 
communities, sometimes it  was hard to establish whether the ceremony people 
referred to was the one supported by Fambul Tok or one they performed earlier.   
Speaking to various groups within each community helped in reconstructing the 
timeline. It  occurred that informants with roots in a certain community had only 
recently returned, not being aware of ceremonies having taken place directly 
                                                 
4
 For further examples of traditional believes being condemned by religious leaders, see Combey (2010:318). 
5
 Nomoli are figurines, often made out of soap stone, that are buried in farm land to request the gods or ancestors for 
a successful rice harvest. For more detail see: Stanley Brown, The Nomoli of Mende country, Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), pp. 18-20 
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after the war. In the case of interviews with multiple informants it  was not 
uncommon that they corrected each other about the sequence of events. Small 
scale ceremonial practices were often performed on individual basis and were 
performed as people returned to their settlements. Families offered small 
sacrifices to their own shrines and cleansed their own sons and daughters of 
evils spiri ts. This being said, due to financial constraints, it  was not uncommon 
for communities to wait  several  years before performing a community-wide 
sacrifice. 
 
Researching in post-war environments.  Some ethical  considerations. 
Researching in a post-war environment carries with itself specific challenges as 
it  “interferes with the lives of people who have been affected and who are trying 
to cope with its  aftermath” (Buckley-Zistel 2007:2). 
As Buckley-Zistel suggests researchers should consider at  least four issues: 
“what questions they pose, how they approach war-torn communities, how they 
themselves deal with the painful information they receive and, most importantly,  
who benefits from their work: they or the people who have lived through the 
horror” (Buckley-Zistel  2007:2)? Within these questions,  matters as power 
relations between the researcher and the interviewed people – both in terms of 
the abysmal material differences as well  as the control over the interpretation 
and spread of the gained knowledge also arise. 
With the main focus of my research on the post-war situation, I chose not to ask 
people directly about any details of their war experience beyond the basic 
information necessary for the categorisation of the interviews. With that 
decision I hoped to minimise the risk of bringing back any painful memories 
they may have tried to overcome or forget although I was aware that avoiding 
this altogether would be hard, if not impossible. Questions about how people 
and communities were dealing with the past cannot be dissociated from that past  
itself. However, very early on it  turned out that  some people were willing to 
share ‘snapshots’ of their war stories with me even without being specifically 
asked. Their stories allowed me to begin gaining a deeper understanding of the 
war,  its  events and consequences as seen and felt by those who have gone 
through it (cf. Buckley-Zistel  2007). 
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Of the issues ci ted above, I find the one concerned with who benefits from the 
research the most difficult to answer. First,  it  is not just a rhetorical question 
posed by a researcher seeking a justification for his/her own work. During my 
interviews - in an effort to create an environment of mutual openness and trust - 
I encouraged people to ask me questions back any time they would feel they 
needed to know more about me, my research or where my interviewing were 
going. Very often – so often in fact that I considered abandoning this practice - 
they only had a single question: “What can your research do for us?” I never 
quite managed to find a satisfactory answer to that question. Second, inspired or 
rather provoked by this direct questioning of my personal motivation by the 
people I interviewed, I started to ask my ‘gate-keepers’ from among the NGOs 
and other organisations, many of whom had previously worked with foreign 
academics and students on several occasions, how much they ever heard back 
from these researchers once they had left  the country. The answers were maybe 
not surprising but worrying. The feedback was indeed extremely poor. This in 
spite of the fact , that the majori ty of these local organisations’ staff who had 
often been working in the field of community dispute resolution, peace-
building, on diverse projects of ex-combatant reintegration and reconciliation 
for several years were genuinely interested in sharing their expertise, discussing 
my experiences and ideas, and finding out more about what has been writ ten 
about Sierra Leone by the outsiders.  Yet,  many bemoaned that the authors never, 
or rarely, send the dissertations or articles that eventually write with their help 
through contacts or information. One may only start mending this by making the 
findings available electronically for at least those among the contact persons 
who have access to the internet; however it  seems that the power imbalance 
between the researcher, the researched and those who assist the former in 
gaining access to the latter will remain hard to mend for a while.  
 
1.7 Thesis outline 
The dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first one maps out the 
discussion about reconciliation in the transitional justice field. In chapter 2, it  
aims to explore and cri tically review the contemporary debates and approaches 
to reconcil iation and highlight its main concerns, arguments and controversies. 
In chapter 3, debates about the African way of just ice and reconcil iation are 
briefly summarized. This extended literature review, based on the particularly 
 
 23  
important contributions to the field both in academic scholarship and in policy 
and practice, seeks to present a background that would set  the stage for the 
inquiry into the community reconciliation in Sierra Leone and the role of local  
cultural practice in this process.  
The second part introduces the case study by briefly looking into Sierra Leone’s 
history and present. It  starts  with chapter 4, which is tracing the causes of the 
war in the workings of the Sierra Leonean post-colonial state, marginalization 
of urban and rural  youth and a pervasive culture of violence.  Chapter 5 follows 
with a more detailed chronology of the war. Understanding the underlying 
causes of the war as well as its  dynamics and expressions helps in highlighting 
the challenges the country faced in its reconciliation efforts. The second part 
concludes with chapter 6 that presents a short overview of the national  
transitional justice institutions – the SCSL and TRC – that  were established 
after the war to seek justice and promote truth-telling and reconciliation in the 
country and the experiences with and reflections of the SCSL and of the trial of 
Liberian ex-president Charles Taylor on a local  level.  
The third part  presents the findings of the field research. It  consists of three 
chapters, each addressing one of the research questions. Chapter 7 seeks to tease 
out the local understanding of reconciliation and the dynamics of seeking and 
achieving such reconciliation. The following chapter 8 details  some of the 
ceremonies performed to remake social  relationships and restore community 
cohesion in the aftermath of the war. It  further attempts to point out the major 
functions these ceremonies have fulfil led in the process of reconciliation. The 
chapter ends with a brief look at other ritual practices such as individual 
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PART I. RECONCILIATION 
2. Perspectives on reconciliation 
The following chapter attempts to explore and critically review the 
contemporary debates and approaches to reconciliation and highlight its main 
concerns, arguments and controversies. My aim here is present an overview of 
the concepts as they are theorized in the academic literature and used in peace-
building and transit ional justice policy and practice. The purpose is  twofold. 
First,  a review of the field is designed to situate the case study presented in the 
second part within the context of the current academic and practice-driven 
research. Second, and more importantly,  it  is to make an argument for the 
approach adopted in this study – a place-based enquiry into the process of 
seeking reconcil iat ion and justice in Sierra Leonean communities.  As will be 
presented below, two important patterns emerge when we examine the field. 
What we currently see in the processes of seeking reconciliation and justice in 
post-violence societies worldwide is,  on the one hand, an increasingly 
‘universalised’ toolbox in the form of criminal tribunals, t ruth commissions, 
‘traditional’ mechanisms, and amnesty programmes etc. These instruments are 
applied in diverse post-conflict  contexts and are al l - with minor local  variations 
- practically always the same. On the other hand, while these institutions are 
said to be contributing towards achieving several goals – providing justice, 
advancing reconciliation, uncovering truth, encouraging forgiveness, assisting 
healing or (re-)building sustainable peace,  there is l ittle agreement on how much 
each of these institutions contributes to reaching any/all of these goals. More 
importantly, it  is unclear what exactly is meant and understood by these 
concepts. In this sense, there is – as Clark (2008) writes – a considerable 
“theoretical poverty” in the study and practice of the processes of dealing with 
the legacy of violent  conflict  (p. 193).   
This chapter looks at the most important aims that post-violence societies 
pursue in order to deal with and overcome the legacy of their violent past.  The 
chapter is  organized along the major questions of the reconciliation debates: 
What is reconciliation and how is it  achieved?  
Who performs reconciliation? 
How does reconcil iat ion relate to other key objectives the post-conflict societies 
may decide to pursue like justice, truth and forgiveness?  
 
 25  
2.1 Locating reconciliation 
Reconciliation comes after violence, or more generally after ‘harm’ – either 
physical or mental – that negatively affected or damaged relationships between 
two or more entities, be it  individuals,  groups, populations, states or others 
(Santa-Barbara 2007). Violent armed conflicts  are one such ‘harm’, usually 
involving large-scale destruction of human life and to the social fabric of 
involved communities, as well as to physical infrastructure and property. Based 
on the argument that “war and human rights abuses become self-perpetuating 
process if anger and hatred are not efficiently addressed” (Brounéus 2003:9), 
reconciliation – through the search for some measure of accountabil ity within 
one of the transitional justice institutions or the diverse range of transformative 
peacebuilding activities focused on building relationships and strengthening 
societal mechanisms for the peaceful management of conflicts – has become an 
important goal for societies recovering from war or other mass violations of 
human rights. It  is therefore not only an approach to dealing with post-war 
situations but also a method for the prevention of further violent conflict (cf. 
Lederach 1997, Long and Brecke 2003).  
 
2.2 Defining reconciliation 
Calls for reconciliation in the aftermath of armed conflict or other mass 
violations of human rights have been heard with growing urgency in many 
countries across the globe at least since the early 1990s. “Throughout Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, many countries are engaged in 
transitions that have nothing in common, save that their incipient governments 
are touting reconciliation as a panacea for their countries ' unique ills” (Sarkin 
and Daly 2004:1). And it is certainly not just the governments. Reconciliation is 
advocated by different sections of the domestic societies -  local civil society 
organizations, community leaders and survivor groups and supported by the 
international community – international  governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, donors and funding agencies. 
It  is  generally recognised that  reconcil iation is vital  if  peace is to be sustained 
in the future. But only rarely it  is clearly explained what is exactly understood 
under reconciliation,  what it  implies or how it is to be achieved. Asking these 
questions,  Suzan Dwyer remarks:  “Curiously,  given the frequency with which 
 
 26  
the term ‘reconcil iation’ is used, no one is saying” (2003:92). For 
VanAntwerpen, the problem is not as much the lack of definitions of 
reconciliation but rather “an abundance of [its] meanings” (2008:46). Certainly, 
scholarship on the subject of reconciliat ion has proliferated over the last two 
decades but a consensus on how reconciliation can be defined or conceptualised 
is hard to find and great disagreements remain.  
Assumptions are often made not only about the precise meaning of 
reconciliation but also about its relationship to other goals sought in post-
violence societies, such as justice, forgiveness or truth. Are they consti tuent 
components of reconciliation, as statements such as ‘there is  no reconciliation 
without justice’ or ‘reconciliation is  impossible without truth’ suggest , or are 
they competing objectives of which one can only be sought at the expense of the 
other? Empirical evidence supporting any of these claims is at best inconsistent  
(cf.  Fletcher and Weinstein 2002). 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘reconciliation’ as ‘the restoration of 
friendly relat ions’ or ‘the action of making one view or belief compatible with 
another ’. Interestingly, the entry for the verb ‘to reconcile’ adds to the above 
meanings the expression ‘to reconcile someone to’ which is ‘to make someone 
accept (a disagreeable or unwelcome thing)’. While in the context of the present 
debates of reconciliation within the fields of transitional justice and liberal 
peacebuilding such interpretat ion of the concept is not applied (and arguably not 
acceptable),  it  may actually be useful for analysing the dynamics and outcomes 
of some real-world reconciliation processes (cf. Kriesberg 2007:7). 
An understanding of reconciliation in terms of re-building or mending 
relationships broken by a period of violence and atrocity is  probably the most 
common. In this sense, Kriesberg views reconciliation as “the process of 
developing a mutual  conciliatory accommodation between enemies of formerly 
antagonist ic groups [.. .  and] of moving toward a relatively cooperative and 
amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving 
extreme injury to one or more sides in the relat ionship” (2007:2).  For Govier 
and Verwoerd (2002), the goal of reconciliation is “the building and sustaining 
of a relationship with sufficient closeness and trust to handle the conflicts and 
problems that will inevitably arise in the course of time” (p. 186). This goal  
cannot be viewed separately from the process – as keeping up a trusting 
relationship is exactly that – a continuous process. (ibid.). Other authors 
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propose similar interpretation (cf. Santa-Barbara 2007, Bar-Tal and Bennink 
2001).   
The understanding of reconciliation in terms of re-building or mending 
relationships implies that there is more to it  than just achieving ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ among the former adversaries. While peaceful  coexistence only 
requires the formerly antagonist parties to refrain from committing violence 
against the other, it  does not depend on their coming together and (re)forming a 
relationship (Clark 2008:194).  
But while relationship building may be broadly accepted as the central tenet of 
reconciliation, this does not suffice. What is the nature,  the quality and the 
content of such relationships? How are relationships (re)built or transformed 
and by which means? And – particularly in case of larger communities - whose 
relationship matter for reconciliation to be achieved? It is  in these complex 
webs that the different meanings of ‘reconciliation’ are conceived.  
Apart from the broad and ‘value neutral’ concept of reconciliation as 
relationship building, there is often a normative element in the way 
reconciliation is interpreted. “Reconcil iation represents the possibility of 
transforming war into peace,  trauma into survival , and hatred into forgiveness” 
(Sarkin 2008:13). It  appeals to the generosity of the human spirit ,  i ts ability to 
overcome, to heal, and to restore and stands in opposition to the committed 
crimes. Reconciliation as a normative goal also aims at the unification, or rather 
re-unification of things (or people) that are meant to be together. It  implies “the 
coming together of things that once were united but have been torn apart ; a 
return to or recreation of the status quo ante, whether real or imagined” (ibid.). 
This notion is  however problematic in many contemporary post-violence 
societies where the recreation of a previous state of affairs in not really 
desirable. It  is particularly true in the many intrastate conflicts where the open 
violence of the war was preceded by years or decades of structural violence and 
of marginalization of certain groups of the population. Or perhaps, as in the 
case of South Africa, where there is no previous state of peaceful  and friendly 
relationships to return to (Krog 1999:165). In spite of the questionable merit of 
such appeals, several countries built  their reconciliation rhetoric around 
references to such non-violent roots of their societies. The Rwandan 
government’s policies of forging national unity and reconciliation in a society 
deeply divided by the genocide of 1994 and the decades of political 
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manipulation of ethnicity and social polarisation that preceded these events are 
a case in point . The government of Paul Kagame promotes a constructed 
narrative of a pre-colonial history that was characterised by harmonious 
relations among all Rwandans, who did not know ethnicity and lived in peace. 
This ideal, the government argues, was only disrupted by the colonial 
intervention, and it strives to re-create it  by – among other things – 
criminalising any mention of ethnic categories of the citizens in public 
(Buckley-Zistel 2011). Some of the many problems of framing reconciliation in 
these terms are also evident in the Rwandan example. First ,  the reconciliation 
narrative is in fact hijacked by the government and used as a political tool to 
intimidate anyone who disagrees with the government and its version of the 
history. It  silences the stories of survivors and forecloses a societal dialogue on 
the causes of the violence and on the way forward. Rather than bridging the 
divisions and fostering relationship building, it  blames outsiders for damaging 
the otherwise ‘tradit ionally’ peaceful coexistence and refuses to deal with the 
real and deeply divisive questions present in the post-genocidal society 
(Buckley-Zistel 2011, cf.  Waldorf 2010). 
But the particle ‘re’ in reconciliation (as in reconstruction and resolution) need 
not be viewed in this way, Galtung (n.d.) suggests: “Like for research it  means 
again. And again. No end. And it  does not mean the restoration of status quo 
ante except if  that is good enough” (p.  53).  
The notion of reconciliation may also carry strong religious connotations. 
“.. .that God was reconciling the world to himself in Christ, not counting men's 
sins against them. And he has committed to us the message of reconciliation” 
(Corinthians 5:19, New International Version).  In Christian tradition,  
reciprocated remorse and forgiveness are important parts of reconciliation. 
Indeed, Christian theology importantly informed the work of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SA TRC), which has since inspired many 
reconciliation processes worldwide and sparked much debate among academics 
and practitioners alike. While it  was not officially conceived as a religious 
body, the leadership of the charismatic Archbishop Desmond Tutu as well as the 
important role the faith community played in the anti-apartheid struggle meant 
that  the Christ ian views of reconciliation often prevailed in the work of the SA 
TRC (Graybill and Lanegran 2004, Borer 2004). Bolstered with the appeal to the 
spiri t  of togetherness embodied in the ‘traditional’ African philosophy of ubuntu  
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(see below), it  laid the emphasis on confession, remorse,  and forgiveness.   
It  is precisely this close association of reconcil iat ion with forgiveness in the 
Christian theology that some authors find very undesirable as it  may lead to a 
wrong impression that one must be altruistic to achieve reconciliation (Brounéus 
2003:14). Some of the strongest criticisms of the SA TRC followed this l ine of 
argument (Hamber and Kibble 1999). Given the religious overtones of 
reconciliation as a concept, some authors have gone as far as to argue against 
the use of the word altogether. Dan Bar-On, for example, sees reconciliation as 
“basically a rel igious emotive concept that has been introduced into social  
sciences discourse,  in order to address key issues that earlier cognitive 
conceptualizations such as formal conflict resolution did not resolve properly” 
(2005:181). Furthermore, it  is an essentially Christian concept not deeply rooted 
in the Islamic or Judaic tradit ions that  have different rel igious approach to 
reconciliation (ibid.).
6
 Instead, he suggests other concepts – as they are free 
from religious baggage and better developed conceptually -  such as ‘dialogue’ 
or ‘working through’ to be used in the discourse of conflict  transformation and 
of social healing (Bar-On 2005:182). 
Taking yet another angle from which to understand reconciliation, Daniel Bar-
Tal underscores its  psychological aspects: “The essence of reconciliat ion 
involves socio-psychological  processes consisting of changes of motivations,  
goals, beliefs,  at titudes and emotions by the majori ty of society members” (Bar-
Tal 2008:365). Such understanding of reconciliation extends it  already into the 
pre-agreement phase of conflict because it  is necessary if peaceful resolution of 
the conflict is to be achieved and receive support in the society (ibid.). Such 
reconciliation is, however, only required in societies that  “evolve a widely 
shared psychological repertoire that supports the adherence to the conflictive 
goals,  maintain the conflict, delegitimize the opponent and thus negate the 
possibility of peaceful resolution of the conflict  and prevent the development of 
peaceful  relations” (Bar-Tal 2002, quoted in Brounéus 2003:15)  
 
 
                                                 
6
  It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to explore ‘reconciliation’ in different religious traditions. 
For more discussion see i.e. Irany, G.E. and Funk, N.C. (2000): Rituals of Reconciliation: Arab-Islamic Perspectives. 
(Washington: USIP) or Rittner, C.; Smith, S.D. and I. Steinfeldt (eds.) (2000): The Holocaust and the Christian 
World: Reflections on the Past and Challenges for the Future (London: Kuperard)  
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2.3 Who reconciles? 
Just as the meaning of reconciliation itself, the levels of reconciliation and the 
actors involved are not always clearly stated. This confusion is most frequently 
demonstrated in the practice of reconciliation. Tristan Anne Borer (2004) 
analysed the use of ‘reconciliation’ in the documents and the report of the SA 
TRC and found the term was used for both ‘interpersonal/individual 
reconciliation’ and ‘national  unity and reconciliation’. While the SA TRC 
acknowledged the complexity of term and the different levels of reconciliation, 
it  neither clearly specified which of the two it was referring to in its frequent 
use of the word nor provided a clear definition of reconcil iation, who it was 
aimed at  and what were its goals (p. 29). This continuous slippage between 
different  meanings and levels of the concept, Borer contends, had serious 
implications for the expectations it  raised as well as the ways in which the 
success of the Commission was evaluated (ibid.).  
So, is reconciliation the same thing when it refers to individuals,  small 
communities or whole nations? Do they same policies and processes assist 
achieving reconciliation at all these levels? And what is the relat ionship 
between the levels? 
As Borer above, many scholars make the dist inction between two levels of 
reconciliation: national/political  and individual (Hayner 2002, Prager and 
Govier 2003).  In the same vein,  Dwyer (2003) talks of micro- and macro-level 
reconciliation, with the former referring to “local, face to face interactions” and 
the latter concerning “more global interactions between groups of persons, 
nations of institutions, which are often mediated by proxy” (p. 93). 
Govier and Verwoerd (2002) however question the dichotomous distinction 
between individual and national levels,  as “individuals and groups can be 
connected, and in varying ways are interdependent, in many sorts of 
relationships” such as between families, small groups and communities, 
professional and occupational groups and others, that one could call the 
intermediate level, which are also seriously affected by violence or other harm 
(p.  187). Similarly, Stovel (2006) proposes a three-level framework of 
individual,  group-level and national reconciliation.  
Even when the distinct levels of reconciliation are established, important  
questions remain. What is the relationship between these levels? Can they be 
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viewed separately or are they closely interconnected? Does, for example,  
individual reconcil iation directly translate to national level reconciliation – or 
vice versa? And who are the relevant actors and processes at each of these 
levels? 
By linking individual confessions and forgiveness on the one hand and the 
rhetoric of ‘healing the nation’ on the other, the SA TRC (and many truth and 
reconciliation commissions after that) helped to create the illusion that  the 
national ‘body’ can be cured with the same ‘medicine’ as the individual, this 
medicine being the truth about the past. “The identity of the body in question – 
whether that of the individual giving testimony before the TRC or of the 
suffering South African nation – is blurred, suggesting that the healing efficacy 
of truth-telling operates simultaneously on personal and national levels that are 
homologous” (Shaw 2007:190-191). Hamber and Wilson (2002) reject entirely 
the metaphor of national healing, arguing that “nations do not have collective 
psyches which can be healed, nor do whole nations suffer post-traumatic stress 
disorder and to assert  otherwise is to psychologize an abstract  entity which 
exists primarily in the minds of nation-building politicians”. 
The role for leaders and elites in positions of public prominence at all levels is 
emphasised in the li terature. Reconcil iat ion is an active and planned effort and 
not a self-driven and spontaneous process – and it is the society's elites who 
have a key role to play in inspiring and implementing reconciliation policies.  In  
Michael Ignatieff 's words: “Leaders give their societies permission to say the 
unsayable, to think the unthinkable, to rise to gestures of reconciliation that 
people, individually cannot imagine” (1998:188). But as several authors have 
argued that in order to be successful, reconciliation process must proceed both 
in the top-down as well as the bottom-up directions simultaneously (Bar-Tal 
2008, Lederach 1997, 2000).  
 
2.4 Justice, truth and forgiveness: ingredients of reconciliation or competing 
aims? 
Several other concepts, those of just ice, truth and forgiveness often are 
frequently associated with reconciliation.
7
 These are, just as reconciliation, 
                                                 
7
 There are several others, such as healing, peace, respect, trust etc. but these will not be discussed here in more 
detail.  
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complex and multilayered concepts, the meaning of which deserves a closer 
scrutiny before any claims about their mutual relationships can be made. These 
concepts and their many links to reconcil iation have thus been subject to much 
discussion and controversy both in academic writing and peacebuilding and 
transitional justice practice.  
Sometimes, reconciliation is  presented as a more general concept consisting of 
several ingredients,  among which justice and truth have a prominent place. 
Kriesberg (2007) distinguishes between four dimensions incorporated in 
reconciliation “in some combination, at varying levels” (p. 3). These are truth, 
justice, respect and security.  Lederach (1997) proposes an understanding of 
reconciliation as a place where four elements meet – truth, mercy, justice and 
peace: “Truth  is the longing for acknowledgement of wrong and the validation 
of painful loss and experiences, but it  is coupled with Mercy ,  which art iculates 
the need for acceptance,  letting go, and a new beginning. Justice  represents the 
search for individual and group rights, for social restructuring, and for 
restitution, but it  is linked with Peace ,  which underscores the need for 
interdependence, well-being, and security” (p. 29). In a more practice-oriented 
treatment of reconcil iation, it  is seen as an overarching process which involves 
a search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and reparations (Bloomfield et 
al. 2003, Bloomfield 2006). What these views, and others like them (cf. Rigby 
2001),  have in common is that they see the attainment or at least the efforts 
towards it  of these different  goals as supportive of and necessary for the search 
for reconciliation. Furthermore, also these different components are interrelated 
and complement each other.  “Where they are ignored, isolated from one another,  
or chosen one over the other, we often are unable to create sustainable peace 
processes” (Lederach 2001:848). 
In spite of these at tempts to develop definit ions and understandings of the 
dynamics involved in reconciliation, much of the discussion continues to be 
framed in terms of dichotomous opposites (cf. Shaw 2009). Initially, just ice and 
reconciliation consti tuted the two opposing poles of the debate that was taking 
place against the backdrop of the South and Central American democratic 
transformations. ‘Reconciliation’ was seen to be practically synonymous with 
amnesty – to pardoning the wrongdoers and letting go of the past. While this 
was often presented as a sound political choice in si tuations where a 
compromise with the outgoing regime had to be negotiated to secure stabil ity of 
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the newly emerging democracy, this reasoning was seen by some as morally 
problematic (cf. Leebaw 2008, Shaw 2009).  The modus operandi of the SA TRC, 
which could grant amnesty to perpetrators of human rights violations who fully 
disclosed the truth about their crime and were able to present clear evidence that 
their crimes were politically motivated,  shifted the focus towards truth versus 
justice controversy (cf. Teitel 2003). To its  critics, the SA TRC was 
compromising justice. For Archbishop Tutu and other proponents of the 
mechanism, it  merely embodied another kind of just ice – restorative justice 
(Tutu 1999, Maepa 2005, Bhargava 2000, Asmal et.al.  1997, Villa-Vicencio 
2000).  In recent years, the discussion took yet another form, and justice was 
placed in opposition to peace (Sriram and Pillay 2009, Allen 2006). 
The different ‘mutations’ of these debates are arguably down to the polysemous 
nature of all these concepts. As Shaw (2009) remarks in relation to the justice 
versus peace debate:  “Given this fundamental indeterminacy of justice and its 
placement in binary opposition to a second floating signifier – ‘peace’ – the 
peace versus justice debate offers abundant possibilities for struggles over 
meaning, morphing across t ime and place in diverse historical and political 
contexts” (p.  210). The following part therefore presents a clarification of some 
of these meanings of the three concepts most pertinent to the case study 
presented in the second part. 
 
2.5 Reconciliation and justice 
The issue of justice has been subject to the most polarized debates within the 
field of transitional justice and beyond.
8
 Post-conflict justice is most commonly 
understood in terms of criminal prosecution of the perpetrators of violence and 
mass human rights violations. While this represents a rather narrow definition of 
justice, a strong ‘prosecution preference’ is indeed presently discernible in the 
debates among post-conflict justice and peacebuilding practitioners, activists 
and, possibly to a lesser degree, among scholars. Disagreements are thus often 
limited to the issue of feasibility rather than desirabil ity of prosecuting 
perpetrators which is widely accepted as the appropriate response to past  
atrocities (Aukerman 2002: 40). There is  however a growing body of empirical 
                                                 
8
 There is a history of philosophical and theological thought on the concept and meaning of justice but it is beyond 
the scope a purpose of this review to look at these. For more discussion see Mani (2002).                                    
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studies from diverse post-conflict countries that problematise the assumption 
that punishment is always the preferred option among the population affected by 
the conflict (Weinstein et al. 2010, Biro et al. 2004, Longman et al. 2004, 
Lambourne 2009).  
Clark (2008) distinguishes three broad models of justice as responses to crime – 
retributive, deterrent and restorative.  The key difference between these three 
models lies in what they identify as the purpose of punishing the perpetrators 
and, related to this, what form it  should take.  Retributive and deterrent justice 
see punishment of the perpetrator as the central (and frequently the only) aim – 
retributive view of justice emphasises punishment as means to bringing the 
perpetrators to account, giving them what they ‘deserve’ while deterrent justice 
approach accentuates rather sending out a message to the perpetrator and to 
other potential criminals that committing an offence does not stay unpunished. 
Restorative justice does not regard punishment as the primary aim of justice. 
The emphasis here is on restoring relationships – between perpetrators, victims 
and the broader community. In the same vein, Stovel (2003) points out the 
different  ethics of retributive and restorative justice.  While legalistic 
(retributive and deterrent in the above Clark’s classification) justice 
“emphasises obedience to moral principles,  presumed to be partly reflected in 
the law”, restorative justice “reflects an ethic of care which argues that people 
are ethically responsible for those around them with whom they have a 
relationship” (p.2). In this light , while in the former crime is  seen as “law 
breaking and a violation against the state and accountabili ty as punishment for 
breaking a law”, the latter views it as “a violation of a relationship, an injury 
inflicted on another person that harms the people involved and the community” 
and accountability subsequently means an effort to mend those relationships 
(p.3). In post-war societies, the legalistic approach found expression in the 
establishment of formal criminal tribunals, international, national or,  as in 
Rwanda, adapted informal ‘traditional’ judicial mechanisms. The restorative 
justice served as a model for the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and similar mechanisms that  followed it.   
The different facets of reconciliation and justice are variously interrelated 
(Kriesberg 2007:4, cf. Pankhurst 1999).  When justice is understood in purely 
legalistic terms, reconciliation can be presented as its  opposite and perceived as 
a threat to the cause of just ice (Sarkin 2008:15).  This works both ways as 
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prosecutions have been denounced as potentially jeopardizing the reconciliation 
process (Graybill and Lanegran 2004:4).  More recently, however, some of the 
international tribunals mentioned reconciliation among their goals,  albeit 
usually in passing and without detailing how punishing perpetrators contributes  
to it  (cf. Clark 2008:192). Thus the UNSC Resolution 955 (1994) establishing 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) states that “the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law (…) would contribute to the process of national 
reconciliation”. Similarly,  the judge of the Special  Court for Sierra Leone in his 
opening speech of the Revolutionary United Front process declared that the 
SCSL aims among else at furthering reconciliation in the country (War Don Don 
2010). 
Others have suggested that the relationship between legalistic justice and 
reconciliation is one of indifference. Writing about trials, Marta Minow (1998) 
observes: “Reconciliation is not the goal  of criminal trials except in the most 
abstract sense. We reconcile with the murderer by imagining he or she is 
responsible to the same rules and commands that govern all of us; we agree to 
sit  in the same room and accord the defendant a chance to speak, and a chance 
to fight for his or her life. But reconstruction of a relationship, seeking to heal 
the accused, or indeed, healing the rest  of the community,  are not goals in any 
direct sense” (p. 26).   
At least since the establishment of the widely publicised SA TRC, restorative 
justice emerged as an alternative to the retributive model of criminal 
prosecutions. The reconciliation-oriented nature of restorative justice arguably 
makes it  the preferred alternative for the justice needs of victims, perpetrators 
as well as the whole communities in post-conflict  societies (Tutu 1999). 
Restorative justice has been commonly associated or even equated with truth 
commissions. This is evidenced in statements such as this one: “Restorative 
justice...  has been increasingly applied since 1974, with truth commissions 
implemented in approximately two dozen countries around the world” (Graybil l 
and Lanegran 2004:1). This understanding was also openly promoted by the SA 
TRC (Tutu 1999, Asmal et .al . 1997, Villa-Vicencio 2000). Stovel (2003) 
however cautions against conflating restorative justice as a distinct model of 
justice that must be applied as a whole and restorative philosophy based on a 
particular set of values and assumptions - such as importance of rebuilding 
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relationships and reintegration, emphasis on dialogue between all the sides to 
the conflict, responsiveness towards the needs of both victims and offenders and 
other – that may be “inserted where possible and appropriate” in the process of 
addressing past crimes (p. 35). The proceedings of the SA TRC were 
successfully guided by restorative philosophy but were not an instance of a 
genuine application of the restorative justice model. Full restorative justice,  
Stovel warns, would have to provide for the inclusion of vict ims in the amnesty 
decisions as well as require white South Africans to take responsibility for 
apartheid, “either by acknowledging their culpabil ity and responsibility in it  or 
by atoning for their actions”, neither of which really happened (p. 37). The same 
reservation can be made with regards to other truth commissions.  The model of 
restorative justice as an alternative to legalistic criminal prosecutions in 
responding to mass atrocity thus remains underexplored.  
 
Beyond justice as a response to crime 
The dominant focus on justice in terms of criminal accountabil ity in the 
contemporary discourse may obscure the fact that there are many other forms of 
injustice, such as socioeconomic injustice, that  lie at  the heart of many 
contemporary violent conflicts and must be addressed in their aftermath in order 
to prevent renewed violence. A few authors have tried to broaden the focus of 
the post-conflict  justice debate beyond the issues of redressing the injustices 
committed during the course of an armed conflict or other mass human rights 
violations. Arguing that “injustice is  not  just a consequence  of conflict , but  is 
also often a symptom  and cause  of conflict”, Rama Mani (2002) proposes an 
understanding of justice that encompasses three dimensions:  rectificatory,  legal 
and distributive justice (p. 5). These three areas are interdependent and must all 
be addressed if just ice is  to be restored and long-term and sustainable peace 
promoted. Rectificatory justice refers to redress for violations committed during 
the conflict period through a combination of tools already introduced above – 
criminal trials , t ruth commissions and a range of other, more informal, adapted 
‘traditional’ measures of just ice (ibid.:110). Legal justice is  synonymous with 
rule of law and includes reform to the “triad of the justice system – the 
judiciary,  police and prisons” (ibid.:56).  Distributive justice is concerned with 
the removal of structural injustices such as polit ical and economic 
discrimination and real or perceived inequalities of distribution that often 
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underlie the conflict  (ibid.:9). Wendy Lambourne’s (2009) transformative justice 
model proposes four constituent elements of justice that beside legal justice also 
include truth and acknowledgement, socioeconomic and political justice. But 
such broad conceptions of justice in the transitional justice discourse remain 
scarce.  
 
2.6 Reconciliation and truth 
It  is popularly stated that truth is the first casualty of war.  Reversely, 
establishing the truth about what happened in the past has often been proposed 
as both a precondition to reconciliation and to achieving sustainable peace. In 
line with this argument, Rotberg (2000) stresses that “if societies are to prevent 
recurrences of past  atrocities and to cleanse themselves of the corrosive 
enduring effects of massive injuries to individuals and whole groups, societies 
must understand - at the deepest possible level – what occurred and why. In 
order to come fully to terms with their brutal pasts, they must uncover, in 
precise detail,  who did what to whom, and why, and under whose orders” (p. 3).  
But as reconciliation and justice, also truth is not easily defined in post-conflict 
contexts.  Is  it  to be understood only as the “accumulation of forensically-proven 
facts” or does it  require “a more complex and multi-faceted narrative” (Sarkin 
2008:14)? The SA TRC Report distinguishes between four forms of ‘truth’: 
factual  or forensic truth, personal and narrative truth consisting of the stories of 
individual experiences, social or dialogue truth that emerges from interaction 
and discussion, and healing and restorative truth which “places facts and their 
meaning within the context of human relationships” (quoted in Parmentier and 
Weitekamp 2011). The SA TRC’s underlying assumption that truth leads to 
reconciliation that was captured on the banners displayed at the public hearings 
of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the slogan ‘Truth: 
The Road to Reconciliation’ did however little to elaborate on how each of the 
forms of truth related to the (similarly diverse) notions of reconciliation. In 
spite of this it  has been so often rei terated that truth-telling leads to 
reconciliation that  it  now has “the status of a truism” (Borer 2004:21). Others, 
however, draw attention to the potential conflict  between exposing the truth 
about the past and efforts at national reconciliation.  Truth,  it  is argued, can 
hinder reconcil iat ion rather than facilitate it .  On this matter,  Ignatieff, quoting 
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an African proverb, writes that maybe, al l truth is good but only some is good to 
tell (1998:170).  
In any case, can one ‘truth’ about the past be established at al l?  As Clark points 
out with regard to the South and Central American truth commissions, attempts 
to construct an ‘official version’ of truth are problematic as “individuals’ and 
groups’ recollections of the past often clash, and may be expressed for a variety 
of well-intentioned of cynically instrumental  reasons” (2008:203). In this sense, 
truth-seeking is an inherently political process.  Mamdani (2000) urges for “an 
acknowledgement that truth may be not in the singular, but in the plural,  and 
that  there may not be one but several versions of truth” (p. 178).   
 
2.7 Reconciliation and forgiveness 
Talking of forgiveness in the aftermath of war or large scale human rights 
abuses invariably arouses emotions. There are disagreements as to whether 
forgiveness is  (or should be) part of reconciliation. Many authors caution 
against revoking forgiveness too readily in the post-conflict  contexts as it  may 
place too much pressure on the victims of violence. Forgiveness, Martha Minow 
argues, must be a voluntary act performed by the victim. It  is, she argues, “a 
power held by the victimized, not a right  to be claimed. The abili ty to dispense, 
but also to withhold, forgiveness is an ennobling capacity and part of the 
dignity to be reclaimed by those who survive the wrongdoing” (1998:17). 
Expecting or requesting forgiveness from victims means “heaping another 
burden on them” (ibid.).  
For many authors, forgiveness is related to the foregoing the desire of revenge. 
Durham describes forgiveness as “mourning the passage of revenge” (2000:70 
cited in Gobodo-Madikizela 2010:212). Similarly,  Clark (2008) writes that  
“forgiveness requires only that a victim should forgo feelings of resentment and 
a desire for direct revenge against the perpetrator” (p.  202). It  is not necessarily 
aimed at (re)making any relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim. As 
such forgiveness is generally conceived as an important step to ‘break the cycle 
of violence’. But some authors go further. Hartwell (1999) sees it  as a “powerful 
expression of unconditional acceptance and love that  can be seen as an attempt 
to stop the transfer of hate from one generation to the next”.   
There has been much discussion about what is necessary for forgiveness.  It  is 
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often seen in close relationship to repentance or genuine remorse. Gobodo-
Madikizela (2010:211) argues that at least two important factors - remorseful 
apology and acknowledgement of wrongdoing – are necessary to create 
forgiveness within victims. “Seeing the other as a human being – feeling and 
responding to the other 's pain with remorse – is probably the most crucial 
starting point in the encounter between victims and perpetrators” (p. 217). 
However, Shriver (1998) stresses that forgiveness and repentance can go both 
ways – a gesture of reconciliation can inspire a wrongdoer to come forward and 
repent, or a confession and apology may give victim space to consider 
forgiveness (p. 11).  
Forgiveness, even more than reconciliation, has been also equalled to giving up 
the pursuit of justice, with let ting the perpetrators ‘off the hook’ and with 
granting amnesty (Lambourne 1999 cited in Clark 2008:202). However, Clark 
(2008) suggests forgiveness should be seen as a more conscious act that at times 
requires active and public acknowledgement of crimes committed and leaves 
open the possibility of punishment (p. 202). Forgiveness is not equal to amnesty 
or a pardon: i t  “marks a change in how the offended feels about the person that 
committed the injury,  not a change in the actions to be taken by the justice 
system” (Murphy 1988 cited in Minow 1998:15). However,  when it is applied as 
a policy at the national level by a governmental body, forgiveness often takes 
the form of an amnesty or pardon, preventing prosecution and punishment 
(ibid.:15). 
Forgiveness is closely associated with the religious, or more specifically 
Christian,  conceptions of reconciliation. Many of those who approach 
reconciliation from a rel igious perspective see forgiveness as one of its 
elements (e.g. Tutu 1999, Biggar 2001). As reconcil iation itself, the introduction 
of the concept of forgiveness into the debates in post-conflict justice and 
peacebuilding can be most likely linked to the work of the SA TRC, and has 
since been subject  to much controversy.  The ti tle of Archbishop Tutu’s (1999) 
memoirs, “No Future without Forgiveness”, confirms the prominent place 
forgiveness occupied in the TRC’s philosophy and work. While truth 
commissions have been praised for providing a forum where these processes 
may take place, they have also been criticised for putting too much pressure on 
victims to forgive, for making them feel  compelled to forgive for the common 
good of the society as a whole (Crocker 2000). The central contention related to 
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the South African TRC was its use of forgiveness, intrinsically an individual 
act, as a means for achieving national  healing and reconcil iat ion.  
Making a dist inction between the possible multiple levels of forgiveness – just 
as in the case of reconciliation discussed above – may help to ease some of 
these tensions. Forsberg (2001), one of the few authors to do just that,  
recognizes between individual and societal forgiveness. By forgiving 
perpetrators, the society takes them “back into the public moral  community. It  
does not follow from this that they should also be received back into the 
victim’s private moral community.  Societal forgiveness is not a substitute for 
individual forgiveness” (p. 60).  
This raises another widely discussed issue: can groups or larger communities 
forgive? Govier (2002) argues that groups are regularly treated as moral agents, 
and can indeed suffer harm as groups (p.  78 cited in Santa-Barbara 2007:178). 
Groups, according to Govier, “can have beliefs, attitudes and feelings – 
including forgiveness – and that , when these are expressed by legitimate 
leaders, they can be regarded as valid in the absence of widespread dissent” 
(ibid. cited in Santa-Barbara 2007:179). Hartwell (1999) proposes a more 
politically focused interpretat ion of forgiveness depicting forgiveness and hope 
as a means of launching a new beginning by rebuilding social, political and 
economic structures on a national level. However, she also writes: “In the end, 
it  may be wise to remember that no matter how much a group promotes or 
supports a climate for reconciliation and healing, it  is the capacity for 
forgiveness that lies within each individual that arguably influences the long 
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3. An African Way of Reconciliation? 
3.1 A shift toward the local in peacebuilding and post-conflict justice  
As mentioned in the introduction, since at least mid-1990s,  increasing attention 
has been given in the fields of peacebuilding and post-conflict justice to more 
culturally sensitive,  contextual  approaches.
9
 Gradually,  also in the dominant 
liberal peacebuilding and transitional justice practice, there has been a visible 
shift towards ‘the local’, evidenced in a growing emphasis on local ownership 
and application of local (usually labelled as ‘informal’ or ‘traditional’) 
mechanisms and institutions of conflict management. Thus Annan urged in 2004 
for “respect and support [for] local ownership, local leadership and a local 
constituency” and emphasised that “indigenous and informal traditions for 
administering justice or settl ing disputes” receive due regard in order “to help 
them to continue their often vital role and to do so in conformity with both 
international standards and local tradition” (p.12).   
Interestingly,  the increased attention for ‘the local’ led to morphing of the above 
presented ‘peace versus justice’ debate into a kind of ‘culture versus justice’ 
debate, where on one side stood the dominant understanding of justice as 
criminal prosecution and on the other an essentialised concept of an African 
culture as inherently forgiving and preferring restoration over retribution (Shaw 
2009:213).  Uganda became the most prominent site of this contest and it is thus 
justified to look at i t  more closely. Northern Uganda has been embroiled in the 
conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) since 
the late 1980s. The conflict has caused large-scale displacement of the local 
Acholi population, many of whom have now been living in the refugee camps 
for over a generation.
10
 Characteristic trai ts of the LRA are abductions and use 
of child soldiers,  indeed, the LRA is now composed almost entirely – except i ts 
leader Joseph Kony and few other leaders -  of abductees.
11
  
The mato oput is one of the ‘traditional’ conflict resolution and reconciliation 
mechanisms of the Acholi people. In the course of the conflict resolution, the 
                                                 
9
 The process mirrored similar developments in the field of conflict resolution. (for a thorough discussion see Miall 
et al. 1999) 
10
 According to a report conducted in Northern Uganda, “eighty-six percent of respondents said they had been 
displaced from their home at one time or another during the conflict. Displacement was most frequent in the Acholi 
subregion, where 94 percent of the population reported displacement” (Pham et al. 2007:23) 
11
 According to the same report,  “one-fifth (21%) of the population in the eight Nothern districts was forcibly taken 
away or abducted by the LRA for a week or more, 13 percent for at least a month, and 2 percent for at least a year. 
Half the respondents who had been abducted reported having experienced multiple abductions” (Pham et al. 
2007:28) 
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perpetrator is encouraged to acknowledge his crime, show remorse and beg for  
forgiveness and at times requested to pay compensation. Once victims have 
granted forgiveness to the repenting perpetrator, a reconciliation ceremony – 
mato oput  – is performed, requiring the both formerly aggrieved parties to share 
a bitter-tasting drink made of the blood of a slaughtered sheep mixed with bitter 
herbs and roots in a symbolic gesture of letting go of the past  and restoring 
social trust (Murithi  2008, Allen 2006). In situations of violent death or armed 
clash between whole clans, another ceremony – gomo tong ,  ‘the bending of the 
spears’ – to mark the end of the conflict  is performed (Murithi 2008, cf. Baines 
et al.  2005).  
The mato oput  and other ceremonies have recently received much attention as 
mechanisms for the reintegration of the LRA ex-combatants into their 
communities, a solution to the protracted conflict  advocated by many Acholi 
leaders and civil  society groups both local and international . Emphasising the 
Acholi preference for restorative justice over retribution, their advocates have 
proclaimed much success of these ‘traditional’ rituals. Murithi (2008) argues 
that there are lessons to be learnt from the Acholi system and “the cultural  
wisdom handed down through generations”,  which tells  us “that  punitive action 
within the context of retributive justice may effectively decrease social trust  and 
undermine reconciliation in the medium to long term” (p. 25-26).   
Other authors have looked at the revival of the ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms 
in Uganda with a high degree of scepticism (Allen 2008). The critics of the 
‘traditional’ ceremonies have adverted to the insufficient  legitimacy of the 
present tradit ional leaders as well as the lacking authenticity of the ceremonies 
that have been ‘invented’ in their current form by local leaders and NGOs 
(ibid.). Others have pointed out the exclusion of women and youth in the 
procedure.  
But mato oput  is not the only approach suggested to deal with the LRA violence.  
In October 2005, the International Criminal Court  (ICC), upon a referral by the 
Ugandan government, issued arrest warrants against Joseph Kony and four other 
LRA leaders,  a decision that  sparked a major controversy and opened another 
round of the peace versus justice debate (see Allen 2006, Waddell and Clark 
2008).  Allen finds evidence of strong support for the ICC among those in 
northern Uganda, who know about it  and argues that  they “require the same 
kinds of conventional legal  mechanisms as everyone else living in modern 
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states” (Allen 2006:168). A quantitative study led by Pham (2007) found in fact  
some support for both arguments. Others argue that the traditional practice is 
the preferred and best solution (Branch 2008). But importantly,  this controversy 
is based on dichotomies that are false and artificial  -  posing the universal 
‘just ice as prosecution’ against the traditional/cultural ‘justice as restoration’. 
What the diverse results from the many studies suggest , is that attention needs 
to be given to the specifics of the local situation and context and a research on 
when and why people would chose for the one, or the other, or an entirely 
different  mechanism.  
 
3.2 The myth of harmonious 'tradition’ 
As we have seen above, the shift towards more culturally informed approaches 
led to increased attention to the African ‘traditional’ practices.  Indeed, the 
debate on the role of traditional conflict  management practices and insti tutions 
in modern post-war situations can be observed both in the theory and practice 
since at least the early 1990s. ‘Traditional’ mechanisms and ceremonies have 
been part of government and civil society considerations in designing post-war 
peace building strategies at least since the end of the civil war in Mozambique 
(Stovel 2008).  
In the literature, African ‘traditional’ approaches to resolving conflict and 
dealing with its aftermath are usually described as being strongly oriented 
towards reconcil iation, forgiveness and restoration and their firm place in 
African (and Asian) societies “since antiquity” (Bloomfield et al. 2003:112) is 
presented as a good ground for their contemporary exploration for the 
challenges of dealing with past violence (cf.  Murithi 2008, Malan 1997, Zartman 
2000). 
Before the brief review of the main arguments starts , it  is necessary to at least 
shortly address the terms of ‘tradition’ or ‘traditional’,  which are in many ways 
problematic. They often bear “Eurocentric connotations that tend to view such 
institutions and practices as patterns followed from ‘t ime out of mind’ in static 
political and social  circumstances” (Alie 2008:133). But ‘tradition’ is not 
something inert , unaltered or archaic. Rather, it  is “inspired by a group’s past” 
but being continually updated, adapted and adjusted to respond to the changing 
political, economic and social circumstances as well as able to incorporate 
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external influences in order to survive (Stovel 2006; Alie 2008; Huyse 2008; 
Zartman 2000). It  is in this sense that ‘tradition’ is  understood here.  
Brock-Utne (2001) parallels the African ‘traditional’ approaches to managing 
conflict to the concept of ‘warp and weft’ used in weaving. “The concept 
denotes that even if  the most complex of designs are woven into a piece of 
cloth, the basic structure is  formed by two interwoven sets of thread 
traditionally called the warp and weft” (p. 7).  In conflict  resolution, the first 
element is the tradit ion of family or neighbourhood negotiat ion facilitated by 
elders. The second element is the att itude of togetherness in the spirit  of 
humanhood (ibid. , cf. Malan 1997). Desmond Tutu, the chairman of SA TRC, 
has made a strong argument for the idea of a specific ‘African’ way of 
reconciliation on these grounds.  For Tutu, “In the African Weltanschauung a 
person is not basically an independent, solitary entity.  A person is human 
precisely in being enveloped in the community of other human beings, in being 
caught up in the bundle of life.  To be . . .  is to participate” (in Krog 1999:165). 
The individual is committed to the community;  his identi ty comes from the 
community he is a part of. What this philosophy means in the context of the 
traditional conflict management practices is that the interest  of the community 
is above the interest of the individual (Ngwane 1996: 52). In the verdicts 
passed, the long-term concern for social harmony prevails over the short-term 
benefits . 
In this light, reconciliation and restoration of relationships and social harmony 
are the principal goals of traditional conflict management practices as opposed 
to retribution and punishment. The conflict is viewed less in terms of a problem 
between two parties but rather understood as one occurring between an offender 
and the community. Consequently, rather than proving individual innocence or 
guilt,  the ultimate purpose of the conflict management process is mending the 
broken relationships, reinforcing social solidarity and restoring order and 
harmony in the community (Ngwane 1996:52). In fact, reintegration of the 
offender into the community is implied by the demand to restore social harmony 
as punishing the offender would be “harming the group a second time” (Faure 
2000:158). 
Another potential merit lies in the part icipatory nature of the ‘traditional’ 
mechanisms. Participation of whole communities is crucial in post-war 
peacebuilding as it  contributes to the sustainability of the process. Traditional 
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mechanisms are usually public and inclusive. Not only the parties to the conflict 
have the opportunity to tell  their story but also people from extended family,  
neighbours and other members of the community can take part . This results in 
an agreement, which reflects the consensus of the entire community as 
inclusively as possible. Herein a belief is embodied that  “the whole group 
always has some responsibility for what people do, or do not do, as it  plays a 
central  role in the education of its  members and the posit ion they later on 
occupy” (Faure 2000:159) while at the same time every individual is a part of 
the communal body and therefore his action affects the well-being to the whole 
community. Thus the individual and the community are inseparable and 
everybody has to take responsibility for the solution and restoration of harmony. 
This is well represented in the case of the Rwandan traditional  gacaca  courts,  an 
informal, community-based ad hoc meeting convened to resolve disputes among 
its members. It  is at tended by the disputants as well as the affected community 
and chaired by a wise and respected elder who leads the hearings and 
discussions. The achieved sett lement must be acceptable to al l participants. The 
goal of gacaca is thus to “sanction the violation of rules that are shared by the 
community, with the sole objective of reconciliation” and to restore harmony 
and social order and re-include the perpetrator (OAU 2000).
12
 
Traditional  conflict management practices also make use of different methods of 
healing and purification, performed by traditional healers or other spiritual 
authorities that serve to appease the spirits  and the ancestors and also play a 
cri tical  role in the mental and spiritual  rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators 
(Boege, 2006:15). Singing or dancing together also plays an important role. In 
the current practice,  such ceremonies are often used as part of former child 
soldiers’ reintegration. “The performance of these ceremonies as ri tuals of 
integration create a spiri tual tranquillity in the people while individuals living 
in communities see themselves (feel) protected and capable of confronting any 
situation which the integration of children involved in armed conflict might 
bring about” (Bennett 1998). 
A further supposed advantage concerns the traditional  institutions and 
authorities. Some believe that while the legitimacy of the state institutions in 
                                                 
12
 The adapted gacaca tribunals set up to deal with the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide are however very different 
from the traditional ones. In fact, they are much more strongly focused on legal retribution rather than restoration of 
harmony and reconciliation.  
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many African states has been shaken by years of misconduct, corruption and 
conflict, involving traditional institutions in post-war peace building and 
reconciliation “takes into account that in general people on the ground have a 
desire for peace building and perceive respective endeavours as positive, 
whereas state-building is often perceived as irrelevant for peace and order and 
[…] even seen as negative” (Boege 2006:14).  
But the above paints a rather romantic picture of the ‘traditional’ mechanisms 
and practices. There are also reasons for caution when contemplating their use 
in post-conflict set tings. First of all ,  traditional institutions and actors are not 
always as detached from the state as an idealised perception of tradit ions as 
something ‘preserved from the better days’ might imply. Colonial authorities as 
well as many post-independence poli tical leaders have used traditional  
authorities to mobil ize and sustain popular support  for the regime. Osaghae 
beliefs that “relevance and applicability of traditional strategies have been 
greatly disenabled by the politicization, corruption, and abuse of traditional 
structures…which have steadily delegit imized conflict management built  around 
them in the eyes of many, and reduced confidence in their efficacy” (Osaghae, 
2000:215).   
Furthermore, these mechanisms are based on a set of social normative values 
that  make up the ground for their effectiveness and are therefore limited to the 
contexts of small local communities (Faure, 2000:165). “African traditional  
management techniques depend […] on the existence of a community of 
relationships and values to which they can refer and that provide the context for 
their operations” (Zartman, 2000:224). The lack of such common ground can be 
observed in the case of young ex-combatants who are often deeply alienated 
from their communities, their values and ways of life, so that using traditional 
practices to reintegrate them into these communities might just be ineffective 
(Boege, 2006:16). Protracted armed conflicts , population shifts, urbanization or 
intermarriage may too have decreased the appeal and influence of traditional 
practices. In Uganda, forced displacement and decades of life in the Internally 
Displaced Persons’ (IDP) camps caused that “many people today no longer 
automatically know their Rwot [anointed chief], nor what his role should be” 
(Baines 2005:21). As traditional ways of transmitting cultural norms have been 
restricted in the IDP camps, many Elders also observed they didn't  command the 
level of respect they once did from their communities, and particularly from the 
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youths (Baines 2005:22). 
Lastly,  traditional methods and institutions are often conservative and inflexible 
in the values they aim to protect and may contradict universal human rights 
standards. In many practices,  it  is the vil lage male elders who play a central  role 
while women and young men tend to be excluded from the councils.
13
 Women 
can often be victims of the resolutions under customary law - swapping women 
or giving girls as compensation are not uncommon (Boege, 2006:6). 
However, beyond the problems directly related to the way these practices work 
there is a set of larger issues that  are rarely acknowledged. The contemporary 
understanding of ‘local tradition’ of dealing with conflict and its  aftermath is 
often limited to, and usually equated with, customary law and its mechanisms of 
conflict  resolution at the local  level. This reflects the ‘prosecution preference’ 
in contemporary practice discourse.  ‘Tradit ional’ practices understood as 
customary law can be fitted well  into the ‘toolbox’ of transitional  justice and 
adapted to contemporary peacebuilding challenges (Shaw and Waldorf 2010:15).  
There is evidence of this trend both in practice and in theory, the most 
prominent example being the Rwandan gacaca  tribunals.  
While customary justice sti ll  plays an important role in many African societies,  
many advocates of the indigenous conflict resolution and justice mechanisms 
present a highly romanticised picture of these traditions.  One of the most 
problematic issues is seeing the customary law as synonymous with restorative 
justice and reconciliation. There is a tendency to overemphasise the aspect of 
restoration of social harmony in the customary law mechanisms. Firstly, 
retributive dimensions and punitive measures are indeed known to customary 
justice practices in African countries (Shaw 2009).  Secondly,  the equation of 
‘traditional’ customary justice with restorative justice is also problematic. As 
Stovel (2007) argues, the joint emphasis on restoration of social harmony and 
reconciliation must be further interrogated. Reconcil iat ion, according to Stovel,  
“is not always a good thing” as it  may favour the status quo instead of 
promoting restorative justice, which recognizes that individuals exist within the 
community but does not privilege the interests of the community to the 
individual rights of victims and perpetrators. Similarly, the notion of 
participation in the customary justice processes may be overemphasised as it  
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 In Sierra Leone, some truth-seeking mechanisms are headed by women. There is however no place for young 
men. See Alie (2008).  
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usually is not synonymous with open dialogue, one of the core requirements of 
restorative justice (2007:1).   
A related problem is the limited view of ‘traditional’ practice as synonymous 
with customary law. This comes with a broader set of assumptions in which 
‘tradition’,  ‘culture’ and ‘locality’ are often used almost interchangeably, with 
important consequences (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). This view obscures the fact  
that there are other ‘local’ practices and techniques of reconciliation and 
reintegration. Communities have a wealth of ritual and religious practice they 
can use and adapt to face their conciliatory and integrative needs after armed 
conflict.  Elsewhere,  communities “rather draw upon the performance of 
everyday life as a means of remaking relationships” (Shaw and Waldorf 
2010:20).  All these diverse practices, techniques and beliefs invite closer and 
detailed inquiries into the local  understandings of the concepts of 
reconciliation, justice or forgiveness and the ways of pursuing them, as well  as 
to the areas of “friction” (Shaw 2007) between these notions and concepts and 
the internationally sanctioned tools designed to achieving them in African post-
conflict societies.   
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
As the above review of theorising on and practical expressions of reconciliation 
suggest , there is not  one but many concepts of ‘reconciliation’. Reconciliation 
seems to mean different things to different people, at different levels, in 
different political, historical, social and cultural contexts. Similarly, critical in 
any examination of the relationship between reconciliation and justice, truth or 
forgiveness will  be choices made between varieties, types,  levels and facets of 
reconciliation matched to varieties, types, levels and facets of justice, truth and 
forgiveness. But while the academic debate has to an extent at tempted to engage 
with the complexities of these concepts and problematize their common usage, 
peacebuilding and transitional justice policies have stayed largely stuck in 
“simplistic rhetoric” (Forsberg 2001) of slogans such as ‘truth: the path to 
reconciliation’, ‘there is no reconciliation without just ice’ or ‘let bygones be 
bygones’. Similarly,  it  has also been argued that while a specific, unchanging 
and truly reconciliat ion-oriented African approach to dealing with conflict does 
not really exist , there is a strong case for exploring the local meaning of the 
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concepts before conclusions are made about the relationship between 
reconciliation, justice, truth and forgiveness in the particular society. We will 
do just that in chapter 7 by exploring the meaning of reconciliation as 
understood by local communities in Sierra Leone. First, however, the next part  
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PART II. SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone is a small country with roughly five million inhabitants on the 
west coast of Africa nudged between Liberia and Guinea.  More than sixteen 
distinct ethnic groups inhabit Sierra Leone, among which the Mende, Temne and 
Limba are the largest. The division between the largest ethnic groups is roughly 
along the south-east  (Mende) and north (Temne) lines. Smaller but politically 
and economically influential groups are the Krio (descedants of freed Atlantic 
slaves) and the Lebanese, many of which live in Freetown and the wider Western 
Area. The main rel igions are Islam (77%) and Christianity (21%), and the 
country is characterised by a high degree of religious tolerance.  Sierra Leone is 
divided into 149 chiefdoms each headed by a Paramount chief elected by a 
college of Tribal Authorities. The chiefdoms are further divided into sections, 
led by a section chief, each section containing a number of villages with their 
own chiefs. Villages are often subdivided into quarters and families with their 
own heads. The Paramount Chief provides local administrat ion, under the 
supervision of a government agent, the District Officer. Among others, the role 
of the chiefs includes the administration of the chiefdom courts which try minor 
cases such as theft ,  public disturbance,  battery and adultery.  The ‘traditional’ 
chieftaincy system owes much of its current structure and nature to the colonial 
times rather than the pre-colonial social organisation. Although the current 
chieftaincy system is a British invention, historians and anthropologists believe 
the power relationship between chiefs and their subjects as it  exists today pre-
date the modern insti tution (Abraham 1976).   
 
4. Understanding the war in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone witnessed between 1991 and 2002 one of the most violent civil  
wars that engulfed the African continent after the end of Cold War. There have 
been a number of distinct - and at times contradictory – interpretations of the 
roots, causes and dynamics of the war.  Was it  a “pointless conflict based on 
incomprehensible barbarism” (Richards 2005:9 commenting on a thesis 
presented in 1994 by Robert Kaplan in Coming Anarchy)?  Or was it  driven by 
greed, pursued by purely material  interests of criminal warlords hungry for the 
country’s diamonds (Smilie et al.  2000)? Or was it  brought about by a crisis of 
patrimonial system in the rural areas that resulted in its inabili ty to fulfi l  its 
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obligation of patronage towards a growing number of youth (Richards 1996, 
Peters 2006)? Or were the prime drivers urban ‘lumpen’ elements among the 
street youth socialised over years on the streets on Freetown into a culture of 
crime and violence (Abdullah 2000)?  
Wars do not have a single cause. They also do not just happen. Making sense of 
the war that tore Sierra Leone apart  in the 1990s requires a contextual 
discussion, in which the historical, political , economic and socio-cultural  
factors are considered. As Richards (2005) writes: “All war – and ‘new war ’ is 
no exception – is a long term struggle organized for polit ical ends, commonly 
but not always using violence. Neither the means nor the ends can be understood 
without reference to a specific social  context” (p. 4). In this regard,  it  is 
unhelpful to see ‘war ’ as sudden rupture,  clearly distinguished from (an opposed 
to) a state of ‘peace’. Instead of seeing war as an event with a clear beginning 
and a clear end, i t  is best seen as a continuum (Richards 2005:5, Utas 
2005:139). In order to understand the causes, dynamics and manifestations of 
the war, i t  “needs to be understood in relation to patterns of violence already 
embedded within society” (Richards 2005:11). Several recent ethnographic 
accounts of Sierra Leone suggest that, indeed, violence is deeply inscribed in 
the country’s historical imagination. Writing about the Mende, Marianne Ferme 
explored “modalities through which material objects, language, and social 
relations become sites where a sometimes violent historical memory is  
sedimented and cri tically reappropriated” (2001:5). “Local histories”, she 
writes, “are bound up with matter, which carries sometimes eloquent and 
explici t,  sometimes concealed clues to this region’s entanglements with slavery 
and insti tutionalized inequality, with warfare, and with the precarious balance 
between economies characterised by the mobile exploitation of natural  resources 
(hunting, al luvial diamond mining) and economies based on the more stationary 
cultivation of those resources (farming of staple and cash crops)” (2001:6,  cf.  
Shaw 2002). 
 
4.1 The context: the centrality of patrimonialism  
The roots of Sierra Leonean patrimonialism lie deep in the country’s pre-
colonial history.
14
 Patrimonialism, one of Max Weber ’s (1978) ‘pre-modern’ 
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 This is not to suggest that it has been preserved in some pre-modern form to this day. On the contrary, it has 
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types of authority, is  based on a triadic political hierarchy of patrimonial ruler, 
staff and subjects (Murphy 2003:63). Under patrimonial notions of social  
organization, the ruler – be it  a king, a chief, a warlord or another ‘big man’ – 
exercises authority over his subjects on a personalised basis through his 
intermediate staff – lower chiefs, warriors or even slaves (Kelsall  2009:75, 
Richards 2005). This form of governance rests on vertical patron-client 
relationships. “Followers look up to their patron as to a father, treating his duty 
to protect as a moral or familial obligation. The ‘big man’ in turn expects 
‘family loyalty’ from clients” (Richards 2005:122). The patrons provide their 
clients with basic needs and other material and non-material benefits , mediate 
access to resources and other opportunities and offer them protection and 
security. In return, they receive favours,  support and allegiance, a share of the 
clients’ eventual wealth, as well as legitimacy and social status (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999, Richards 2005, Kelsall  2009, Hoffman 2007).  
Political systems in Africa have been described as neo-patrimonial, referring to 
a situation where the formal state structures are permeated by these – informal 
and essentially private - patron-client relationships (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 
Bratton and Van der Walle 1994, Erdmann and Engel 2007). The exercise of 
power proceeds “in the interplay between the formal and the informal” (Chabal 
2005:3). While this is certainly true for the political system in Sierra Leone, 
both at  the national as well as at the local  level , it  is not the complete picture.  
Patrimonial relations are not limited to the political sphere. Much of the 
ethnographic writing on Sierra Leonean societies suggests that most social 
relationships are organised along the vertical patron-client bond (Ferme 2001, 
Hoffman, 2007, Richards 2005). Richards (2005) has argued that 
“patrimonialism is one of the predominant notions of social solidarity and social 
reproduction in Sierra Leone” (p. 119). Marianne Ferme’s (2001) explains this 
in her research of the Mende: “The crucial point”, she writes, “was that  
everyone must be accounted for by someone else – that  everyone must be linked 
in a relationship of patronage or clientship” (p. 106). The notion of ‘being for 
someone else’ embodies the relationships of dependence between juniors and 
seniors, women and men (p.  110) (cf.  Hoffman 2007, Jackson 2004). Albeit 
situated in a hierarchical  social order, “the system is one of thorough 
                                                                                                                                                             
developed gradually into its present form throughout the centuries and was shaped by the interaction, or rather 
incorporation of what today is the territory of Sierra Leone, into the international trade and political systems.  
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interdependence” (2001:110). As Ferme writes: “Individual autonomy and 
independence threaten these larger units  with infertile and unproductive splits,  
such as those represented by husbandless women and by strangers who have less 
stake in the domestic groups in which they are dependents. Those who are on 
their own are liable to be suspected of antisocial behaviour, such as witchcraft. 
But it  is not only potential dependents,  those ‘for someone’, who can become 
ostracised for showing too much autonomy. Big people who are very successful 
in farming, politics, or business are liable to be equally suspect, particularly if  
there is a perception that they do not use their wealth and status to help 
dependents and instead seek only their own profit” (2001:110).  
 
4.2 The birth and the life of Sierra Leonean patrimonial state 
In 1787, a settlement for freed slaves was established on the Freetown 
peninsula, initially as a largely private enterprise, which was taken over by the 
British government as the crown colony of Sierra Leone in 1808.
15
 Just one year 
earlier Britain had abolished slave trade and Freetown became the base from 
which the British navy led its operations against  slave ships along the West 
African coast . Many Africans from different corners of the continent were then 
released to settle and live in the Sierra Leone colony. 
The abolition of slave trade had a different impact inland, where domestic 
slavery was not abolished until 1928. The 19
t h
 century in the hinterland was 
characterised by continuing insecurity caused by warfare between warrior chiefs 
and merchants involved in long-distance trade (Kelsall 2009: 25). Only in 1896, 
Britain declared a Protectorate over the interior areas. While the Colony was 
administered under British law, in the Protectorate the Brit ish continued to rely 
on local chiefs and customary law. A large-scale rebellion, commonly referred to 
as the ‘hut tax war ’ because it  was sparked by an imposition of a flat house tax 
in the Protectorate in 1898, had a critical impact on the chiefly rule, particularly 
in the South of the country. Once the uprising was suppressed, many rebellious 
chiefs were executed, a few exiled, and yet others fled and went into hiding 
                                                 
15
 The first settlers were mainly the Black Loyalists who fought on the side of Britain in the American War of 
Independence. After British defeat, many of them left either to British Nova Scotia or to London where they usually 
ended up on the streets without financial or material support. The plan 're-settle' (by itself a very problematic idea as 
most of the Black Loyalists were born in the United States and not in Africa) was born from the British abolitionist 
movement. The second wave of settlers who arrived to Sierra Leone in 1792 consisted of the Black Loyalists settled 
in Nova Scotia.  
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(Fyfe 1979:147). On the contrary,  those chiefs who supported the British during 
the revolt were rewarded with increased powers.  The also British replaced the 
executed and defeated chiefs with loyal supporters of the colonial 
administration. This was followed by a profound administrative reform supposed 
to prevent organized rebellion in the future (ibid.:149). The territory of the 
Protectorate was split  up into many small chiefdoms, each headed by a newly 
established Paramount chief.  
The impact of these reforms and the resulting manipulation of the structures of 
local relations have been immense and by far outlived the colonial period. The 
authority of many local chiefs henceforth depended more on their position 
within the colonial  hierarchy rather than on the popular support  of their 
subjects. The British expected the Paramount Chiefs to maintain order in their 
chiefdoms necessary for uninterrupted trade and were not interested in other 
aspects of local governance. In 1902, the British official ly confirmed the right 
of the chiefs to demand forced labour and to adjudicate cases based on 
customary law. This allowed the chiefs to impose heavy fines on those who 
stood up against  them. 
Not much changed in the nature of the Sierra Leone state after independence in 
1961. Milton Margai became the country's  first Prime Minister. His Sierra 
Leonean People's Party (SLPP) ruled until 1967 when i t  lost the elections, 
which the party entered under the leadership of Margai 's  half brother Albert 
Margai, to Siaka Stevens' All People's Congress (APC). In  the last few years 
under Albert Margai, the SLPP had become closely connected to the ethnic 
groups in the south and east and particularly the Mende. The opposition 
frequently accused Margai of favouritism towards members of southern and 
eastern ethnic groups in public appointments (Alie 2006:48).  The APC had won 
the elections on votes from the north and Freetown. The party also profited from 
the fact that Albert Margai had fal len out with a number of young 
Parl iamentarians in the SLPP over chieftaincy issues, which made four of them 
decide to enter the elections as independents (ibid.:51-2).  
Despite a military coup just hours after Siaka Stevens was inaugurated, Sierra 
Leone and the APC made history as the first opposit ion party in post-colonial 
Africa that had ousted the ruling party through democratic elections (ibid:54). 
After two subsequent coups,  APC rule was restored in April 1968 with the 
swearing in of Stevens as Prime Minister.  Patrimonial polit ics grew into great  
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proportions during the presidency of Stevens and his successor Joseph Saidu 
Momoh. “Compared to colonial or SLPP elite accommodations, the new ruling 
alliance made unusually heavy demands on state resources to buy collaborators’ 
loyalties” (Reno 1995:80).  Stevens was an experienced and charismatic 
politician and a skil led manipulator will ing to do anything to consolidate his 
power. By 1978 he had turned the country into a one-party state with himself at  
the helm as President.  
Through politics of clientelism, bribes and cooptation on one hand and evading 
constitution and making use of threats and brutal violence on the other, Stevens 
managed to silence most of the opposition and gain control over the 
government, parliament, army and justice within the first few years of coming to 
power (Alie 2006).  Stevens invited the heads of army and police to the 
government and made sure that leaders of trade unions and other professional 
institutions had a place in the parliament. Stevens maintained a relatively small 
and changing circle of loyal collaborators who enjoyed his patronage. The 
guiding principle of Stevens’ approach to governance is,  according to some, best 
expressed through a Krio proverb, “wusai den tai  kaw, nar dae e dae eat  (a cow 
grazes where i t  is  tethered), for under APC, people with access to public money 
were al lowed to use it  unabashedly for private ends” (Jackson 2004:141). The 
diamonds financed the new elite accommodation, and Stevens use the income 
from the sector to tie SLPP stalwarts closer to him and the APC (Reno 1995:79). 
Chiefs, polit icians and businessmen profited from the spoils  from the ‘shadow 
state’ that Stevens created, but they were also exposed to the arbitrariness of the 
President’s will ;  the chronic insecurity of office increased their urge to ‘make 
the most’ of their office while the grace of the leader lasted. This all  supported 
corruption and abuse of power (Reno 1995).   
Political corruption had a detrimental effect on the Sierra Leonean economy. As 
the majority of state income ended in private pockets rather than in the national 
treasury, the public service and infrastructure were rapidly deteriorating. 
Between 1980 and 1987, the government spending on education and healthcare 
went down by 60% (Alie 2006).  The situation was made worse by the 
development in the world economy – particularly the decline in prices of the 
main export commodities – diamonds, iron, coffee and cocoa and simultaneous 
increase in the price of imported oil .  While the population was growing, the 
agricultural production was declining due to dilapidated infrastructure, falling 
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prices and drain of workforce especially into the diamond mines. Sierra Leone 
moved from self-sufficiency into dependence on rice imports and food aid. In 
spite of the rapid economic downturn, Freetown hosted the 1980 Organization of 
African Unity (AOU) summit.  For the last money in the state coffers and with 
huge loans from abroad, special facilities for the summit were buil t.  Because of 
bad planning, mismanagement and pervasive corruption, the final bil l  for the 
conference reached 200 million USD, double the amount initially envisaged. The 
summit meant the final blow to the country’s collapsing economy. All that  
ordinary Sierra Leoneans were left with was a bitter slogan: “OAU today, IOU [I 
Owe You] tomorrow” (Jackson 2004:128).  
Stevens chose Brigadier Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his loyal successor. When 
Momoh took over as President in 1985, the country was facing a deep economic, 
political, social and moral crisis . Momoh’s programme of change ambitiously 
titled ‘New Order ’ remained in the hands of ‘old’ politicians and its  outlooks 
were bleak from the start.  Towards the end of 1987 after a series of protests of 
state employees Momoh declared a state of economic emergency. One of its key 
goals were ending smuggling and corruption. He sent the army to the rural areas 
along the border with Liberia in order to stop the activities of smugglers of 
diamonds, agricultural production and other goods. Instead of moving firmly 
against smuggling, many soldiers started actively participating in it .  Patrolling 
the borders and combating il licit t rade thus became a new and important  source 
of income for the army and some state officials at the moment when state 
patronage was declining. In April 1990 Operation ‘Clean Slate’ authorised the 
army and  Special Security Division (SSD) units to chase out around 10.000 
diamond diggers from Kono, allegedly in an effort to decrease the influence of 
Lebanese traders (Keen 2005:33). With this move, Momoh was hoping to 
concentrate the diamond sector in the hands of several  foreign firms and 
increase the volume of legal and taxable trade. Instead, the operation brought 
even bigger involvement of the army in the illicit mining as the poorly paid 
soldiers replaced the expelled diggers and local chiefs and APC stalwarts took 
over control of the mining (ibid.). The affected diggers also became an easy 
target for recruitment into the rebel force when a year later the war entered the 
country.   
Faced with both domestic and international pressure,  President Momoh launched 
a process of restoration of multiparty democracy in mid-1990. But 
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democratization was threatening the interests of some powerful and influential 
groups who were profiting from the state weakness and its inability to control 
political and economic processes: many APC politicians, their business 
‘partners’,  and numerous army officers were engaged in the profi table ‘anti-
smuggling’ operations. These people had a big interest  in postponing the 
democratic reforms (Keen 2005:34). When the war started in the eastern border 
regions of Kailahun and Pujehun in March 1991, i t  brought an opportunity to do 
just that.  This direct  clash between the personal interests of the politicians and 
soldiers and their official duty to defend the country helps to partially explain 
how a handful of rebels was able to unleash a violent chaos that gradually over 
took the whole country for more than a decade. 
 
4.3 Culture of violence 
Stevens regularly declared a state of emergency that gave him special powers 
and with that the opportunity to destroy his opponents (Alie 2006, Reno 1995). 
He also strived to keep his grip on power by controlling the army and other 
security services. With the experience of the coups in 1967-68 and aware of the 
developments in other African countries,  he feared a strong army. To ensure the 
loyalty of the armed forces,  Stevens cleansed them of potential ly threatening 
elements from the traditionally pro-SLPP south and east and replaced them with 
APC supporters from the Northern provinces (Keen 2005). Throughout Stevens’ 
rule, the combat abil ity of the Sierra Leone Army was systematically weakened, 
which had dire consequences during the 1990s.  Stevens put his security in the 
hands of the paramilitary police Internal  Security Unit  ( ISU) – in fact  a private 
army, set up with Cuban assistance in 1973 (Gberie 2005:44).  The ISU was fully 
committed to Stevens and the APC and unlike the regular army was well armed. 
The ISU became to be colloquially called I-Shoot-You for the indiscriminate 
violence i t  applied to help Stevens and the APC win elections and suppress 
student and popular protests (Keen 2005, Reno 1995). Towards the end of the 
1970s the ISU was renamed Special  Security Division (SSD). 
Politics in the Stevens era was gradually becoming more and more violent , to 
the extent that violence prevailed over other forms of political competition. 
During pre-election campaigns and elections the APC thugs went on a rampage 
and attacks against political opponents were common. Although Sierra Leone 
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was official ly declared one-party state in 1978, elections continued to be held 
every four years. The limited possibility of competit ion at the national level led 
to an increased rivalry and violence at the local level. Election loss came to be 
associated with a total  physical, social and moral  weakness while victory 
signalled special physical and occult abilities. Victors often exposed the losers 
and their supporters to beatings and public shaming, meaning that much more 
was at stake during election than just  an office (Ferme 1999). 
Jackson (2004) describes an incident that took place in Kabala in the run-up to 
the 1977 elections. An independent candidate, S.B. Marah who enjoyed strong 
support among the population stood against an APC candidate Kawusu Konteh. 
Konteh, who was then Minister of Mines, was unpopular in the district.  Two 
years before the election, he was involved in manipulating the election of a 
Paramount Chief in Kurubonla, which saw an APC preferred man – Madusu Lai 
II – installed as Paramount Chief (p.119).  
“Within a day of the registration of candidates in Kabala, Kawusu’s APC thugs 
began terrorising the town. They drove about in trucks, firing their weapons… 
People were frightened. The market closed. Police were intimidated. Realizing 
the situation was getting out of hand, S.B. asked the police to intervene, but the 
police protested that  they were powerless to do anything. […] Kawusu, his wife,  
and Madusu Lai II left Kabala with nine trucks filled with armed thugs, their 
destination Kurubonla… Most men from Kurubonla were st ill  in Kabala, where 
they had gone to support S.B.’s registrat ion. The thugs were now high on 
cannabis, and when they encountered the women of Kurubonla, singing protest  
songs against  Kawusu and celebrating S.B.’s candidacy, they lost control and 
fired into the crowd. No one knew how many were killed. Two bodies were 
subsequently taken to Kabala.  Others were buried or thrown into the flames 
when Kawusu’s thugs looted and sacked the town” (Jackson 2004:119-120). 
During elections in Pujehun in 1982 one of the opponents of the influential APC 
politician Francis Minah was murdered. Minah’s opponents then launched a 
campaign of defiance known as Ndogboyosoi .  General discontent and anger 
because of marginalisation and underdevelopment of the region as well as 
protest against indiscriminate violence by police and army in the operation 
against illicit trans-border trade surfaced in the campaign. The brutal response 
by the APC displaced thousands of families, often across the border to Liberia 
(Keen 2005:18). Many people were killed, incarcerated or disappeared. When 
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almost ten years later rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered 
the Pujehun District, family members of those who disappeared in the 
suppression of the Ndogboyosoi  were among the first  voluntary recruits 
(Richards 1996:22). 
As a former principal of Fourah Bay College noted: “The idealisation of 
violence by Mr Stevens and his poli tical cohorts produced a belief among a 
whole generation of young Sierra Leoneans (some of them future recruits of the 
Revolutionary United Front, or RUF) that violence pays, that it  is or can be a 
way of l ife, and that  it  is the shortest and most effective route to achievement 
and success” (Newsway 1998:12 in Keen 2005:18).   
 
4.4 Patrimonialism on the local level 
The neopatrimonial logic that was ordering the exercise of power on national 
level was reflected and in fact closely l inked to power structures on the local  
level. On the one hand, the local  landless peasants in the vil lages were tied in a 
relationship of dependency to the chiefs and landowners, on the other hand, the 
chiefs themselves had become tightly nit into Steven's  patrimonial network 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Reno 1995).  
Peters and Richards (2011) trace the contemporary tensions between chiefs and 
their subjects back to “an agrarian order that emerged from the West African 
social  world shaped by the Atlantic slave trade” (p.  377). According to them the 
chieftaincy system developed into two distinct forms during the 19
t h
 century: 
warlords and agricultural  producers.  Warlords lived of controlling and 
protecting or raiding the major trade routes from the Upper Niger to the Atlantic 
and depended on support from young men able to fight. These warlord chiefs 
were common in the southern border region with Liberia where the Atlantic 
slave trade still  thrived. In other districts where slave trade was in decline a 
second type of chieftaincy emerged, that  of agrarian chiefs who had diversified 
from supplying food to slave vessels into meeting the food needs of the infant 
colony of Sierra Leone. When the British declared the Protectorate over the 
hinterland in 1896, a number of warlord chiefs revolted to protect their slave 
trading interests (p. 378). After suppressing the ‘hut tax war ’ as it  became to be 
known, the British created the institution of Paramount as a form of indirect  
rule.  
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Under the system set up by the British the Paramount Chiefs were given 
extensive powers. The British were effectively assisting the Paramount Chiefs 
“in the suppression of local  rivals,  and reducing the option of secession from a 
chiefdom or of withholding payments or compulsory labour from a chief [  by his 
subjects]” (Keen 2003:71). Chieftaincy was also made a lifetime and inheritable 
position limited to members of the ruling houses. As Abraham (1978) has 
demonstrated, these rules in no sense continued pre-colonial  practice but were 
arrangements devised by the British to secure a modicum of local stability 
through the practice of divide and rule. “The overbearing attitudes and 
behaviour imbibed by the Chiefs from their colonial masters led to their 
assuming new and overwhelming powers over their subjects. . .  and was to have 
grave implications on the ways in which traditional rulers related to their 
subjects and on the socio-political organisation of the communities” (TRC 
2004/Vol.3A:8).   
The colonial administration, as well as the post-colonial governments, was well 
aware of the importance of securing cooperation and control over the chiefs.  
“Once you are assured of the loyalty of chiefs, responsibil ity towards the rural 
populace can be abrogated except for carefully targeted patrimonial 
distributions at election time. It is an equally rational  strategy for an 
unscrupulous individual once assured of central  government patronage (or 
indifference) to exploit legitimately-won chiefdom office for personal gain” 
(Fanthorpe et al. 2002: 15-16 cited in Keen 2003:71). Chiefs profited from the 
system by diverting house tax payments,  attracting (and abusing) development 
aid and the right to grant mining licences, giving them resources for 
strengthening their position as patron. Moreover, the vil lage seniors (chiefs, 
headmen and elders) gained the ability to define customary law or impose fines 
and other punishments, all of which “asserted and legit imated their power and 
control over the allocation of resources against the interests of juniors, women 
and migrants.” (Berman 1998: 321, quoted in Boersch-Supan: 6). Their power 
was extensive. What Mamdani (2005) writes about Uganda, holds as well for 
Sierra Leone: “The chief combined in his hands executive, legislat ive, judicial , 
and administrative powers. When he faced the peasant, his fingers closed and 
the hand became a clenched fist” (p. 7). 
 Although slavery was officially abolished in 1928, forced labour for chiefs and 
community elders survived in local communities as a heri tage from domestic 
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slavery. The abuse of young men by chiefs and other local landowners is  closely 
related to what is called as the ‘wealth in people system’ (Shaw 2002, Richards 
2005).  This system is rooted in the shortage of local labour resources necessary 
to farm the land (especially in the harvest  time). To secure sufficient capacity to 
successfully grow enough rice, the farmer needs to control his labour forces “by 
building ties of dependency and indebtedness through kinship,  marriage, 
parenthood, warship,  pawnship, and, in the past , slavery” (Shaw 2000:37). 
Peters and Richards (2011) recognise a number of ways in which landowners 
could secure sufficient labour. First of all,  under customary law, the chief has 
the right to call his subjects for community labour. However, chiefs used to 
abuse this privilege for personal gain rather than for projects that would benefit 
the whole community,  at the most projects like road repair would benefit the 
local middle class involved in trading (Richards 2005).  Young men related to 
the chiefs were often excused from these duties (Peters 2006:37), while those 
that refused would be fined high amounts which would only leave them with the 
option to leave the community (e.g. INT43, FG19, FG21). 
Secondly, other landowners would access labour force through being patrons and 
protectors of labour-sharing co-operatives. Thirdly polygamists with large 
upland farms would encourage their wives to take up relationships with young 
men, after which the local courts would find them guilty of “woman damage” 
and force them to work on the husband’s land as a fine.  A fourth way, would be 
for landowners to become patrons to a ‘stranger seeking land’.  The granting of a 
plot by the chief would require the stranger to support his patron in “a range of 
ill-defined ways” (Peters and Richards 2011:378) including harvest labour and 
electoral support. Peters and Richards conclude that  such a unstable and 
unpredictable relationship makes it  hard “to plan farming as a profitable 
business in the face of open-ended claims by landowners” (idem.:379). 
An additional way to secure labour both by landowning and landless classes 
often recognised in the literature (cf.  Richards 2005: 584-5,  Shaw 2002: 158; 
Fanthorpe 2005: 37) is the so-called “bride service” that a husband needs to 
provide to his family-in-law and mostly comes in the form of working on the 
land of his wives father and brothers.  Marriage was also used as a way to 
incorporate strangers into the local community and its  relationships of 
dependency (Ferme 2001: 81-111, Shaw 2002:158). 
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If  local youth would refuse to work for the chief – either as part  of forced 
labour 'owed' to the chief or as fine for woman damage – the customary court 
would often impose fines that were too high to pay. The youth would have no 
way of appealing against such fines,  and “there is  a strong feeling among young 
people in the villages that elders make up the law to suit their own purposes” 
(Peters 2006: 37). These practices were common across the country right up to 
the civil war. Ex-combatants reported that the “high and arbitrary fines for 
‘woman damage’ and other alleged offences against customary law” was one of 
their main motivations to fight (Archibald and Richards 2002, Fithin and 
Richards 2004). A village chief in the Pujehun District told me that  unaffordable 
fines imposed on youth often drove them away:  
The chiefs [ .. .]  could just levy a fine on the youth [.. .]  which also caused the 
war: Sometimes the chiefs would levy you Le 200.000 which even the chief 
wasn’t able to pay. If  you wouldn’t have that money, a small plantation that your 
parents have,  you go and pledge it .  There is no other way to l ive, the next thing 
you resort to [is that]  you vacate the chiefdom. That was also a cause of  the 
war. (INT3) 
Although the government of Sierra Leone now acknowledges that  corrupt and 
oppressive governance in the chiefdoms contributed to the general climate of 
alienation that propelled the nation into conflict (Fanthorpe 2005:31-2), it  was 
Paul Richards who through fieldwork with former combatants from all fighting 
factions proposed the idea that rural  circumstances and particularly the 
relationship between the local chiefs and oppressed youth was one of the main 
causes of the RUF rebellion (Richards 2005, Mokuwa et al . 2011). 
Under Stevens local  chiefs rapidly became tied into the national patrimonial 
system.  Reno (1995) describes how Stevens tied local chiefs into his 
patrimonial network through offering them positions on the board of the 
National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) and providing them with other 
opportunities to make private gains. Through the chiefs Stevens managed to 
divert most of the profits  from the diamond industry into his ‘shadow state’.  To 
make the chiefs dependent on the ruling APC party,  Stevens centralised 
decisions on licenses for diamond digging. As chiefs were more engaged with 
making private profit than in developing their communities, the system, 
promoted a situation where many chiefs lacked strong support within their 
chiefdoms (Keen 2003:72).  
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Through setting up monopoly trading instruments known as marketing boards,  
Stevens also drew the agricultural sector into his shadow state, exploiting i t  for 
private gains. The rural labouring classes of young people from former slave 
backgrounds found themselves doubly exploited – by tradition at home, and 
through government taxes on agricultural production. Chiefs had either been 
tied into the diamond industry, or if not,  then they would try to compensate by 
exercising their power over local youth.  As Richards (2004) writes chiefs had 
become either “puppets of Freetown or predatory on youth”. Some youth 
migrated as labourers to alluvial diamond districts, but even there the land-
owning chiefly classes controlled mining land through the ‘time-honoured’ 
rules, disciplining production and extracting wealth through ‘custom’, alongside 
the government’s own violence-based methods of taxing flows of mineral wealth 
(Reno 1995). 
Research shows that  young people who had suffered abuse at the hands of the 
chiefs became the early recruits to the RUF part icularly in Sierra Leone's 
Eastern Province (cf.  Mokuwa et.al 2011, Richards 2005). It  was clear from “the 
brutali ty of the treatment meted out to Chiefs and other figures of status or 
authority” (TRC 2004/Vol.3A:8) that many of them had joined the rebels to take 
revenge (cf. Peters and Richards 2011, Fanthorpe 2005, Alie 2006, Archibald 
and Richards 2002, Jackson 2006). A man in a village in Kailahun that I spoke 
to vented the same emotions: 
[…]  before now the relationship [between chiefs and youth]  was something 
different, because they were forcing young men to leave the town and go 
elsewhere. So therefore when I hear of something that has come to destroy [the 
chiefs]  I will join it .  So when I come I am going to revenge.(INT45) 
 
4.5 Crisis of youth 
The ‘crisis of youth’ has featured prominently among the explanations of the 
causes of war al though the interpretations of how it fed into the conflict differ 
(Richards 1996, Abdullah 2000). Undoubtedly, young people were one of the 
groups worst affected by the deteriorating economic situation and the general  
political decline in the country.  The effects varied,  understandably,  depending 
on where one stood. 
Since the end of the 1970s, a student movement began to form at Freetown’s 
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Fourah Bay College, the country’s main university. Students were expressing 
dissatisfaction with the regime, the declining quality of education and with the 
politicisation of the universi ty soil where the stalwarts of the APC and their 
relatives had (as the only ones) access to scholarships and lecturing positions. 
Following a violent  suppression of student protests in 1977, student politics 
gradually radicalised – eventually becoming, according to some observers, one 
of the ideological sources of the rebellion in the 1990s (Abdullah 2000).  The 
radical student movement was informed by a variety of sources of revolutionary 
thinking from abroad; Muammar Qaddafi’s Green Book had a prominent place 
among these. In 1985 about forty student leaders were expelled from the 
university; some of them subsequently travelled to Ghana and later to the 
training camps in Libyan Benghazi. It  was around this t ime that  the student 
movement split  up over the question of a violent revolution. Only a minority of 
students was in support  of armed struggle – and it was these students that left  
for Libya to learn ‘the art of revolution’. 
University students were not the largest group of young people hit  by the 
economic and social  downfall of the country. As in other African countries,  the 
population was rapidly growing and becoming younger. At the same time, 
educational facil ities were declining and employment opportunities in the 
formal sector were lacking. As the future looked bleak for many of the country’s 
youths, it  fostered disaffectedness, frustration and anger. Education has 
historically held a special status in Sierra Leone. Since colonial times it  was 
seen as a route to ‘modernity’ in contrast to the ‘illiterate backwardness’ of the 
‘traditional’ way of life. Education also offered an alternative route to secure 
livelihoods for those who did not have access to land administered by the chiefs.  
In a symbolic expression of the depth of the crisis , Momoh stated during his 
visit to Kailahun District,  the most marginalized of the country’s regions, that 
education was a privilege and not a right (Peters 2006:46).  Several years later 
some of the combatants quoted his statement as one of the motives for taking up 
arms.  
In the second half of the 1980s most children left school before they finished 
basic education, usually because their families could not pay for expensive text 
books or examination fees.  Others were forced out of school by the absence of 
teachers. The decline of education was apparent especially towards the end of 
1980s when Momoh’s government stopped paying the already low wages of 
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teachers and other state employees altogether. Teachers focused on providing 
basic livelihoods for themselves and their families instead of teaching in 
dilapidated schools. In 1987 less then 30% children above the age of 12 were 
attending school (Beckley 1993:68 in Keen 2005b:78) 
Once they were compelled to leave school the youth had three options (Peters 
2006). They could stay in the village and do agricultural work. This was not 
usually on their own land but in an unequal bondage on the land of the chief or 
other prominent land owners. Girls  could enter an early marriage. Diamond 
fields were their second option, where many left in search of wealth. In this 
respect, diamond mining to a certain extent and for a period of time defusing the 
simmering social conflict because it  was able to absorb big numbers of these 
young ‘renegades’. The last possibility was going to Freetown with the hope for 
employment in the local informal sector. The new comers only extended the 
ranks of unemployed and homeless youth already living on the street (p. 39-42). 
The numbers of ‘street youth’ in Freetown grew. These youth were often meeting 
in places called potes .  They hung out here, drinking palm wine and smoking 
marihuana waiting for any small, oftentimes illegal, job opportunity. It  was in 
their ranks that the APC politicians hired violent thugs to threaten and beat 
opponents during election campaigns. In the 1980s, many radical  universi ty 
students as well as middle class youth started to spend their time with the 
excluded youth in the potes .  Also here,  revolutionary thoughts were discussed 
and spread. It also became a prominent recruitment ground in the up-coming 
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5. The war – a chronology 
A chronological description does not do justice to the complexity of war. 
Furthermore, the present one is by no means exhaustive.
16
 A short outline of the 
main developments and turning-points is nonetheless necessary.  
 
5.1 The RUF incursion  
The beginning of the war in Sierra Leone is generally dated to March 23, 1991 
when a small group of about a hundred combatants invaded the village of 
Bomaru in Kailahun District  from neighbouring Liberia. The Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) as the fighters called themselves was led by a former army 
corporal Foday Sankoh and comprised of two groups of Sierra Leoneans. Its 
core was formed of combatants who had received guerrilla training in Libya in 
the late 1980s. They were joined by new recruits,  mostly Sierra Leoneans held 
captive in Liberia by Taylor ’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), just 
before the invasion was launched (TRC 2004/Vol.3A:102).  The RUF fighters 
received support  from Liberian rebels from the NPFL
17
 and Burkinabe 
mercenaries (Richards 1996:5, Alie 2006:132). Sankoh and NPFL leader Charles 
Taylor had met in Libya while undergoing military training and Sankoh had 
taken part in the initial NPFL attack on Liberia launched from Ivory Coast.  It  
was in his conquered territory that Taylor al lowed Sankoh to train his RUF 
fighters (TRC 2004/Vol.3A:100). Taylor is regarded as the main sponsor of the 
RUF incursion (Keen 2005:37),  and many Sierra Leoneans blame him for 
fomenting the war in the country.  
If  it  had not been for Sankoh announcing that the RUF had started a war against 
the APC regime over the radio, chances are that the start of the conflict might 
have gone unnoticed (Hoffman 2011:32). There had been clashed along the 
border with Liberia for a while at that stage. The area was a refuge for both the 
war-affected Liberian population and the anti-NPFL fighters and there were 
occasional incursions by the NPFL. Further, the involvement of the Sierra 
Leonean Army (SLA) in the illicit t rans-border trade had at  times resulted in 
violent clashes over money or goods (TRC 2004/Vol.3A).   
                                                 
16
 For a more elaborate account of the history of the war see the TRC Report  
17
 The National Patriotic Front of Liberia has started a war in the country in 1989 when it toppled the President 
Samuel Doe.  The NPFL initially supported the RUF and provided a substantial number of the troops for the 
invasion. 
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Neglected by the central government, the border region had been an area of APC 
opposition and there is some evidence that the RUF may have initially had some 
sympathy among the population in Pujehun District and some areas of Kailahun 
District (cf. Alie 2006:133, Richards 2005:581, Combey 2010:296) Building 
upon the popular disaffectedness and frustration, the rebels presented 
themselves as liberators and spread a message of a better and just future. A chief 
in a village in Kailahun told me: When the war came some of  us were told not to 
fear and remain where we are, [then]  we saw how serious i t  was and we couldn’t 
flee. So some people then joined into the fight hoping it could lead to good 
things. (INT42) 
The numbers of the rebel forces soon swelled and in less than a month the RUF 
had occupied the entire Kailahun District (Alie 2006:132). Although the RUF 
had some initial support , “[l]ater recruits were captives from village raids or 
abductions in refugee camps, including children, both boys and girls, in large 
numbers” (Weinstein 2008:438). The army, divided by years of politicization 
and neglect under the APC rule, poorly equipped and inexperienced, was unable 
or - as argued above in chapter 4 -  unwilling to meaningfully respond to the 
incursion. President Stevens had reduced the role of the army to not much more 
than a ceremonial one in favour of his eli te security force the ISU  (TRC 
2004/Vol.3A:148). At the start  of the war the national army barely counted 
3.000 soldiers, reservists included. Their equipment was outdated and low pay 
had resulted in high levels of corruption and abuse of civilians (Keen 2005b:83, 
TRC 2004/Vol.3A:245). The RUF gained control over a fifth of the country’s 
territory before Momoh’s government, with substantial help from Guinean and 
Nigerian troops and anti-NPFL fighters from the United Liberation Movement of 
Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), pushed the RUF back to the eastern border 
region of Gola forest  early in 1992 (Alie 2006:134).   
In April 1992, Momoh’s government was toppled by a group of young army 
officers frustrated by the government’s disregard for the conditions facing the 
common soldiers on the bush front while the war funds were being embezzled by 
high army commanders and politicians in Freetown. The coup ended the twenty-
two years of APC rule swiftly and without much resistance.  The soldiers set up 
the National Provisional Ruling Council  (NPRC) and appointed  27-year-old 
Captain Valentine Strasser as head of the military regime. In a country where 
power and respect are usually reserved for old men, their youthfulness was a 
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source of worries to some people – the NPRC was teasingly referred to as “Na 
Pikin Rule Contri” (Children now rule the country) (Keen 2005:94). But their 
youth also raised hopes that tomorrow’s politics could be different , free of old 
practices, abuses of power and corruption. The youthful mutineers were popular 
especially among the youths (Alie 2006, cf. Shaw 2002) 
The NPRC promised to quickly end the war and allow the resettlement of the 
displaced and repatriation of refugees (Richards 1996:9). They pledged an early 
return of the country to a democratically elected civil ian government and 
initiated crit ical reforms to the state administrat ion and programmes to improve 
the ailing infrastructure (Alie 2006:141). While the NPRC launched 
investigations into corruption of the APC regime, their own practices soon 
started resembling those of their predecessors. The junta members were involved 
in illegal trade of diamonds mined by the soldiers in the east (Keen 2005). 
The RUF – which was at that  time st ill  confined to Kailahun and Pujehun 
Districts – came forward with an offer to negotiate a peace deal with the 
military junta. The NPRC opted for a military solution and instead stepped up 
its recruitment efforts. The army ranks swelled from the pre-war 3.000-4.000 
men to around 15.000-20.000 in 1993-94 (Fithen and Richards 2005, in Peters 
2006). The majority of the conscripts came from among the unemployed and 
socially marginalized youths in Freetown, which meant that  the social base of 
the new army dangerously started to resemble that of the RUF. Discipline of the 
soldiers rapidly dropped (Alie 2006:150, cf. Keen 2005, Hoffman 2011, Kandeh 
1999). This was to have serious consequences for the course of the war and for 
the civilian population in the future.  The SLA was also (albeit not officially) 
recruiting children who fought, worked or mined diamonds for their 
commanders. Poorly trained but heavily armed, scores of chronically destitute 
lumpen youth were deployed in the countryside where they did more to terrorise 
innocent civilians than engage the enemy (Kandeh 1999:363).  
The SLA gradually regained control over most of the RUF occupied territory 
and by November 1993 the RUF “stood squarely on the border with Liberia and 
on the brink of oblivion” (TRC 2004/Vol.3A:175).  Why exactly did the NPRC 
decide to declare a unilateral ceasefire at this stage and did not finish the RUF 
off has been a matter of much speculation. Some claim that i t  was sheer greed 
on the part of the NPRC and other SLA commanders who would lose the 
opportunity to make profit  from looting and illegal mining if the war ended 
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(Peters 2006:48). Other accounts point  out the reliance by the SLA on “the 
vastly-exaggerated accounts fil tering through the civilian population about the 
fearsome potency of the insurgents” in estimating the strength of the RUF 
(Richards 2005:381). The army subsequently advanced “with tedious over-
cautiousness” and “showed the RUF combatants more respect  than was perhaps 
necessary” (TRC/Vol.3A:176).  Yet other explanations put it  down not so much 
to the ulterior motives or deficiencies on the side of the SLA as to a change of 
tactics by the RUF. Both weakened militari ly and without a supply of new arms 
after a row with Taylor ’s NPFL, the RUF adopted guerri lla warfare tactics to 
which the SLA was i ll-equipped to counter (TRC/Vol.3A:320). During 1993, the 
RUF set up several  bush camps from which it  conducted hit-and-run attacks 
against the army. It also started raiding villages in order to obtain food, 
medicines and manpower (Peters 2006:49). The thick and inaccessible terrain of 
the rainforest was thus the main tactical advantage of the RUF against the 
poorly trained and pain and inadequately equipped soldiers (Richards 1996).  
There were also growing accounts of SLA soldiers who practically left the army 
and worked alongside the rebels or carried attacks on villages on their own 
masking it as RUF acts. A phenomenon of sobels  – “soldiers by day, rebels by 
night” - was thus born, foreshadowing what was to become an overt alliance 
between the army and the rebels in a few years time (Richards 1996, Alie 2006, 
Keen 2005).  A chief in Moyamba District  told me: 
It was very difficult for people to tell the RUF from the soldiers. Because they 
were often in the same uniforms. So it  was very hard to say that these were RUF 
and these were soldiers. And in fact , most of those that did the destruction 
around this area were wearing the same uniform. And some soldiers deserted 
their barracks joined the RUF. I cannot say who was a soldier and who RUF .  
(INT17) 
Caught in a situation where civilians could no longer trust their own army, 
civil ian-led mili tia initiatives for their own protection started to flourish. The 
weak national army had started to seek help from the local communities’ 
traditional hunters probably as early as 1991/92, and more systematically since 
the takeover by the NPRC. The hunters had an intimate knowledge of the rough 
terrain of the rain forest.  The traditional hunters are also l inked to the Poro 
society (see chapter 8.1) and apart from practical knowledge they also relied on 
esoteric and magic weapons (Hoffman 2011, Keen 2005; Ferme 2001; Kandeh 
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1999). The Kuranko tamaboro  hunters from the northern district of Koinadugu 
were the first hunters to organize for the war. The tamaboro  wearing the 
traditional ronko  gowns and amulets protecting them from usual and magical 
weapons aroused fear in the rebels (Alie 2006:149). The successful cooperation 
of the tamaboro  and SLA was short-lived, however (Jackson 2004:144). As the 
distrust of the army grew in the communities across the country these Civil 
Defence Forces (CDF), as they would become to be known in the course of the 
war, started to emerge as an important player in the conflict. Civilians started 
organizing defence groups around the traditional hunters also in other regions – 
there were the Mende kamajor ,  the donso  among the Kono or gbethi  and kapra 
of the Temne.
18
 The hunters were bound through init iat ion rituals by many 
taboos and they had a code of behaviour emphasising discipline, loyalty and 
self-sacrifice. Common among these groups was a belief that initiation would 
render them bulletproof (Jackson 2004, Ferme 2001, Hoffman 2011). They 
imposed strict  laws on the members of the communities that they resided in,  
which, if broken, would result in loss of their abili ty to be bulletproof.
19
 The 
punishment for breaking the laws of the Kamajors was harsh.  One Kamajor that 
I interviewed in the Bo District  explained as follows: 
Kamajor: The laws that were put by us: if  anybody broke those laws we would 
deal with that individual. [ .. .]  The action that would be taken against any 
defaulter: we made a cage to imprison all those that broke our law. We would 
put them in the cage which was made of sharp objects. You could barely sit  
inside the cage, and you could hardly turn else you would be hurt by those sharp 
objects. We would be throwing water at you while you were in the cage. If  you 
broke the law, the fines that  you would have to pay the Kamajors would protect  
us from being wounded by the bullets.  The cage was for Kamajors that broke the 
law, but also for civilians that broke the Kamajor law and didn’t  pay the fine.  
The relatives of locked up civilians would come and pay the fine. If  they didn’t 
pay the fine, and we Kamajors would be hit by a bullet we would definitely be 
wounded. The fine would normally be rice, chickens, oil.  
Me: can you explain what sort of laws the Kamajors had? Why did they apply to 
the civilians as well? 
                                                 
18
 The Kamajors were probably the best known among these hunter-militia groups, and I will refer to the various 
local militia using the name Kamajor throughout this study.  
19
 See “Brief history of bulletproofing” see Hoffman 2011. 
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Kamajor: There were some laws that were purposely for the civilians. After 6 
o’clock you cannot beat with the Matawudo [grinder] , you cannot beat rice 
inside that,  it  would affect us. That law applies to everybody, even in this town 
where we were living, they would not remove palm cannels [to take oil from the 
palm trees]  If you break that law by removing the palm cannel we would deal 
with you if we were in town. (INT4) 
In the early months of 1994, the RUF took Kono District and the diamond-rich 
Tongo fields in Kenema District , dealing both a military and financial  blow to 
the NPRC. The rebels then launched a coordinated offensive around Christmas 
1994 across several areas of the country,  some of which ‘tasted the war ’ for the 
first time. They took rutile and bauxite mines in the south and at the beginning 
of 1995 they stood in front of Freetown. It was in recognition of the army's 
intractable ‘sobelisation’ that the NPRC government decided to hire Executive 
Outcomes (EO), a South African security firm with interests in Sierra Leone's  
diamonds, to help wage war against the rebels (Harding, 1997; Rubin 1997 in 
Kandeh 1999:364). In order to avert the pending takeover of the capital , the 
NPRC contracted EO in March 1995, paying them reportedly USD 1,7 million a 
month and granting them diamond mining concessions (Riley 1997: 287-92 in 
Zack-Williams). Several hundred mercenaries were tasked with securing the 
capital, regain control of the rutile, bauxite and diamond mines and then clear 
the remaining parts of the country from RUF. They were also supposed to train 
the SLA and the civil militias. With the help of local civil militias, EO was able 
to recapture the diamond mining areas and temporari ly turn the tide of the war 
against the rebels (Kandeh 1999: 364).  As a result of the ongoing abuses of 
civil ians by government troops and Liberian ULIMO fighters that  assisted the 
SLA in fighting the RUF, paramount chiefs called for these troops to be 
withdrawn from their territories in favour of state supported CDF units (Keen 
2005:133).   
 
5.2 The democratic intermezzo  
The NPRC did not rush with handing the government back to civil ian hands. It  
nonetheless started the process in 1994 by inaugurating an Interim National 
Electoral Commission and convening a National Advisory Conference to discuss 
the details of the democratisation process. The conference set the date for the 
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election for February 1996. A month before the election, Julius Maada Bio took 
over from Strasser as a chairman of the NPRC in a palace coup. There were 
doubts in some corners about the advisability of holding elections before peace 
was achieved. However, it  is alleged that  most of the sceptics were among those 
who had something to lose from the end of the military rule (Stovel 2008:110).  
The election took place on schedule in late February 1996. The security 
situation in many parts of the county was critical and in some areas in the north 
and east  it  was impossible to organize the election at  al l.  The period between 
November 1995 and June 1996 also saw the first wave of amputations, in which 
the RUF was punishing the population for participating in the election (Hirsch 
2001). A farmer from a Bo Ngleya village spoke of the amputations to the TRC: 
“People armed and in combat uniforms attacked our village and killed many 
people. They went all round and shouted that we, in the vil lage had voted for 
President Kabbah as President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and because 
President Kabbah is  a proud man they are going to cut off our arms so that we 
will never vote for him again. It  was in 1996 and they said that we should go to 
him to treat us and give us another hand. Four of us were amputated, two men 
and two women” (TRC/Vol.3A:474). Also some SLA units tried to sabotage the 
election and there was shooting heard in Freetown, Kenema and Bo on the 
election day (Alie 2006:163). 
The SLPP came out victorious in the election with 36% of the 750.000 votes 
cast and its candidate Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was inaugurated into the 
presidential office on 29 March, 1996. The RUF refused to participate in the 
election arguing it had no trust in the ability and willingness of the NPRC to 
conduct fair elections. In fact it  was probably its  justified doubt that people 
would give them their votes (ibid.). 
President Kabbah did not have much trust in the army’s ability to defend his 
government and the country. He appointed Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, the 
respected kamajor  leader, as Deputy Minister of Defence and from 1997 as 
National Coordinator of the Civil  Defence Forces. The fight against the RUF 
was to be spearheaded by the CDF, assisted by EO. The hunter mili tia had now 
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 For a detailed account about how the local civil defence groups were formalised into a state supported militia see 
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As the hunter militia became more institutionalised, especially after 1997, many 
of the traditional rules loosened and the militia increasingly took part in 
committing abuses against the civilian population (Keen 2005:276-80). The 
increased in-take of CDF recruits led to the “dilution of ranks” (Hoffman 
2011:237). A fundamental problem was that the social base of the Kamajors had 
some similarit ies with that of the RUF and the Sierra Leonean Army (Keen 
2003: 86).   
Hoffman (2011) claims that the shortened version of the initiation used for these 
new recruits was “of a qualitatively different order from those versions that had 
come before” (p. 237). Also Ferme (2001) notes that magic rituals used to 
initiate the new recruits  “were sometimes mimicry of purportedly traditional 
practices, of which they took only the surface appearance” (p. 223).  An 
informant in Bo District that was initiated into the Kamajor society in 1996, 
told me: 
In 1997 when the military joined our patrol,  when the Kabbah government was 
toppled [.. .]  it  started at that point . There were people that  were resigning from 
the military and coming to join the Kamajors. Even the rebel groups, some of  
them came to the Kamajors. Prisoners that were freed [by the junta]  came and 
joined us. These people were all taken together to be Kamajors, some of them 
were not initiated in the normal procedure. Some of these Kamajors we did not 
even allow in our own home town, because they were more dangerous than the 
rebels (INT1). 
The rivalry between CDF and SLA deepened and there were clashes between the 
two since early 1997 (Alie: 174). During September and October 1996, the joint 
effort  of CDF and EO destroyed the RUF’s main camp ‘Zogoda’ and pushed the 
rebels from key positions in the south-east . Parallel to stepped-up military 
efforts, Kabbah’s government held peace negotiations with the RUF in Abidjan, 
Côte d 'Ivoire. Under pressure by military losses,  the severely weakened RUF 
signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November,  1996. The Accord called for 
an immediate cessation of all hostili ties,  disarmament,  demobilisation and 
reintegration of al l  combatants,  withdrawal of the EO forces and for a 
transformation of the RUF into a political party, absolving the movement of all  
responsibility for its past actions. It  also spoke of an electoral and judicial  
                                                                                                                                                             
Danny Hoffman's “The War Machines” (2011). 
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reform and improving conditions for the people of Sierra Leone in many areas 
(Abidjan Peace Accord 1996).  
But the peace was short-lived. The RUF used the time to regain strength and 
rearm (cf. Alie 2006:176). The government terminated the untenably expensive 
contract with EO in January 1997 and its  security remained solely in the hands 
of the CDF, ECOMOG – a Nigerian led West African peace force that had 
originally been located in the country to help restore peace in neighbouring 
Liberia – and the unreliable SLA. Sankoh’s arrest in Nigeria in 1997, where he 
allegedly was arranging arms supply for the RUF, sounded the death bell to the 
peace accord. Although some RUF members were willing to continue the peace 
process, the new leadership of the RUF under Sam ‘Maskita’ Bockarie launched 
an offensive (Keen 2005). 
 
5.3 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  and its aftermath 
The sidelining of the SLA by Kabbah’s government created much resentment 
among the army’s ranks. In the morning of 25 May 1997, a group of soldiers 
from Wilberforce barracks in Freetown staged a successful  coup d’état stating 
the government’s favouritism of the CDF among their main motivations (Alie 
2006:176; Peters 2006:53, Zack-Williams 1997). The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), as the junta called itself, chose Johnny Paul 
Koroma, an army officer, who was at the time awaiting a trial at the Pademba 
Road prison for an attempted coup few months earlier, as its chairman. Some 
believed him to be a prime example of the sobel phenomenon (Gberie 
2004:147). 
The AFRC ordered the CDF to disband and invited the RUF to come and join the 
military government in Freetown, making the convergence between the army and 
the rebels - the ‘unholy al liance’ – official (Alie 2006:177). The SLA was 
dissolved and replaced with the ‘People’s Army’ – a joint  force of ex-SLA 
(about 80% of its  soldiers) and the RUF. They declared RUF leader Foday 
Sankoh – in detention in Nigeria at the t ime – as Vice Chairman of the AFRC. 
Some of the APC politicians supported the AFRC, thereby earning ministerial 
and other civil service positions (ibid:178). As Keen (2005) concludes, “[h]ad 
the war really been between soldiers and rebels, a joint  regime would have been 
the recipe for peace that  Koroma was claiming” (p.  210).  
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The toppled government, supported by Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) leaders, preferred a negotiated departure of the junta to a 
military solution (Gberie 2004:159, cf. Alie 2006). Several rounds of diplomatic 
meetings between the AFRC representatives and the Sierra Leonean government 
resulted in the Conakry peace plan in October 1997. Although the soldiers stood 
to gain a lot from the plan, including another six month in power before the 
scheduled hand-over to the civilian government, they were making ever new 
demands. Eventually,  the exiled government and representatives of some 
ECOWAS countries opted for a military solution.  
In February 1998, the Nigeria-led ECOMOG launched a major operation against 
the AFRC in Freetown. Together with the CDF who had been fighting the 
People’s Army in the provinces for most of the second half of the previous year,  
and supported by the loyal SLA troops,  police and students in the capital, it  
gained control over most of the city within two weeks. The AFRC was 
overthrown but not beaten.  In order to prevent any more civilian casualties in 
Freetown, ECOMOG allowed the escaping RUF/AFRC fighters a free passage 
out of the city. The retreating combatants moved northwards and north-
eastwards to Kambia, Tonkolili  and Koinadugu Districts.
21
  Some of them 
headed further on to Kono and took over the diamond centre of Koidu by the end 
of February.  The AFRC and RUF units continued their violent campaign and 
started to regroup and expand, forcefully recruiting in the villages (Peters 
2006:54).  
In Freetown, the fall  of the junta was followed by a wave of mob justice. Groups 
of self-appointed popular ‘judges’ were searching for and dealing punishments 
to combatants, supporters and sympathisers of the AFRC. Also the ECOMOG 
and CDF executed any suspected rebels on the spot.  Often,  the internally 
displaced who had nobody around to confirm their identity and spare them the 
unjust punishment were killed innocently (Stovel 2006:116). 
In October 1998, the ex-AFRC started a march back towards Freetown. On their 
way, they forced thousands of civilians to walk along. As the renegade soldiers 
headed southwards, they were again joined by the RUF. The planning of the 
operation was however in the hands of the soldiers. The destruction of the 
                                                 
21
 The retreating AFRC/RUF combatants split up into three groups when they reached the town of Masiaka. The first 
group moved on to Mile 91 and then northwards to Magburaka, the second continued through Lunsar to Makeni  - 
some of them later met up again and moved towards Kono. The third group set out for Port Loko and then Kambia 
(Alie 2006: 183). For the geographic information, see Annex 1. 
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capital was meant to be a revenge for the execution of 24 ex-AFRC officers and 
the exclusion of many more from joining the restored SLA (Keen 2005:220).  
Freetown was attacked on January 6, 1999. The ECOMOG was caught unaware, 
faced with a mass of civilians used as human shield with fighters dispersed in 
the crowd. A reverend in Freetown who during the war took care of orphaned or 
lost children, told me:  
I was there on January 6, I entered the city with the rebels at night. […] . We 
were more than half a mill ion people from Wellington to the city, if  you turn and 
look back you don’t  see anything, [but]  human beings. If  you look in front of 
you, human beings. I  was with them, we all came.  (E5) 
The ‘battle over Freetown’ was fought practically over every street corner for 
over two weeks. Yet again, civil ians suffered the brunt of violence, not only in 
the hands of the AFRC/RUF but also by the ECOMOG peacekeepers. The eastern 
parts of Freetown suffered most damage; as the invaders were pushed out of the 
city, they destroyed and burnt virtually everything in their wake and kidnapped 
thousands of civilians as porters or new recruits.   
 
5.4 The Lomé agreement and the road to peace 
Domestic and international  pressure for a negotiated end to the war increased 
after the invasion of Freetown. As in 1998, the rebels and renegade soldiers 
were pushed out of town but not crushed militarily. Nigeria,  by far the largest 
contributor of personnel and finances to the ECOMOG operation, announced its  
plans to gradually withdraw from Sierra Leone.  
A new round of peace negotiat ions that started in the Togolese capital of Lomé 
in May 1999 was concluded less than two months later with a new peace 
agreement. The Lomé Peace Agreement was essentially “a power-sharing deal 
that involved buying off the RUF leaders with amnesty and prime jobs” (Stovel 
2006:121).  It  granted a blanket amnesty to all combatants and provided for a 
transitional government of national unity and deployment of a United Nations 
peacekeeping force (Lomé Peace Agreement 1999). Abraham (2004) notes that 
the difference between the Abidjan and Lomé peace accords is that the latter 
was “all carrots, no sticks” for the RUF (p. 213). The RUF was ‘reinvented’ as a 
political movement -  the Revolutionary United Front Party - and Sankoh became 
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a vice-president and Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the 
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconciliation and Development. 
Koroma was in the end appointed (somewhat paradoxically) the chairman of the 
Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, set up to supervise the 
implementation of the accord. However, as Koroma was later to fall out with the 
RUF it was not easy to fulfil  this task (Alie 2006:201). In an aim to reconcile 
the nation President Kabbah called on the people to ‘forgive and forget’. 
At the time of signing the Lomé Peace Agreement, the RUF held most of the 
Northern and large parts of the Eastern Province including the diamond fields in 
Kono and Tongo. Following the signing of the peace agreement, in October 1999 
the UN Security Council established a 6,000-member UN Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL) under chapter VII of the UN Charter, to replace ECOMOG. 
By December, UNAMSIL troops from Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Kenya and 
Zambia had begun to arrive, and in February 2000 the Security Council agreed 
to increase their number to 11,000 (Alie 2006:200) UNAMSIL launched the 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme in October 
1999 but by May 2000 only about 19,000 combatants turned up in the 
registration camps, many of them without weapons. Some of the demobilised 
combatants were subsequently rearmed by the government to fight the RUF 
(ibid.: 201).  In early May 2000, the RUF took more than 500 UNAMSIL troops 
hostage in several locations and confiscated their weapons and vehicles. In a 
reaction to the kidnappings and RUF’s continued breaching of the peace 
agreement, a peaceful march was organized in Freetown by several civil society 
groups from the city centre to Sankoh’s villa. The demonstration was hijacked 
by Koroma’s ex-AFRC fighters and resulted in a violent clash and a number of 
civil ian deaths on both sides. Sankoh himself escaped but was captured in 
Freetown few days later (BBC May 18, 2000).  
The RUF attempted to attack Freetown in the wake of the May events and 
Sankoh’s arrest but  was repelled by a motley coali tion of pro-governmental 
forces – the new national army, CDF, ECOMOG and the West Side Boys, a group 
formed of some ex-AFRC fighters.  In yet another violent incident a few months 
later, a splinter group of the West Side Boys kidnapped eleven British soldiers. 
A dramatic rescue “Operation Barras” by the British el ite SAS force destroyed 
the kidnappers and sent a potent signal  to all the RUF and other potential 
dissenters that no more ceasefire violations would be tolerated (Peters 2006:55). 
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The continuous breaches of the peace accord also led president Kabbah to 
reconsider its amnesty provisions and in August 2000, he requested the UN to 
establish a joint UN-Sierra Leone Special  Court to prosecute those who bear the 
greatest responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
The final ceasefire was negotiated in November 2000 in Abuja in Nigeria. The 
DDR programme got back on track in May 2001 and by the end of the year, it  
extended even to the RUF strongholds in Kono, Kailahun and Kenema Districts 
in the Eastern Province (Peters 2006).  Fighting declined but attacks on civilians 
continued. On 18 January,  2002 President Kabbah declared the war was 
officially over. The war had led to the death of upwards of 50,000 people 
(mainly civilians),  the maiming and mutilation of thousands, and the 
displacement of more than a third of the population of 5 million (Gberie 
2003:637). The process of reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life 
continued until December 2003. In total,  72.490 ex-combatants were disarmed, 
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6. The National Transitional Justice Institutions 
6.1 The SCSL and TRC 
Recent years have seen a worldwide proliferation of transitional justice 
institutions established to assist post-war and post-authoritarian countries to 
deal with their violent past. Sierra Leone was no exception in this respect; both 
criminal prosecution and truth-telling were sought in the country, by the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconcil iation Commission 
(TRC) respectively.  
The establishment of the TRC was laid down in the Lomé Peace Agreement. This 
was a result of several months of t ireless efforts by a number of Sierra Leonean 
civil society groups and human rights advocates (cf. Dougherty 2004). The 
peace agreement granted a blanket amnesty to al l the combatants and the TRC 
was initially envisaged to be the only accountability mechanism. As stipulated 
by the Lomé Peace Agreement, the task of the TRC was to “address impunity,  
break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations to tel l their story,  and get  a clear picture 
of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation” (Art .XXVI). 
It  was supposed to look into the human rights violations committed since the 
beginning of the war in 1991, and explici tly tasked with recommending 
“measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights 
violations” and submitting a report to the government that pleaded “immediate 
implementation of its recommendations” (Art.XXVI). The Government of Sierra 
Leone passed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act in February 2000; 
the TRC was inaugurated in July 2002 and its ini tial operational phase began in 
early October 2002. Between December 2002 and mid-April 2003 it collected a 
total  of 7706 statements from victims, perpetrators and witnesses across the 
country and from refugees in Gambia, Guinea and Nigeria (Conibere et.al 2004). 
On April 14, 2003 public hearings opened. In the following three months until 
July 11, the TRC held five-day long sessions in Freetown and in each of the 
country's  district  headquarter towns.  
Following violations of the Lomé agreement, president Kabbah’s government 
approached the UN Secretary General on 12 June 2000 with a request  to initiate 
an establishment of an international criminal court. The UN already previously 
expressed i ts preference for criminal just ice. According to Human Rights Watch, 
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the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative Francis Okello at tached a 
hand-written disclaimer to the Lomé peace agreement declaring UN’s 
unwillingness to recognize “the accord's amnesty provision as applying to 
crimes of genocide,  crimes against humanity, war crimes,  and other serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law” although the UN did not 
further act upon this disclaimer either through a protocol or a Security Council 
resolution (HRW 2000). Following Kabbah’s appeal , the UNSC Resolution 1315 
passed on August 14, 2000 requested the establishment of a criminal court and 
on 16 January 2002, an agreement was signed between the UN and the 
Government of Sierra Leone establishing the Special Court  for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL). The court became operational seven month later in August 2002. The 
SCSL was conceived as a first-ever hybrid international criminal  court,  
mandated to prosecute crimes both under international and domestic law, and 
involving international  and Sierra Leonean personnel.  Sitting in Freetown, it  
was hoped the SCSL would overcome one of the greatest  criticisms against 
international criminal justice being too distant  from the countries where the 
prosecuted crimes were committed. The Statute of the SCSL gives the court “the 
power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed 
in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996” (2002:Art.1). In 2003, 
a total of thirteen people were indicted by the SCSL’s Prosecutor David Crane. 
The first  trial  began in June 2004, against three members of the CDF: Chief 
Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa. Hinga Norman died in 
custody before judgment was issued; the Appeals Chamber Judgement in May 
2008 handed down sentences of 15 and 20 years for Fofana and Kondewa 
respectively. The RUF trial  against Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and 
Augustine Gbao began in July 2004; Sesay was sentenced to 52 years, Kallon to 
40 years and Gbao to 25 years in April 2009. The former members of the AFRC 
Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu stood trial 
between March 2005 and February 2008. After the Appeals Chamber judgement 
dismissed their appeal Brima was sentenced to 50 years in jail and Kanu and 
Kamara to 45. Three key players in the conflict  were indicted – the RUF leader 
Foday Sankoh died in custody in July 2003 and his deputy and RUF Battlefield 
Commander Sam Bockarie was killed in Liberia in May 2003. The former head 
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of AFRC Johnny Paul Koroma is considered by the SCSL to be at large.
22
 The 
trial of the former President of Liberia Charles Ghankay Taylor was the only 
outstanding case of the SCSL when I conducted my fieldwork in early 2010. 
Rather than inquiring about the general attitudes of people towards the SCSL, I 
therefore decided to ask about their perceptions and knowledge of this specific 
case. Some general  remarks on the work of the court  came up in the 
conversations with my informants but the bulk of information in 6.2 below 
concerns specifically the Charles Taylor trial. A brief overview of the process is  
therefore justified here.  
Charles Taylor was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on June 4, 
2003 and charged with 11 counts war crimes, crimes against humanity and other 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. He has denied all the 
charges and pleaded innocent. The key task for the prosecution is  not  to prove 
that crimes were committed in Sierra Leone – which Taylor does not deny – but 
to prove that Taylor had direct connection to the Sierra Leonean rebels – that he 
gave them orders, supported them and knew about the crimes they were 
committing and did not act upon that.  It  took almost three years to negotiate his 
hand over to the Court from Nigeria where he was offered asylum as part of the 
Liberian peace deal . He was eventually arrested and transferred first to the 
Special Court in Freetown in 2006 and later that year to The Hague.  
The trial has been taking place in The Hague on the premises of the 
International Criminal Court
23
 where it  was moved out of fears that a process in 
Freetown would create instability in the region, particularly in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia.  This however means that it  is taking place far away from the ci tizens of 
Sierra Leone – which contradicts the idea of “hybridity” of the SCSL. It  further 
negatively influences the impact (in spite of the efforts of the Outreach 
programme) that the Court has on the ordinary Sierra Leoneans who lost the 
abili ty to closely follow the trial .  
The trial had a somewhat rocky start when Charles Taylor, arguing that  his right 
to a just process was not fulfilled, fired his defence counsel and decided to 
boycott  the trial until his defence was given time and resources comparable to 
those given to the prosecution. But since then it  has been a rather unspectacular 
                                                 
22
 Allegations were heard during the Taylor trial claiming Koroma was murdered in Liberia on Taylor’s orders but 
this was disputed by the defence on the grounds that it was unfounded (The New Democrat, 25 October, 2010). 
23
 It was later moved to the premises of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
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process. The process started on January 7, 2008 and was init ially hoped to take 
twelve to eighteen months. Eventually, the guilty verdict was read out on April 
26, 2012 followed on May 30 by a conviction to 50 years.
24
 To date, the Charles 
Taylor trial has cost  over USD 50 million paid by donor contributions mostly 
from the US, together with the UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Nigeria.   
Sierra Leone was the first country where an international criminal court and a 
truth commission operated concurrently.  It  was in fact an experiment, viewed by 
commentators as “a laboratory in which to examine how the two bodies, special 
‘inst itutionalized’ courts and truth commissions, relate to each other” (Schabas 
2003:1065). As Shaw points out,  the language of experimentation raised serious 
ethical questions: “Beyond this disturbing image of Sierra Leoneans as 
experimental subjects and those who run the Special Court and TRC as white-
coated scientists lay the even more troubling implication – sometimes made 
explici t by expatriated in Freetown – that Sierra Leone was less important in 
itself than as a model for other countries” (Shaw 2010:119 referring to her 
conversation with Danny Hoffman).  
It  has brought several problems – not only in terms of the actual operations and 
outcomes of these institutions but also in the way Sierra Leoneans perceived 
these insti tutions and how they reacted to their respective missions.  
As mentioned above, the TRC initially had a broad support  among the civil  
society groups who urged i ts creation and were involved in the preparatory 
phase leading up to i ts setting up (Dougherty 2004). Many of them however lost  
trust in the TRC even before the crucial statement taking had started. There 
were accusations that the selection of the national  commissioners was politically 
driven as they all had close ties to the ruling SLPP, the staff recruitment was 
also plagued with serious problems (cf. Stovel 2007:195-196). The parallel 
operation of the SCSL, which – given the clear preference among the donors for 
criminal justice - at tracted more attention and funding, left  the TRC severely 
underfunded and led to some of its activities having to be cut down (Dougherty 
2004). 
Further clashes arose in the area of the practical operations. The question of 
information-sharing has been particularly contentious.  This issue was also 
subject of wild public imagination. According to a local NGO leader in 
                                                 
24
 At the time of writing Taylor’s defence team has filed for appeal to the setence.  
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Freetown, there was a rumour going around about an underground tunnel 
connecting the two neighbouring buildings of the TRC and SCSL through which 
people and information were shared (E10, cf. Kelsall 2005:381). It  was also 
reported that  the fear of the SCSL using self-incriminating testimonies given by 
the perpetrators to the TRC meant many of them stayed away from the 
Commission’s hearings (Kelsall 2009, Coulter 2009, Shaw 2010). For many 
Sierra Leoneans it  was hard to distinguish between the tasks and mandates of 
the TRC, SCSL and other national initiat ives such as the DDR programme which 
resulted in hesitant  cooperation with all of them (Coulter 2009, Shaw 2010, 
Stovel 2006, Kelsall 2009). 
The confusion among the population as to the respective roles of the SCSL and 
TRC cannot be entirely at tributed to problems in communication and the fact 
that “the existence of the SCSL complicated matters because people now had to 
understand two separate transitional justice institutions and the relationship 
between them” (Dougherty 2004:46).  As Danny Hoffman writes: “the efforts of 
the accountabili ty institutions to establish a singular narrative of the events of 
the war in Sierra Leone privilege an ideal of the therapeutic properties of public 
discourse not shared by many Sierra Leoneans” (Hoffman 2004:338).  Kelsall 
(2009) has persuasively argued that the Special Court fai led to accommodate the 
local culture in which it  operated,  while Shaw (2010) noted that “despite the 
TRC’s victim-oriented mandate [it]  often appeared remote from survivors’ 
concerns” (p.112). She further contends that  both mechanisms failed to address 
the social and economic injustices from before the war (ibid.:131, cf. Shaw 
2005, 2007).   
Sawyer and Kelsall (2007) conducted an opinion survey into transitional justice 
in three districts of Sierra Leone in 2005. They found support for the TRC and 
SCSL in the country, inferring that there is a genuine desire for some form of 
accountability process. Importantly though, these attitudes were based, to a 
large extent, on ignorance of what the two institutions actually did and at times 
on confusion between the two. The authors therefore concluded that, if such 
institutions are to be successful  in their goals,  a sound understanding of their 
work rather than broad uninformed support is  vital . In the next part the 
knowledge of and attitudes towards the SCSL and the Taylor trial  wil l be 
examined in order to establish how meaningful it  has been to the process of 
reconciliation and dealing with the violent past in the local communities.  
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6.2 The reflection of international justice on the local level: the Charles 
Taylor trial 
Sierra Leone hosted two large international transitional justice inst itutions – the 
TRC and the SCSL, as described above. No study of community reconciliation 
could thus be complete without a look at  the dynamics of the encounter between 
these institutions and the local reconciliation efforts. At the time of my research 
in 2008 and 2010, the TRC has already finished i ts work and the SCSL was 
wrapping up its operations in Sierra Leone, with its only pending case of the 
former Liberian president Charles Taylor taking place in The Hague. My 
interviews therefore focused primarily on the Taylor case and the SCSL because 
it  was still  regularly reported on the radio.  
Most people in the villages that I visited knew about the existence of the 
Special Court and the ongoing trial of Charles Taylor. Their information usually 
came from regular listening to radio broadcasts. Some of them mentioned a visit  
by SCSL representatives in the village, referring probably to the officers of the 
SCSL Outreach Programme. The generally high level of awareness was contrary 
to suggestions given to me by a number of NGO workers and academics in 
Freetown who were sceptical about the knowledge people upcountry would have 
about the court (E10, E11). To the extent that just being aware about the 
existence of the SCSL and the Taylor trial in itself seen as beneficial , this high 
awareness confirms success of the praised Outreach Programme.  
Further conversations, however, mostly revealed that the knowledge people have 
is either very shallow or confused and rarely goes beyond knowing about the 
SCSL’s existence (cf. Kerr and Lincoln 2008, Kelsall and Sawyer 2007, BBC 
World Service Trust 2008).  This lack of detailed knowledge in turn reflected on 
how the villagers perceived the relevance of the court for them, their community 
and for Sierra Leone. This was a typical reaction to my enquiry about people’s 
awareness of the Taylor trial:   
We only heard about Charles Taylor but we don't know him. Yes, we learnt about 
his arrest. But we do not know where he is tried. We only know a litt le thing 
about him.. . Since we know very li ttle about it ,  i t  is not really important to us.  
(INT27) 
This si tuation can part ly be explained by issues of practical nature, such as 
communication problems, but cultural factors also play a cri tical role. Given the 
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high illi teracy rate, making the population aware of the work and purpose of the 
SCSL, or of the transitional justice inst itutions in general , was a challenging 
task. Two media have been widely used – picture brochures or posters and radio, 
which is the most common and effective communication tool in the country.  For 
most people, radio was the only source of information they had about the trial.  
The broadcasting – mainly by the UNAMSIL radio and the BBC was in ei ther 
English or in Krio. Statements such as the following were common particularly 
among women in the rural areas who do not understand either of these languages 
and whose ability to learn about or understand what is going at the SCSL is 
therefore seriously constrained: 
We are not much aware of it ,  because we don't speak English or Krio. Though 
we hear from others that his trial is on the radio, we have to rely on what others 
tell us. […]  On the radio we only hear Charles Taylor, Charles Taylor. But 
whatever they are saying about him, or about the court, or what he did, we don't  
know. […]  All that they told us about Taylor is that he is a wicked man and 
we’ve heard that he is in jail but  we don’t know where. […] When we hear it ,  
sometimes we get confused, as if  it  is a thunderbolt that has just cracked. As a 
result of what we have gone through, we get confused or scared when we hear 
his name on the radio. But we don't  understand what they say.  (INT16) 
In other places, lack of radios compounded the problem. 
It  does not seem that  physical outreach to the communities by the SCSL officers 
did a lot to change situation. Instead, it  brought problems of its own. In four of 
the villages people confirmed that they had visitors from the SCSL who showed 
them a film about the SCSL and ‘sensit ised’ them either on the general purpose 
of the institution or on the Taylor trial (INT3, INT17, INT28, INT50). But I did 
not find significant difference in the knowledge between those villagers where 
they had a visi t from the SCSL and those where they did not.   
In two of the villages,  informational posters still  reminded of these Outreach 
programme visits (see Annex 6). I saw the first posters in a village in Port Loko 
District. The first with the title “Greatest Responsibility” showed a map of 
Sierra Leone with five of the indicted men behind bars. In front of the map, 
there was a crowd of Sierra Leoneans,  each with one raised arm and one finger 
pointing towards the incarcerated perpetrators.  The other illustrated a vision of 
“Sierra Leone after the Court”,  when “together the Special Court  and the people 
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of Sierra Leone will move towards peace and justice”. This was symbolized by a 
group of civilians, young and old, standing in a rice field,  looking over the 
ocean at the sun rising on the horizon. 
These are some of the comments people made about these posters when I 
referred to them: 
We do not understand the pictures on the chief's veranda. We just take them to 
be ordinary pictures,  like a calendar. We don't know that they are depicting the 
Special Court. We are not aware of the Charles Taylor trial since we live in 
rural places we hardly receive news.  (FG11) 
We are not able to recognize any of these people, because we do not know their 
faces. When these pictures were brought,  we were not educated properly as to 
why some are behind something like a fence on a map while others are outside. 
They told us that they are giving this to us to see what happened during the war 
or something like that and then they gave us the papers and then went back. [ ...]  
We heard about the Special Court, but  we do not know the people that were 
tried. […]  Charles Taylor was once a president of Liberia.  But I do not know his 
whereabouts now.  (INT28) 
My second encounter with the Special  Court posters was in a village in 
Koinadugu District.  Here, the black and white drawing graphically depicted 
some the worst atrocities committed during the war – a woman being raped at  
gunpoint by a group of combatants; two obviously amused rebels holding a 
toddler by hands and legs while a third one is swinging up a machete to sl it  the 
child in half; villagers having their arms cut off as limbs of others are already 
scattered on the ground; others being burnt alive in a car. Myself feeling 
uncomfortable looking at the depicted scenes, I asked about this poster in my 
interviews:  
Me: Why do you have the poster on the chief ’s house?  
Elder: The poster was put up there by the Special  Court representative. He came 
by and plastered it  on the wall. He also played a video, but we do not 
understand what takes place in the Special Court. 
Me: Do people look at that picture? How do you feel about seeing it?  
Elder: We feel sad because of what happened. When we see the poster we recall 
those incidents. 
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Me: Why don’t  you take it  off  of  the wall? 
Elder: Because outsiders hung i t there and we might get in trouble for removing 
it.  We never said that we wanted it ,  but  it  was brought by outsiders so we cannot 
judge it .  We don’t want to watch it  but it  was put there by others with permission 
of the elders, we actually don’t want to remind ourselves of this but it’s  not our 
fault. We don’t want to talk about those events again. It  is not  our wish to have 
it ,  but we don’t want problems.  (INT17) 
Others expressed similar sentiments. People clearly found it  very distressing to 
look at  those pictures.  Instead, they stated a preference for moving on, not 
talking about the past anymore and not being reminded of the war experience 
(see chapter 7).  
 
The purpose of trying Charles Taylor 
Most people thought it  was good that Charles Taylor was facing trial . But they 
often had different reasons for their support . Some people blamed the war and 
their suffering on Taylor, for others the main reason were security concerns and 
fear. There also were a number of people who felt  no trial  was necessary. 
Several people gave general and vague but the more resolute statements about 
Charles Taylor and his connection to the war in Sierra Leone, naming him as the 
main or even the only cause of the conflict.  These statements are illustrative: 
It is horrible to even kill  one person. But Charles Taylor came with this war that 
made people do even worse things to other people.  ( INT15) 
All the problems we are facing are because of Taylor because he was the 
architect of the war.  (INT10) 
It is  because of this man that we know all  the ‘secrets of war ’.  (FG22) 
During 1990, he promised the late President Momoh that if  he hosts ECOMOG 
in Sierra Leone to intervene in Liberia, the country is  going to taste the 
bitterness of war.  And after he said that the war overtook this place. (INT26) 
It  is  difficult,  i f not impossible, to trace the origins of this perception of Taylor 
as the main ‘architect of the war ’. His own announcement in a BBC World radio 
interview in 1990 that Sierra Leone would “taste the bitterness of war” (referred 
to in the last quote above), may have contributed to this, although only three of 
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the informants actually referred to it  explicitly.  More often such statements 
about Taylor ’s involvement came in the form of “they say”, “we hear”, 
“according to what we are gett ing” which may suggest that  radio or the SCSL 
Outreach visits may at least partly be sources of this image.
25
  
Security concerns were strongly articulated by most people as the major reason 
for their support  for incarceration of Charles Taylor.  This is  arguably closely 
related to the previously discussed perception of the war as brought about by 
Taylor ’s vicious planning in the first  place, although not everyone who gave 
security as their main concern blamed the war entirely on the Liberian 
president. These statements were typical:  
If he was not indicted we would be in the bushes hiding. So we are afraid of 
him.  (FG17) 
The atrocities that  will occur now will  be more dangerous than those that just 
occurred i f  they free him. (INT4) 
The fear argumentation thus appears both with reference to the past conflict as 
well as – and much more often – in relat ion to the future of the country and the 
life of the people and the communities.  
Conspicuously missing from the above statements supportive of the court are 
any references to the need for ‘justice to be done’ that underlies the transitional 
justice institutions in the rhetoric of its proponents. This was even more evident 
in the answers and reactions to the question of what would happen if Taylor is  
found innocent by the court  and walks out free: 
They should not release him now. That is  very important to us. I am giving you 
an example: if  you catch a lion or a tiger, they are wild animals, and you lock 
them up for some time and keep them in a cage. It  will  become angry when it is 
not free to move in the bush l ike that . After some time you release it ,  i t  will be 
wilder than before.  Very wild by next  time. [.. .]  You must keep him there. 
(INT20) 
                                                 
25
 The structural causes of the war in Sierra Leone as discussed in chapter 4 are largely supported by the TRC report, 
and recently the risk of casting too much blame for causing the war on Taylor was pointed out by his legal defence 
team. After his conviction on April 26 2012, his lawyers said that “their client should not be made to shoulder the 
blame alone for what happened in Sierra Leone's war” and that the court should not support “attempts by the 
prosecution to provide the Sierra Leoneans with this external bogey man upon whom can be heaped the collective 
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There were however also a few people who did not see any benefit in trying 
Charles Taylor and refused the SCSL on the grounds that there is peace now and 
that reconciliation has happened. In their answers resonated the widespread 
appeal to ‘forgive and forget’ (as will be discussed in Chapter 7): 
For us,  since the war is over, and there is peace, there is  no need for the trial  of 
Charles Taylor.  (INT24) 
Because we said – let us forgive each other. So he also should be forgiven. 
(INT37) 
In this view, the trial  cannot do anything for Sierra Leoneans and their efforts  to 
come to terms with what happened during the war once they agreed to move on. 
Furthermore, as Stovel (2006) points out, there is an apparent contradiction 
between the ‘forgive and forget’ that the Government and reintegration agencies 
had been preaching in the direct  aftermath of the war and the SCSL that sought 
to keep some of the perpetrators accountable.  This was echoed by a number of 
my informants that  believed that Taylor should not be tried in the light of 
Kabbah’s plea to ‘forgive and forget’. A Kamajor in Bo (INT1) told me: 
The decision [to try those people]  was not taken properly,  what they should have 
done is to tell the people to forgive, tel l them that all has passed and [they]  
should have not arrested anybody. But at the moment that  they had arrested 
somebody it meant that they did not help them. The ex-combatants in general, 
they did not help them at all by arresting their leaders and putting them into 
jail.  Forgiveness did not occur in that particular sense.   
The prosecution of some of those that ‘bear the greatest responsibility’, did not 
always help those that returned to their communities integrate any easier. This is  
also confirmed by Shaw’s (2010) research, who finds that  the argument that  
justice mechanisms promote integration is not based on the realities on the 
ground (p.114).   
 
Discussion and Analysis 
The most important reason why people in Sierra Leone want Charles Taylor to 
be imprisoned are fear and security concerns. This is significant in itself. It  
points at the continuing feeling of insecurity in the countryside, not as much an 
immediate one but rather a continuing lack of trust in the state’s ability to 
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provide its population protection and security. The Sierra Leonean war was 
preceded by decades of declining state presence especially in the countryside, 
which led to its virtual disappearance during the war. Although the country has 
been stable since the war ended in 2002, people’s confidence in the state 
institutions is still  l imited. With this in mind, having Charles Taylor - whose 
cri tical role in fomenting the war in Sierra Leone is widely known (although not 
always truly understood) - taken away from the region indeed makes many 
people feel safer. As a young woman in Port Loko told me, removing Charles 
Taylor “helps to maintain the peace in Sierra Leone”  ( INT22). 
On the other hand, the idea of tribunals helping to restore the dignity for the 
victims by providing them with the desired retribution does not resonate widely 
in the responses. Indeed, there was virtually no mention of a need for retribution 
in the interviews. There are other needs that the informants see as a priority in 
their dealing with the war experience. One of the reasons why international  
justice often fails to satisfy victims is that it  is happening in a world that is  
extremely different and distanced from theirs (not just geographically but also 
through the moral universe that it  occupies). The standards and privileges that 
are given to the accused perpetrators are much better than their own and outside 
their reach, and are thus often viewed as “adding to the crime” (E19). While 
most people in the villages are not aware of the total amount of money spent on 
the SCSL or on Charles Taylor, those that do have an idea tend to see it  as a 
waste of money.  
They often argue the money should have been spent on the war victims in Sierra 
Leone instead: “We, who are the true sufferers during this war, the money that 
they are using on Charles Taylor case, if  they had taken the money to give to 
people who are victims to this war, i t  is better” (INT48), or bemoan the comfort 
and attention Charles Taylor is receiving in The Hague:  
He has a TV and has a comfortable life, he has everything. He is living a happy 
life. Nice place to sleep, food, everything. […]  For a notorious person to be 
enjoying such luxurious life, and us who suffered not even being able to afford a 
meal for the day. ..  the question of whether we are happy about it  or not is even 
beyond imagination. We are not happy. Our voices won't reach there. What he is 
enjoying we will not  enjoy until the end of our lives. A goat here is different 
than a white man's goat.  (Meaning: The conditions here and in The Hague 
cannot even be compared. Taylor is better off,  is  treated better.) ( INT17) 
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Kerr and Lincoln (2008) also note that “regardless of whether these people’s 
freedom had been withdrawn and they were being prosecuted for bearing the 
greatest responsibility for the worst crimes against humanity, all that people saw 
is that these people were getting what they didn’t have; namely food, shelter and 
security” (p.23). A civil society leader in Freetown concluded that the Charles 
Taylor process was not meeting any of the needs of the victims or the population 
at large.  He doubted any contribution of the SCSL to ordinary Sierra Leoneans 
on these grounds,  arguing that  “the reconciliation really has to touch the life of  
the victims” (E10). 
Many of the statements suggest that people perceive of the SCSL as a foreign 
institution, belonging to some distant outsiders in Freetown and to the 
international community,  referred to often as ‘them’ and not ‘us’. This is true of 
the way people spoke about receiving information about the court or the way 
they spoke about Taylor ’s involvement and judgement - and sometimes in 
explici t statements on the issue of the ownership of the whole process: 
We have reconciled,  we forgot about it .  So whatever you are doing there with 
Charles Taylor, it  is just to satisfy your own needs - whether you want to 
demonstrate human rights, whether you want to demonstrate democracy,  
transfer of anger […] . How is that going to benefit Sierra Leoneans? […] 
People here stil l  need reconstruction, so why can't you bring the money and help 
the people's lives? Go to most of these villages and you see the walls of the 
burnt houses, people are not able to rebuild it  again.. .  […]  You are not going to 
satisfy me or many Sierra Leoneans, you only want to satisfy yourself that you 
are transparent in democracy,  you are transparent in justice, for me Charles 
Taylor trial is useless, you can do whatever you feel l ike doing with him, for me 
I am coping - we have peace,  the country is gradually developing, nobody is 
thinking of  bringing fighting back again,  so we are ok.  (E19)  
In the eyes of many, the SCSL and the Taylor trial are there because the 
international community (or the ‘white people’) wanted it  to be there and i t is 
then up to them what will or will not happen. Sierra Leoneans ei ther have no 
interest,  no say in it  or no benefit  from it.    
Overall ,  the findings suggest that the SCSL and the Taylor trial  have a very 
limited relevance for the local communities and their coming to terms with the 
war. It  bypasses the local understanding of reconciliation and its proceedings as 
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well as i ts underlying philosophy are removed from the local reality. While 
people have shown approval with Charles Taylor standing trial, their concern 
was security and not justice. This confirms what other authors have suggested 
that  “for many ‘survivors’, t ribunal justice fails  to palliate their sense of 
injustice” (Stover and Weinstein 2004:333 quoted in Kelsall 2009:7). The claim 
by the SCSL prosecutor Brenda Hollis on the day that the guilty verdict against 
Charles Taylor was pronounced that “this judgment brings some measure of 
justice to the many thousands of victims who paid a terrible price for Mr. 
Taylor 's crimes” (BBC, April 26, 2012), does not thus resonate with my findings 
in the local communities. In chapters 7 and 8 below I will  turn to the local  
understandings of reconciliation and the processes that better fulfil  the needs 
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PART III.  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
As evident from the brief discussion of the war above in chapter 5, the violence 
that  engulfed Sierra Leone for over a decade left  deep marks on the local  
communities. People lost family members and friends, many were kidnapped, 
many maimed or raped. Refugees and internally displaced people spent extended 
periods of time away from their homes. As people started returning to their 
homes they often found their villages destroyed. Their houses had been burnt 
down, their farms infested with weed and taken over by the bush, and their 
ancestral  shrines and sacred bushes ruined and desecrated. The task of 
rebuilding the communities,  both the physical structures as well as human 
relationships, was overwhelming.  
But Sierra Leonean communities also have – like other communities worldwide 
– established strategies of coping, of healing and of coming together in the 
aftermath of violence and conflict . These are found in “the performance of 
everyday l ife” and/or in “ritual and religious practice” (Shaw and Waldorf 
2010:20). The following two chapters are looking at these two realms in turn. 
The meaning of reconciliation as it  is described locally is first outlined, 
followed by a presentation and analysis of the local  narratives about whether 
and how such reconciliation has been achieved. It also looks at the practice of 
reintegration and the post-war relationship between the chiefs and youth.  
Chapter 8 looks specifically at  the role of ceremonies and other traditional 
practice. The narrative is built  around excerpts from the interviews that  are 
interpreted and complemented with part icipant observation and with findings 
from other research.  
 
7. Community reconciliation in Sierra Leone 
7.1 Meaning(s) of reconciliation  
The English word of reconciliation  has made its  way into Sierra Leonean 
common parlance most probably through the work of the country's  Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and activities implemented by local and 
international NGOs. Consequently, it  is  usually used to describe the national 
level efforts; the terms used to describe the process at the community level are 
different .  
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On the individual level , reconciliation is  expressed through the notion of having 
‘kol at’ (cool heart). Although having ‘kol at’ is a personal condit ion, its 
meaning is strongly relational. It  means that one’s heart  does not contain 
feelings of anger, resentment or grudge against others and refers to the person’s 
capacity to have proper social relationships with others (cf. Shaw 2005; 
Boersch-Supan 2009). Indeed, Shaw points out in her analysis of the local 
concepts of personhood that parts of the body are often used “as tropes for the 
capacity to relate to others” (Shaw 2000:40).
26
 A young man in a village in 
Kailahun District likened ‘kol at’ to ‘peace of mind’ which was a necessary 
condition for one to be part  of a working community:   
If you have peace of mind as an individual,  you will come together with the 
others,  eat together,  hug each other and that wil l bring reconciliation. (FG19) 
Collective reconciliation at the level of a community, be it  a family, vil lage or a 
larger group, is best  expressed by the phrase ‘le we mak wan word’ (let 's make 
one word).  
A single tree cannot be a forest. So one person cannot promote or develop the 
community until  others go with him, you go together, put  things together, then 
you try to work for the better to develop this community. It  is  unity. And that is 
wan word.  (INT35) 
Unity and the abili ty to work together resonated very strongly in people’s 
descriptions of what reconciliation was about. The progress of reconciliation – 
or the lack of it  – was often illustrated by reference to practical examples of 
accomplished or ongoing work in the village:  
There are certain i llnesses and we have no medical centre here – if  we have an 
outbreak of cholera, if  you are ill ,  people will take a hammock and carry you to 
the next village with the medical centre. Every time. And it shows [that]  we are 
united.  (FG22)  
Other examples were often given, such as assisting each other with rebuilding 
houses or brushing farms together. The idea of cooperation was also closely 
observed in the organisation of reconciliation ceremonies. Under the economic 
duress, the only way that  communities could gather the minimal sacrifice 
                                                 
26
 Shaw (2000) talks specifically about the Temne; her findings are arguably also valid for other groups in Sierra 
Leone. ‘Kol at’ is the expression in Krio, the Sierra Leonean lingua franca, the expression in Temne is “ka-buth ke-
thofel” (Shaw 2005:1), in Mende it is “ndi lei” (Boersch-Supan 2009:13). 
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necessary to perform a ceremony was to require contributions from its  members.  
Organising a ceremony with contributions from everyone in the community 
could be considered as an important result of cooperation, encouraging the 
participants to cooperate for further development.   
These expressions of reconciliation go beyond a mere statement of peaceful 
coexistence as they emphasise cooperation. This must be seen in the context of 
the vital importance that  social networks play in the local  context. 
 
7.2 Achieving ‘kol at’ and restoration of community cohesion 
People in the communities that  I visited almost unanimously confirmed that 
such ‘unity’ or reconciliation had been achieved in their place. What accounts 
for this apparent success and what is  the nature of this unity? 
Interestingly, people did not readily relate achieving reconcil iation to the issues 
most often associated with the concept in the transitional justice debates as 
discussed in chapter 2. They did not mention the need to know the truth about 
the past,  nor to see the perpetrators punished. Instead, two themes were often 
mentioned as important and interlinked ingredients of achieving reconciliation: 
forgetting and material redress. Let me now look at  both of them in turn. 
When asked about achieving individual and community reconciliation, or about 
dealing with the violent past more broadly, many people spoke about 
‘forgetting’. As an ex-combatant in Kailahun said: 
Everybody said let’s get forget  about all these things. We are all  one, let  us 
reconcile. That was why we performed that ceremony.  ( INT39) 
The processes in place are however more complex than first meets the eye. For 
one, it  would be wrong to see the appeal to forget,  or rather ‘forgive and forget’, 
in opposition to seeking acknowledgement of the past wrongs (either through 
truth-telling or criminal accountability),  as it  is often presented in the peace 
versus justice controversy within transitional justice.  
‘Remembering’ war or the inability to ‘forget’ was expressed as an individual 
rather than a community matter. More importantly, ‘remembering’ was related to 
present material hardship result ing from the war. Not one of the people that I 
spoke to put down their inabili ty to achieve ‘kol at’ to the need of knowing what 
exactly happened, who caused their suffering nor to seeing the perpetrators 
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receive judicial punishment for what they did. A man in a village in Kailahun 
District (FG29) summarized these sentiments in a proverb:  If you’ve come to 
apologise, show me where you kil led my father .  In other words, asking questions 
about the past only produces more questions and resentment, which both make it 
impossible to move away from the past.   
This confirms the findings of Rosalind Shaw who speaks in this context about 
‘social forgetting’. She sees it  as a process “different […] from individual 
forgetting, in that people still  have personal memories of the violence. But 
speaking of the violence - especially in public - was (and is) viewed as 
encouraging its return, calling it  forth when it is still  very close and might at 
any moment erupt again” (Shaw 2005:9).  
The prevailing response to dealing with the past in terms of ‘forgive and forget’, 
or even its more moderate expression of “I can forgive but I cannot forget” has 
sometimes been put down to a specific Sierra Leonean cultural characterist ic 
(cf. Shaw 2009). Many outside observers have been fascinated by the ‘forgiving 
nature’ of the local people. Richard Dowden (2008) admits he is “always struck 
by the spiri t  of forgiveness” and “talent for reconciliation” at the end of African 
wars, including the one in Sierra Leone (p. 305). I also heard reference to the 
culture of forgiveness from a number of Sierra Leoneans in Freetown during my 
first visit in 2008. My interviewees in the villages, many of whom said they 
have forgiven, however never spoke of the forgiveness as of a natural quality 
they possessed.  
Before we look into the nature and meaning of forgiveness, let me start with an 
excerpt from an interview with an elder (FG10) who lost his father in the war. 
The RUF locked him up in a house with many others and set them on fire. He 
saw forgiveness in these terms:  
Elder: We only accept to forgive because we have no other alternative. For the 
sake of peace. Like we, the old people, i t  was only with the help of god that we 
were not killed during the war.  We will  never forget , we are forgiving, but  we 
are still  reminded of  how our homes were vandalized and how people here were 
injured.  
Me: If you had a choice what would you l ike to happen to the perpetrators, what 
would you suggest? 
Elder: We have no alternative but to leave our case to god. 
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Two important aspects of forgiveness in post-war Sierra Leone are evident from 
this passage: a strong sense of pragmatism and deep religiosity.  A child 
reintegration officer similarly summarized to me his interpretation of Sierra 
Leonean forgiveness:   
In Sierra Leone people use the expression: ‘Aw fo do?’ In English it  is  ‘What to 
do?’ It means to say ‘what has happened, has happened’; ‘lets leave it  as it  is, 
lets accept i t  as i t  is, lets move on, lets  not dwell on it’.  And because Sierra 
Leoneans are deeply religious, some people will maybe also say a passage from 
the Bible or Quran that talks about forgiveness and moving on. So that is how 
we deal with issues generally, from polit ics to social  issues, to everything. (E9) 
Coming together, accepting the former fighters into the community's midst was 
to many simply the only available option to secure peace for the future. 
Forgiveness meant avoiding further violence. Indeed, statements such as “We 
have the belief that  if you punish them, they will not be happy about it  and 
revenge” (INT32) were very common.  
 
This view was also often presented to the communities by the country’s 
government and by the local tradit ional  authorities. There was a very strong 
appeal by Kabbah’s government to the nation to accept the ex-combatants and 
‘forgive and forget’ (Shaw 2009, Boersch-Supan 2009). Several people even 
today refer to the president’s post-war message:  
Kabbah called for peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone.. .  he said to accept 
those people that have done things in our homes, in these places, let 's have 
peace and forget about it .  (INT48) 
The second element in the Sierra Leonean’s forgiving atti tudes is their strong 
religiosity. According to statistics, Sierra Leoneans are about 77 % Muslim, 21 
% Christian and 1 % traditional/animist (Thomas 2007:59). Most Sierra 
Leoneans however practice animist beliefs along their Muslim or Christian 
fai ths, belong to the local secret societies and take part in diverse ri tual practice 
(cf. Shaw 2009:214). As discussed previously,  religious identities were not 
among the sources of divisions that fuelled the civil war. On the contrary, Sierra 
Leone is  characterised by religious tolerance and respect. The Interreligious 
Council of Sierra Leone played a prominent role in bringing together the 
warring factions at the Lomé peace talks and later continued “preaching of 
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God's message of repentance, forgiveness and reconcil iat ion” (Turay 2000:53).   
Sierra Leoneans often turn to religion in their responses to the experiences of 
the violent  war and their religious beliefs undoubtedly shape their ideas of 
forgiveness,  reconciliation and justice. In many local  communities,  religious 
leaders were very active in promoting reconciliation and religious spaces 
provided a safe space where former combatants could plead for acceptance into 
the community. In a village in Kailahun District , the local imam, who himself 
was held captive by the RUF and exploited for forced labour for three years, 
called for unity in the mosque:  
We all gathered at the mosque and said all that have grievances for your brother 
or sister, let  us all shake hands.  There are no more grudges.  (INT46) 
But religion is  not  only source of charity and forgiveness.  God was, for many of 
my informants, to be also the ultimate arbitrator of just ice. People often 
declared their forgiveness in this life together with an expectation of justice 
being served by god in the hereafter.  These statements are representative: 
We were told that nobody should revenge. That was the first message that came 
to us. Everybody was made by God. And if the person knows that all that he was 
doing was bad, then it  is lef t with the Almighty. But we ourselves,  we were made 
by God, so we don't have to revenge...  They [the chiefs]  were just tel ling us – let  
us forget about it ,  let us leave everything to the Almighty to decide. (FG20) 
In two villages people told me stories confirming in their eyes that such divine 
justice was indeed at  work. They spoke of ex-combatants who returned home but 
died soon after as a result of the crimes they committed during the war:  
I think we had two or three people here. Two of them are dead now. Only one is 
still  al ive.  But he is  not healthy again. ( . . . . ) Because that particular individual 
invited the fighters to come here and to kill  everybody. And he himself is now 
dead. God did not answer to his own thinking, his own prayers, so he died 
before us.  ( INT32) 
Rosalind Shaw also finds “a strong sense of the relationship between human 
forgiveness and deferred, divine retributive justice for the unknown 
perpetrators” in her interviews in the village of Gondama (Shaw 2009:219). In a 
similar vein,  Igreja (2007) notes in his study from Mozambique: “it is part of 
the socio-cultural system of belief that the spirits of dead victims or God or the 
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evil  tongue can enact justice by punishing the perpetrators of various crimes 
against innocent civilians” (p. 370). 
To a certain extent, placing the ultimate justice in the hands of God has to do 
with the history of injustice on the Sierra Leonean territory and people’s known 
inability to seek due justice from the state institutions. It  is thus not only an 
expression of deep rel igiosity but also of the prolonged failure of the Sierra 
Leonean state to provide people with justice, rule of law and security. Shaw also 
finds that many people “located forgiveness within multiple continuing forms of 
structural violence in the present:  powerlessness, exclusion, poverty,  
marginali ty,  insecurity” (2009:222). Forgiveness in this sense, she writes, “does 
not denote the absence of culpability but rather its expansion to implicate a 
much broader set of actors and institutions - the failure of the state, the failure 
of government, the fai lure of the legal  system, the failure of education, the 
fai lure of development, the failure of the international community” (Shaw 
2009:222).  For this reason, Laura Stovel warns against reinforcing a belief in 
ultimate justice because “it also may lead [people] to accept lack of justice 
which is both their due and is  needed to end impunity” (2006:71). There is 
another way of looking at it ,  however, if we accept that justice can indeed have 
“a supernatural dimension” (Igreja 2007:370). Leaving the punishment in the 
hands of God and other spiritual powers means that people can concentrate on 
their more immediate needs to restore a functioning community, which is 
paramount in an environment often characterised by scarcity of resources and 
high degree of mutual dependence (cf.  Igreja 2007:369-370).  
Statements about people’s inability to ‘forget’ the war – and achieve ‘kol at’ – 
tended to be followed by people’s requests for material assistance in various 
forms – with rebuilding and reconstructing their houses,  Court Barries or 
bridges,  with supporting their children’s education etc.  (cf.  Shaw 2007). 
Material compensation makes ‘forgetting’ and achieving ‘kol at’ possible, or at 
least easier, by giving the survivors the opportunity to rebuild their life and 
move on:  
All hearts are not equal [.. .]  Those that had houses and those houses were burnt, 
even if  that person may have peace of mind, at any time he or she reflects back 
to the past he will have no peace perhaps because that person is old now and 
cannot afford to put up another house. So that is the problem now.  (FG21) 
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In her ethnographic account of the TRC hearings, Rosalind Shaw finds that  
many of the civilians, who testified publicly in front of the Commission, did 
that in the hope that  it  would help “exchange their painful memories of the past 
for a sustainable future” (Shaw 2007:203, cf. Millar 2010, Stovel 2006). Jackson 
(2005) similarly observes that in spite of the Sierra Leonean custom of not 
dwelling on the past “the possibility [exists] that some will see the Western 
emphasis on talking through one’s grievances,  of publically confronting one’s 
oppressor, and of punishing those who perpetrated human rights abuses, as a 
more effective way of securing benefits  than silence and resignation” (Jackson: 
369). ‘Forgetting’ the war, and thus reconciling, seems then to be intimately 
linked to the ability to (re-)build one’s life and livelihood.  
 
7.3 Of truth and trust: the dynamics of reintegration 
Of the 18 villages that I visited, in 13 people told me there were former 
combatants l iving among them and that they have been accepted.
27
 The general 
preference to ‘forgive and forget’ discussed in the previous section might invite 
an expectation that  the ex-combatants would just settle down in the communities 
and be accepted unconditionally.  The reality is  much more complex than this.  
Certainly, it  seems that no open and public discussions about the particular 
crimes committed by the ex-combatants took place in most of the villages.  
‘Confessions’ and apologies on the side of the ex-combatants were rare.  Much 
ambiguity surrounded the narratives through which people explained how 
apology, forgiveness and acceptance worked. Apology (or accepting one's guilt)  
is stated by many as an important condition for forgiveness. Similarly, Stovel 
(2006:241) finds that many people expected the ex-combatants to apologise, but  
that  apologies were not forthcoming (cf. Boersch-Supan 2009).  
None of my informants had heard of any ex-combatant apologising in person.
28
 
In spite of not receiving an apology, my informants confirmed that they have 
forgiven now and reconciliation has occurred in their village and in Sierra 
Leone at  large. This passage from an interview with women in a village in 
Moyamba is informative: 
                                                 
27
 It is hard to tell whether this is the real number, as will be discussed below, people had several reasons for denying 
the presence of ex-combatants. 
28
 The exception being Fambul Tok ceremonies – see below. 
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Me: And can you reconcile with someone when you cannot forgive him for what 
he has done? 
Woman: No. You forgive the person before reconciliation. 
Me: How do you forgive? 
Woman: Through an apology. When somebody apologizes, you can forgive. You 
cannot repeat evil  for evil.  So if  the person comes and confesses and then 
apologizes,  you will reconcile with that person. 
Me: What i f  he does not apologize? 
Women: Well, even then, you must give him the benefit of the doubt. Because the 
person knows what he has done. So if  he says he is not going to apologize, then 
you give him the benefit of a doubt, then you continue.  (FG23)  
Giving the ex-combatants the ‘benefi t of the doubt’ seems what many people in 
the villages indeed did. This was not easy and mostly was not automatic. An 
appeal to forgive and accept people by the national and local  authorities as well 
as by the reintegration agencies certainly seems to have gone a long way in 
assuring peaceful coexistence and a start of reconciliation in many communities.  
The village elders remain to play an important role in several aspects of the 
reconciliation process. They often served as intermediaries in the reintegration 
process, both as partners to the reintegration agencies and in cases of individual 
acceptance of the ex-combatants. A NGO worker in Bo aptly pointed out the 
crucial  role of the chiefs in the reintegration process:  “Because whoever sits in 
the lap of the chief should be taken the greatest care of” (E1). In the same vein, 
John Williamson indicates that  “local chiefs and their counsellors were key 
initial points of entry into communities. NGO personnel discussed the situation 
of the former child soldiers with these traditional leaders,  stressing that these 
children had been abducted and forced by adults to become part  of the RUF or 
other groups.  Eventually,  chiefs allowed them to approach key people in the 
community. ..  These leaders, in turn,  influenced other local  residents” 
(Williamson 2006:193).   
Returning ex-combatants therefore entrusted their fate to the chief, who would 
accept them in the name of the entire community and mediate their return. 
Groups of returning fighters would first meet the chief to get his approval for 
their return. They would give him an account of what they committed during the 
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war and left it  to him to inform the town. A chief in a village in Moyamba 
District explained:  
Me: When the war was over, did those who were with the RUF say that they were 
with rebels in the bush and what they were doing etc.? 
Chief: Some confessed. They said that they were with them. That they fought 
alongside with them and were in the bush. 
Me: At what occasion did they tell their stories? 
Chief: Not under duress. They came and they confessed.  
Me: Who did they confess to?  
Chief: During that t ime when they came, they went to the chiefs. We just don't 
accept people when they come l ike that, they first go to the chiefs and report to 
them. So during that time they confessed these things. 
Me: So they confessed only to the chiefs,  not to the community...  
Chief: To the chiefs, not to the community, no. 
Me: So community had to accept them without knowing what they did? 
Chief: Well , we the chiefs tell the community: Your brother has come, he was 
like this,  but  don't take him like that,  just  accept him as a brother. (FG18) 
It is also necessary to examine the concept of ‘confession’.  There is little to 
suggest , that i t  would entail a detailed narrative of what exactly happened or of 
the crimes the ex-combatant had committed. Instead, it  seems that the fighters 
would often give the chiefs a “socially desired explanation” about why they 
fought and which crimes they had committed (Shaw 2010: 124-6). Young people 
would often rely on stories of abduction and forced drug use to explain their 
deeds (Coulter 2009, Shaw 2010). As will be discussed below in relation to the 
Fambul Tok ceremonies, it  seems that these ‘confessions’ were performative acts 
demonstrating the ex-combatants will ingness to accept the authority of the 
chiefs and demonstrations of their ‘changed hearts’ and humbleness (cf. Shaw 
2010) rather than acts of telling the truth about the past. 
The civilians would not have many other options but to accept these ex-
combatants. Individual apologies or compensation were not forthcoming once 
the chiefs agreed to welcome them to the community. As an NGO worker in 
Freetown noted in the below statement, once a returning fighter had been 
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pardoned by the chief there was little that  the actual victims could do: 
You have gone to the community, they have confessed, “I burned your house, I  
killed that child, I did this, but please I am sorry and I did that because of  
drugs, forgive me”. And the chief would stand up and say: “Look, my son, you 
have [been]  forgiven today.” They have a ceremony, they eat  and they go away. 
But the chief is still  speaking on behalf of the people that really suffered - the 
person whose hand was cut,  the person whose house was burnt down. He is only 
speaking as authority. So this man whose house was burnt will not  make any 
retaliation because traditionally, the chief speaks for us. If  the chief speaks, 
who are you to contest that statement? The chief has said, we have accepted 
you, you are now part of us, and we have forgiven all you have done. So if  I go 
and say: “No chief,” or I do the contrary,  I [.. .]  will be contesting the powers of 
the chief.  (E10) 
At times, the chiefs reinforced the acceptance and appeal to forgive by 
introducing bylaws or other forms of orders and bans were that forbade people 
to refer to the returned fighters as ex-combatants, rebels or any other names 
related to their past:   
One of the first things that happened when we returned was that by-laws were 
introduced that no one should point hands at anyone else and saying he or she 
belonged to this or that faction. If  you say that to someone else and there are 
witnesses, they will take you to the chiefs.. .  ( INT38) 
As will be discussed below, these acts of acceptance,  sealed with the 
introduction of bylaws, often happened as part of ceremonies. They cannot be 
understood solely as enforced upon the communities as they in many respects 
expressed a joint desire for a closure and for moving on. Arguably, the chiefs 
just as their communities had few other options at their hands and their appeals 
to forgive expressed an ambition to promote peace and reconciliation in the 
village. It  represented the common practice of ‘directed forgetting’ - 
“displac[ing]  explici t verbal memories of this violence through a range of social 
and ri tual practices (.. .)  the purpose of which was to create ‘cool hearts’ that 
form the basis for l ife in a community” (Shaw 2007:195). It  is in many ways 
also in line with the role of the chiefs in the conflict resolution mechanisms in 
the practice of customary justice. In many everyday conflicts  people would go 
to the chiefs or elders and ask them to mediate. Probably for this it  also means 
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that the communities were familiar with such practice and thus largely accepting 
of i t .  
Nonetheless, it  seems that the acceptance and ‘forgetting’ was in most cases not 
entirely unconditional. Two closely related factors play a crucial role -   the 
abili ty of the ex-combatants to contribute towards the common good and their 
willingness to ‘fi t  in’ seem to be the ‘makers or breakers’ of their reintegration. 
The first  in fact  l inks importantly to the local notion of reconciliation 
emphasising working together,  coexistence and unity. Rather than just  being 
accepted, perpetrators were being valued through contributing to the 
development of the community (Stovel 2006: 154-60, cf. Shaw 2010). This was 
confirmed by a chief in a village in Kailahun: 
Me: How did the ex-combatants reintegrate? 
Chief: When we came back we knew people were left behind here. We knew it 
was war and they did wrong, but we didn’t blame them. They had food because 
they had been farming. When we returned, they gave us food and encouraged us,  
we encouraged them. We were all the same, and we didn’t mind them, and we 
didn’t need to point fingers. We needed to forget and reconcile and develop the 
town. [.. .]  There was a large swamp that we decided we should develop into a 
communal farmland for the town, no one was exempted. Returnees and ex-
combatants all  worked together. (INT42) 
A return to ‘normalcy’ means also accepting one’s place in the society and 
performing one’s social role. Indeed, as Shaw argues, the ex-combatants were 
evaluated “on every day action, humility,  hard work, and sobriety” (Shaw 2010: 
131). Arguing that quotidian life in Africa is “a good deal more expressive and 
histrionic”,  Jackson writes about the Kuranko: “Kuranko do not fetishize the 
ego as we do, but emphasize a person’s social nous. As such, authenticity is 
consummated in the way one realizes one’s given destiny or plays one’s social 
role. The name of the game is not self-knowledge, but knowing one’s place and 
making the most of  it .  For this reason, theatricali ty implies something very 
different  from acting out. Rather than spontaneously giving vent to one’s 
feelings, one learns to perform the gestures and emotions appropriate to one’s 
role” (p.137). During the war, some of the social roles were temporarily 
reversed. In its aftermath, accepting their reestablishment could be seen as an 
expression of the willingness on the part of the ex-combatants to ‘reconcile’ 
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with the community.  In this light, “regret may be less important  than 
compliance” as a chief told to Peters in Kono (Peters 2006:155). Abducted 
female ex-combatants in Kabala indeed needed to show through behaviour that 
they were willing to comply with the social norms: 
I feel  better now, but it  came with time. At the beginning, I was feeling sad. My 
friends did not accept me back. But after that – five month, six month – they saw 
that I behaved just l ike them and believed that I will not do bad to them. And 
now we all came together.  (INT10) 
7.4 Chiefs, youth, human rights and reconciliation 
From the above discussion, it  is evident that chiefs and elders have played a 
vital  role in the reconciliation and reintegration processes. Indeed, they retain 
an important place in the communities,  both as the agents of the state and 
administrators of customary law as well as guardians of much of the ritual  
practice. However, the chiefs and other traditional authorities have also been 
widely criticised for their role in fomenting the civil war. As discussed in 
Chapter 4 they have been accused of corruption and abuse,  particularly towards 
young men. As Archibald and Richards (2002) write: “The rebel RUF in its 
earliest  forays into eastern and central  Sierra Leone (in 1991) targeted and 
killed government agents, including chiefs and court  chairmen. From the outset 
it  was clear that some rebel cadres were settling old scores for justice gone 
sour” (p.344). Their role in contributing to the causes of the conflict makes the 
above described centrality of chiefs in reintegration and community 
reconciliation practices problematic. Several authors have brought attention to 
the aspect of remarginalization of the ex-combatants and the reestablishment of 
their subordination and dependence on the chiefs, conditions that brought the 
war in the first place (e.g. Shaw 2010, Stovel 2006, Fanthorpe 2005, Keen 
2003). However, post-war research has also revealed that  the chiefs for a 
number of reasons st ill  enjoy popular support or at the least acceptance locally. 
Keen (2003) quotes a report by Department for International Development 
(DFID 2002) noting: “The recent consultations at chiefdom level in Blama, 
Mano and Rotifunk re-confirmed public acceptance of the institution of chiefs 
despite open criticism of the corrupt and arbitrary way in which some office 
holders behaved in recent years” (p.89).  
While a return to the familiar social order was one of the greatest priorit ies, 
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evidenced for example in the support for the restoration of the chiefly structures 
and in the role chiefs played in the reintegration process, this by no means to 
say that everything just returned to its pre-war state. The relationship between 
chiefs and subjects had been influenced by several factors.  Displacement had 
led to people being exposed to new ideas and systems making i t less likely that 
they would accept abusive behaviour from the chiefs (Keen 2003:89). Archibald 
and Richards (2002) write that “between a retreating chiefly patrimonialism and 
the vengeful egalitarianism of the RUF [opened up] a space in which an 
emergent individualism began to take hold” (p.357). Ferme and Hoffman (2004) 
also note this increased sense of individualism (p.84). Jackson (2006) asserts  
that even from within the chieftaincy itself, there were calls  for reform led by 
the newly elected chiefs (p.106).  We will therefore briefly turn to issue of the 
dynamics of the post-war relationship between the youth and the chiefs as this is 
an important  aspect  of reconciliation in the local  context. This is not  limited 
only to the ex-combatants but to youth in general.  
Part icularly in the communities in the eastern and southern districts, the youth 
often told me that  they had organised themselves and had come to an 
arrangement with the chiefs about under which terms they would contribute to 
local development and public works: 
When we returned, the elders told us to clean the town, and when we were doing 
it,  i t  was not because they were using force on us.  We as young people were the 
future of the town and we had to come together to make sure that the town is 
growing. (.. . ) But if  the elders fail to do what is right it  is going to delay any 
work that might be given to us in the town. So youth in town that are healthy 
will always work. If  you are healthy and refuse to work it  wil l be a problem on 
your side. That is now a bylaw. Also if  elders wrong youth, we will also gather 
and deliver a complaint to the elders, and if we meet and they see it  is true then 
the elders are ready to apologise. Not bow down before us,  but they tell us they 
are sorry and will not do it  again. We will  accept it .  (INT38) 
Overall ,  in most places, conversations with the youth suggest improved 
conditions and relationships.  However, problematic issues remain. The 
discussion about the relationship between the youth and the chiefs often shifted 
to the topic of human rights.  Numerous NGOs have been involved in 
‘sensit ising’ local chiefs about their past mistakes and about human rights. 
However, chiefs and youth seem to have opposing interpretations of human 
 
 107  
rights law, which might threaten the local community cohesion. Although abuse 
and forced work for the personal benefit of the chief was one of the issues that 
led to dissatisfaction among youth before the war,  after the war youth in some 
cases would be hesitant to take up work that would arguably be beneficial for 
the community as a whole – e.g. repairing the road, digging a well etc.  In some 
places, there was a visible rift  among the chiefs and the youth in the village. In 
my interviews with the chief in a vil lage in Pujehun District (INT3), he 
bemoaned the lack of respect  given to him by youth since the end of the war:  
Before the war, we were having our own traditional ways of settling disputes. 
But now they came and passed on us the human rights laws...  In those days I 
would call a young man: “hey, young man, come!” but these days when I say 
“hey, young man, come”, he will not come: “I am going about my own business, 
you are not the one feeding me”, he wil l say. That is a problem. 
The interviews with the youth presented a mirror image:  
“It is  happening that the chiefs are still  not listening to the youth. In those days 
[before the war]  people didn’t  know their rights,  but  because of the war we have 
come to realise our rights.”  (FG4) 
Although there is clearly tension between the elders and the youth about the 
interpretation and respect of individual rights, in many communities the elders 
had either reflected on the past wrongs or recognised the increased bargaining 
power of the youth, resulting in a less authoritarian relat ionship. As the youth in 
Koinadugu District  told me: 
The difference between, during and after the war: before the war the leaders 
were very oppressive, [the youth]  make money for them without receiving 
compensation, [and]  at the same time the youth was suppressed. Now the elders 
need to go through negotiation, if  they want the youth to work for them they 
need to negotiate and pay the youth money. They prepare food and then the 
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8. Ceremonies and ritual practice in reconciliation 
Rural communities in Sierra Leone use a wealth of ri tual and religious practice  
to respond to violence, regulate and remake social relationships and restore 
community cohesion. Ceremonies and ri tuals of a great variety took place in 
post-war Sierra Leone (e.g. Shaw 2005, Stovel 2007, Utas 2009, Stark 2006).  In 
all the villages,  people confirmed that  they performed a ceremony or a coming-
together event of one sort  or another to mark the end of hostilities. They were 
performed on family as well as on community level and within the community's 
secret societies. They often shared common features and served common 
purposes although the specific forms and features vary from one chiefdom to 
another .  Indeed:  “Even within a community there are various societies or 
traditions that maybe performed here, but could not be performed in another 
chiefdom” (E4). 
This chapter starts  with an overview of the role of ritual  practice in 
reconciliation on community level in Sierra Leone with a part icular emphasis on 
the relationship between the community and their ancestors. It  then moves on to 
describe how four different  villages used rituals and ceremonies to bring their 
community together after people had returned from the war. The themes and 
features that are found in these descriptions will  be discussed and analysed in 
order to tease out the most important functions these ceremonies played in the 
process of reconciliation.   
 
8.1 Traditional belief systems 
The ceremonial acts such as reconciliation and cleansing rituals or pouring of 
libations have their roots in the traditional belief systems, which share some 
important similarities among the different ethnic groups in the country 
(Manifesto 99). Fundamental to these beliefs is the belief in the supernatural . 
This has three main elements. The first  is the belief in a supreme being (now 
God of major religions). Second is the belief in spirits or natural divinities that 
mainly reside in the bush and can be ei ther good or bad. Third is belief in the 
spiri ts of the ancestors who continue to influence the day-to-day affairs of the 
living (Alie 2008:136; Manifesto 99:31).  Whatever happens we will  speak to the 
ancestors so they wil l communicate with god to tell this is what has happened to 
us, but we want god [to hear]  that since they [the ancestors]  are intermediaries 
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between us the living and the dead. So we speak to them. For example in the 
farming season we speak to them, go and tel l the order to god that we have done 
some farming here [and]  we need more yield. Like women are in the town, some 
are in pregnancies and we don’t know what is happening with some especially 
those who are pregnant they will ask the dead to assist in cases of giving 
carefree birth to children. Or fishing in the town, when we f ish, let us get more 
fish and more yield in the town. That is things we ask the dead to communicate 
with god so we have that connection. (INT45)  
The ancestral spirits of the community reside in shrines or ‘sacred spaces’ 
(Kaidaneh and Rigby 2010:244). The community shrine often takes the shape of 
a li ttle ‘house’ in the village. Under its roof the villagers put stones or other 
objects that represent those that have ‘gone ahead’. In Port  Loko District one 
elder described their shrine to me: 
 Shrines where those stones were kept in remembrance of the ancestors, mostly 
little structures were erected before or after the town, you never erect them in 
the middle of  the village. Those stones,  only when an elder died in the vil lage or 
a society person died in the village, a stone would be collected and put there. 
But only when old people died not when young people died. Old people of which 
they thought they could serve as ancestor. So they could not be forgotten so 
easy. It  makes us feel the presence of the ancestors.  (INT25) 
Also natural features in the landscape are locations where offers to the ancestors 
are made:  […]  people since long ago believed that their ancestors are not too 
far away from them, and they live in the mountains, by big rivers and the big 
trees and that type of thing .. .  in the bushes  (E17). A failure to at tend to the 
relationship with the ancestors or properly address the defilement or destruction 
of the shrines might result in the withdrawal of the ancestral  favours and bring 
about ‘bad fortune’ in the community.  This is also common in other parts of the 
continent. As Honwana (1998) writes about ancestral  spirits in Mozambique: “. .  
if they feel neglected they can punish people by provoking illness or can even 
cause death” (p. 17).  
For the communities it  is important to retain the favours of the ancestral spirits , 
such as good harvests and catch, health and general well-being. To this end, 
communities as well  as individuals feed the ancestors by offering sacrifice in 
the form of rice,  kola nuts or animals such as a chicken or a fowl,  a goat or a 
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cow.  
The pouring of l ibation is  part  of many larger ceremonies but can also take 
place independently.  It  basically is a simple ceremony during which water, palm 
wine or an alcoholic beverage is  poured on the ground in a request to the 
ancestors for well-being or other favours.  Pouring libation can also mark an end 
to a dispute when done by the elders after mediating between two people that  
have had an argument. It  seals the agreement that  has been reached and restores 
the relationship with the ancestors. 
People also frequently spoke of ‘pulling Sara’ which means making a sacrifice, 
for instance of chicken, rice, other food i tems and even clothes. “The Sara is a 
sacrifice in order to get something in return.  In the case of sexually abused 
people it  is a way to get rid of spirits that are not allowing the survivor to rest” 
(Utas 2009:37).  
Ridding the secret society bush or farmland of bad virtue is referred to as 
‘cleansing’ or ‘washing’ of the bush. Gittins (1987) writes that when a 
relationship between the living and the ancestors has been spoiled there is the 
need for it  to be restored through ‘washing the bush’. Crimes like rape, incest, 
and defilement of the bush or shedding blood spoils the relat ionship between the 
living and the ancestors and therefore requires cleansing rituals or pouring 
libation to take place to deal with such spiritual pollution and appease the 
spiri tual world (Manifesto 99:34). The pollution of secret society bush or 
farmland can be caused by a single individual but affect the entire community. 
“This purification ritual [for intercourse in the bush] was necessary for the 
whole village community, because fai lure to perform it resulted mostly in 
irreversible calamities. . . .  the logic of solidarity based on the idea that ‘one 
man’s business is everybody’s business’, took due forms in such cases” 
(Combey:70). It  follows from this that community members expected those who 
had spoiled the relat ionship with the ancestors by committing all kinds of sins 
during the war to go through cleansings to avert  bad fortune for the community.   
There are also annual ceremonies. Most of the villages that  I visited confirmed 
that they used to organise annual ceremonies before the war which included 
sacrifices to the ancestors, dancing and masked-devil performances on a 
community-wide level. Women in a village in Moyamba District described their 
annual celebration to me: 
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There is a place here, about half a mile from here – a high hill  and there is a 
lake there. We used to go there - we would collect rice,  rum, animals and there 
were mask devils and we danced there all time and eat and drink. When the 
priest chief  would be ready, we would cook food, put it  in a dish and pray on i t 
in our way and then we pushed the food to the lake – and at some point it  would 
sink, which meant that the ancestors accepted it .  It  was first the men and the 
women did the same.  (FG17) 
These ceremonies usually involved long planning, “preparing the sacred sites 
and making necessary arrangements for hospitality as other communities are 
always invited to at tend” (Kaidaneh and Rigby 2010:245). “On the day of the 
celebration, most inhabitants go to the sacred site, with leaders and elders 
taking posit ion close to the inner part of the shrine. Communities follow a broad 
program of events that include greeting and the recital  of the names of 
ancestors, confession and requests for forgiveness, libation, offering, and 
appeal, and the restoration of convivial social interaction” (Kaidaneh and Rigby 
2010:245-6).   
Re-establishing the relationship with the ancestors, appeasing them, was an 
important priority when communities returned to their villages: When we came 
back this place was deserted. Most of our grandfathers are buried here.  We 
wanted to perform some ceremonies and pour libation to let the ancestors know 
that that we are back and pleaded for peace. We showed them that we didn’t 
abandon them. We asked them for good harvest and healthy children.  ( INT42) 
The ancestors would use dreams to communicate to certain people in the 
community that a sacrifice should be made if good fortune was to be secured or 
retained. Such dreams motivated “the community to undertake particular forms 
of religious action” (Combey: 93). In a village in Moyamba District, an old man 
had a dream, in which “he saw the ancestors coming, they were having cowry 
shells and calabash and eggs and they came and gave it  to the chief  and then 
they told the chief to bring that as a sacrifice for this town”  (FG21). Elsewhere, 
a fortune-teller paid a visit to the vil lage to bring a message from the ancestors  
(FG29). 
As Gittins (1987) writes in his book on Mende religion a basic distinction can 
be made between ancestral and non-ancestral spirits and between rituals 
performed in the community at large and those in specialised groups such as the 
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secret  societies (p. 153). Secret  societies are sodalities widespread among the 
inhabitants of Sierra Leone as well as other societies of the Upper Guinea Coast  
of West Africa.  The adjective ‘secret’ is misleading and some have suggested 
using other terms instead such as forest societies or forest sodalit ies or cult  
associations (cf.  Fanthorpe 2007; Richards 2005). The existence and purpose of 
the societies is publically known – as Gittins notes, knowledge about what goes 
on ‘in the bush’ is quite widespread (1987:138). The activities and ceremonies 
of the secret societies take place in secluded areas of the bush outside the 
village and their functioning is connected to a number of rules, bans and 
sanctions. The secrecy lies in the fact that members of the societies are 
forbidden to share any information about the societies’ affairs with non-
members. Non-members also cannot take part in any society activities and 
ceremonies and are banned from entering the secret society bush. The most 
common secret societies in Sierra Leone are Bondo (in the south it  is usually 
called Sande) for women and Poro for men.
29
 
Secret societies mediate and control  the power of the supernatural – the world 
of ancestors and spirits, so that they work in the favour of the community.  The 
powers of the spirits are often incorporated in masks and other artefacts and 
‘medicines’ (Fanthorpe 2007:1) and is activated through diverse ceremonies. 
The preservation of the grace of spirits also requires observing many taboos and 
laws. Crimes such as murder, rape, theft  or others are offences against ‘the 
medicine law’ and secret societies therefore also carry out punishments of the 
transgressors (ibid.:4). The societies also serve as educational institutions that 
supervise the rites of passage of young girls and boys into adulthood. 
Production of ‘fully socialized human beings’ is one of the main purposes of the 
societies:  “The basic idea here is that people are no less repositories of spiritual  
power than ‘medicines’, the dead ancestors and the wild creatures of the bush. 
These powers are sex-specific and so harnessing and controlling them 
necessitates the separation of the sexes“,  writes Fanthorpe, and later continues: 
“learning how to nurture powers contained in masks and medicines teaches 
initiates to recognize and regulate corresponding powers within themselves and 
thus adhere to culturally prescribed behavioural norms specific to their sex” 
(ibid:2-4). For the vast majori ty of people, joining secret societies is  “part  of 
                                                 
29
  There are other men’s societies such as Wunde or Gbangbani (Fanthorpe 2007). One of the specialised societies 
were the Kamajor militias during the war although in the form they appeared were founded by High Priest Initiator 
Allieu Kondewa (see Fanthorpe 2007:2 or Hoffman 2011). 
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the normal process of social  maturation in the communities in which they were 
born” (ibid.:14). 
 




Outside Kailahun, along the road to Guinea, I visited the village of Moa, one of 
the largest  communities among my research locations. When I first came, the 
village was preparing for the visit of a delegation of donors that had assisted in 
the rebuilding of the village school. Local youth was preparing the school and 
mending the potholes in the road.   
Kailahun District  suffered from prolonged economic exclusion under the APC 
one-party rule system. The Imam who I interviewed in the village said the 
situation had been so bad that people had literally been praying for the war to 
come (INT46). When the war eventually came most of the population fled to 
nearby Guinea.  During the war the RUF had a base near the village and forced 
the remaining vil lagers to work the land for them. The Imam and his wife were 
among those that suffered during the occupation of the village: 
When we worked for them and it was during the harvest time, they drove us to 
farm and flogged us not to eat  the food we harvested […]  Three years we worked 
for the rebels.  When we set  traps in the bush, if  we caught an animal and they 
saw it,  they would take i t  from you and f log you. It was taken away from you, so 
there is nothing you can do. (INT46) 
According to the Imam by the time the first group of returnees came back from 
Guinea around 1999, only a single brick house was left standing. Today, 
compared to villages that I had visited in the surrounding area, Moa looked 
quite affluent. It  was clear from the way the buildings – the houses, the school, 
the Mosque and the Court  Barrie
31
 – looked that many of them had been erected 
recently. Although at  least two NGOs had assisted in rebuilding the village,  the 
people in the community professed that  they had greatly relied on self-help. The 
Imam described the cooperation, emphasising it  was a proof that  reconciliation 
was achieved in the community:  
                                                 
30
  The names of the villages have been changed to pseudonyms as I promised anonymity to my informants. 
31
 The Court Barrie is a central structure found in almost every settlement that serves as a central point for important 
public meetings. Sometimes also  referred to as Court Barre or Court Barry. 
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[…]  some examples are building houses,  building structures.  These houses were 
built in three months time. People group together to plant some plantations in 
the bush, we all put  our hands in one basin and eat .  (INT 47) 
After an interview with the local chiefs (FG29), they offered to take me to their 
ancestral shrine. We walked along a footpath leading into the thick forest on the 
edge of the village. Just across a stream, under a big tree stood their ancestral 
shrine (see Annex 4), a simple wooden structure with a zinc roof. The chief 
proudly insisted that  I photograph it.  He told me that during the war, even the 
RUF leader Foday Sankoh had visited the shrine.  
My informants recollected the ceremony that took place at this shrine after the 
war. When the elders of the town assembled the villagers to announce the 
ceremony would be performed they asked everyone to contribute rice and other 
food stuffs for the sacrifice and a shared meal. Young men were asked to go 
hunting and provide animals for the ceremony. Once the necessary food was 
collected, the community gathered under the big tree to offer sacrifice, which 
included a goat and rice, to the ancestors.  They asked the ancestors to accept all 
returnees back and to let the village experience peace and unity and to forget 
about the war. The participants offered prayers for those that had died during 
the war and the elders asked the ancestors to forgive those who had committed 
bad deeds. After that the food was cooked and everyone shared the meal. The 
meal was followed by a celebration, of which dances where an integral part. 
One of the women explained to me why it had been decided to organise the 
described ceremony:  
So all of us did it  in order that we ask the ancestors to really accept us as we 
have returned home from war and when we are together lets first continue to 
experience peace and unity in the town. That nobody is named with this war, 
“you did it ,  you did it ,  you did it .” Let’s all forget about that. So we did some 
ceremony. To remember our forefathers what happened. (INT48) 
In addition to ancestral blessing for a peaceful future coexistence in the village, 
this passage also points to an important second aim of the ceremony, sealing the 
past by no longer casting blame on anyone for bringing the war or committing 
wrongs during the war. Because our local  contact knew that I wanted to speak to 
as many different parties as possible – including ex-combatants – he was happy 
to lead me to them. However, in my interview with the Imam, he assured me that 
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no ‘such person’ (ex-combatant) was living in the community. In the end, it  was 
impossible to talk to the ex-RUF as he twice failed to be at his home at the 
agreed time. However, I did interview a Kamajor (INT49), who experienced the 
ceremony as an encouragement and a confirmation that the past  was being left 
behind by everyone:  
To me it  was good as I am a cit izen,  in the ceremonies performed it  was said we 
wanted to make peace, it  was good for me to hear that from the elders and the 
people said that during the ceremonies. That was very good for me.  
Since then he claimed he had not experienced any discrimination. 
Similarly a woman who was raped during the war fel t that  the ceremony had 
given her a feeling of inclusion.  
When we made that celebration, most of  the things we did, they helped me to 
forget about certain things like feeling alone and having a stigma. I am ok, 
because I feel that I  am not ignored in the community, everyone I meet [says]  
“sorry, sorry,  sorry” and all those things. I mean, I  am feeling better.  Every 
time there is a meeting with the women I am invited, I go there, we do things 
together,  so it  has a very big impact on me that sort  of ceremony. (INT47) 
The ceremony did not include any elements of apology or truth-telling. The 
recounting of the war experience was limited to the chiefs denouncing the 
crimes that had been committed during the war in general  terms, not casting 
blame on any individual combatants who had actually committed these crimes.  
As emphasised above, elders used the ceremony to denounce the crimes that had 
been committed in the war by some of the community members, while at the 
same time instructing the community to refrain from pointing fingers at  
individuals. Participation in the ceremony meant accepting its  aim of community 
reconciliation and opened space for inter-personal relat ions to return to normal.  
The Kamajor explained: 
As far as I am aware, when we came back, all those things were done, those 
ceremonies.  That was according to custom or culture and there was no need for 
people to announce what they had done. And also those fighters they felt that if  
this was the way i t was done then that was in the interest of the whole 
community. (INT49) 
The victims in the village that I spoke to (INT46, INT47) confirmed that no 
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apology or confession was needed since the ceremony had taken place. The 
elders (FG29) explained to me that ceremonies had always served to seal what 
had happened. [They]  show the people that something has been done, that it  was 
bad, but something has been done to cleanse it  off.  
An important goal of the ceremony was to restore community cohesion. Because 
of the war the community had changed. Not just perpetrators that originated 
from elsewhere had decided to stay,  people had returned married, or with 
children who were raised elsewhere. Important people had passed away. During 
the war people had taken up different roles, the traditional hierarchical power 
relationships had been shaken. The ceremony also had a social  function of 
“mak[ing] sure that we are all the same” (FG29):  
We did that because we needed peace and needed to revive the minds of the 
ancestors because we were gone and left  the town and only a few people stayed 
here but we have come back to put hands together and make peace. That is the 
reason why we did that we sti ll  have peace now.  
From my interviews it emerged that  the village had no tradition of personal 
cleansings or healings to rid people of their traumatic experience or to cleanse 
them of ‘spiritual  pollution’.  As one informant said (INT47): 
Especially as I am also a victim of the same problem [rape]  – no one ever came 
and said since this has happened to you, to make you feel better let’s perform 
some cleansing ceremony. Or do something to see that what happened is no 
good. I have not seen it  performed for anybody else.  
According to the chiefs, before the war the community members practised a 
range of cleansings related to breaches of the moral code (incest,  intercourse in 
the bush), however, the only one that remains to be practised is the washing of 
women that have given still  birth. The decline in the ceremonies performed on a 
regular basis was closely related to the damage and influence of the war on 
people's attitude towards these traditions. During and after the war major 
rel igions had made new inroads in the community:   
The impact is  that the religion has really intruded into the entire traditional 
rules and norms, we have forgotten about them, as we believe in praying to god 
in the Islamic and Christian way and that wipes out the tradition a bit in the 
way our fathers used to do. (FG29) 
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But also the absence of vil lagers knowing how to perform certain ceremonies or 
the destruction of artefacts needed to perform them correctly had contributed to 
their demise. Since this is the case the community “look[s] for new ways of 
dealing with things” (FG29).   
The secret societies in the village were facing a similar fate. Neglected by a 
generation that was raised in exile and missing certain essential and hard to 
replace artefacts, the villagers had hardship to restore the societies to their 
former glory. Despite these drawbacks, across my interviews it was commonly 
agreed that the men and women should at least make an effort to restore these 
institutions as they were perceived as cri tical for the life of the community:  
Me:  What was impact of the war on the women’s society? 
Young woman: The destruction of those places has great impact on us, we are 
not happy about that. Things that we used to do, like discussing the truth [in  
the sacred bush] , and these things are now destroyed, and we are not happy 
about that.  
Me: Has there been any effort of  reviving this and get new artefacts? 
Young woman: We are trying to revive them, because some of us believe that 
without those things we are trying to destruct  the culture at our own cost .  
Me: What has so far been hindering the revival? 
Young woman: Our return is still  very strange to us, although it has taken some 
time, but as we continue, once we have our dwelling places, and we are now 
settled finally, people will feel that they are still  part of  the customs and 
traditions, we wil l try stil l  to revive them and look out for the people that can 
restore them .  (INT47) 
 
Bahun 
This small village of barely 200 people is located several miles out of Kabala. 
The badly maintained forest road taking us there made me expect the worst. 
However, the atmosphere in the village was very friendly and welcoming. My 
field notes from that day mention a complete and rare absence of requests for 
material  assistance.  Before the war the farmers in the village had grown citrus 
fruits  and mangoes and at one time they were even breeding fish in artificial 
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ponds. The war first entered into the Bahun in November 1994. During the 
initial attack by the RUF four villagers were killed and several children 
abducted. After the war a number of these children had returned and were, 
according to the vil lagers, successfully reintegrated.   
An account of a ceremony in the village is  not  only another example of how 
these ceremonies looked but also hints at  the many meanings and purposes they 
had in bringing about community as well as individual reconciliation.  Below are 
some of the features and purposes of the ceremony that  was performed in the 
village after the war:  
When the war was over, we came back and offered a sacrifice of white bread 
[beaten flour and kola nut] .  For the people that  have gone, for them to return 
because we were scattered. By doing that they started returning, bit by bit from 
different places of hiding. We offered a big sacrifice, a bull , once we returned in 
full.  That we offered because of the bad things that went on and that we saw and 
also to reunite ourselves. (FG5) 
Two women in the village gave a more detailed account of the big sacrifice that  
the above quote mentions: 
It was a priority to offer a sacrifice of a creature [a red bull]  for peaceful and 
healthy living for the community as a whole. It  took place in town. First during 
the night a 'play'  was performed for more harmony by the women.
32
 A dance was 
performed by the women. This included a prayer to the ancestors. They will 
swear that all that brought evil to them will suffer. We asked the ancestors for 
protection and for nothing sinister to happen again. Also the men went to the 
bush to consult the spirits  and then organised their own 'play'  at night. After we 
did these activities, men and women separately,  we came together as the whole 
village and made the collective sacrifice of a red bull  and ate it  together. It  
created unity and oneness. (INT16) 
They later continued on the effects of the ceremony:  
It has gone a long way in assisting us and in ensuring for us that something like 
that [war]  was not going to happen again. Also for those that have gone, and 
praying for those that are not present for their safe return.  It  wasn’t  automatic, 
                                                 
32
 The 'play' that is referred to was a secret ritual done by the secret society – separately by the women's Bondo 
society and men's Gbangbani society. For the most part, this occurred in secrecy in the bush.  The two separate 
events were followed by the joint ceremony inside the village.   
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not that after a ceremony all is done. It  will come over t ime and we have 
patience. But when we see the result we believe that it  comes because we 
performed all this. We did all  these sacrificial ceremonies to live in peace and 
harmony until  god meets us. […]  We believe that the ceremonies will help in 
achieving that.  (INT16) 
The elders emphasised another important  aim of the ceremony:  
[…]  ‘the play’ in essence was to ensure that no one can hold grudge to the next  
person, like “oh this person was responsible for this act or this person was 
responsible for this act .” That is  why we made ‘the play’. (INT15) 
Although the ceremony was said to have fulfilled the important role of bringing 
people closer together, the community had the feeling that more needed to be 
done to secure the favours of the ancestors. According to the elders, a ceremony 
to honour those who had passed away during the war should still  be observed 
and the pollution of the farming bushes st ill  needed to be addressed: 
Up to this day we have not offered sacrifice for the lost ones. To our own 
perception this has [caused]  disturbances in our farming activities. Also the use 
of women, the raping of women in our farm, bushes has added more to the 
problem. Because normally before the war, the harvest we used to get is not  
what we are observing now, in terms of rice, in terms of  ground nut, whatever 
we plant. So we live with the assumption that this is st ill  haunting us.  (INT15) 
Indeed, there has been no other ceremony since the one performed at the end of 
the war described above. There have been no annual ceremonies for many years. 
As the women explained:  
It is not as it  was in former times. Because of the meagre harvests i t  is 
impossible now. Before, at the end of the harvest times, we would invite other 
villages and celebrate [play]  together. Then the men would go to their secret 
bushes and offer libations and perform symbolic activi ties, trying to appease the 
ancestral spirits . But now the harvests are meagre and we cannot do it  any 
longer,  that is  why it  is not happening as it  used to be. (INT16) 
The separate men’s and women’s ‘play’ that was part of the ceremony suggests 
that secret societies also play an important role in bringing people together and 
contributing to reconciliation. Indeed, efforts were made to restore these 
institutions.  During the war the rebels had burnt down the shrine of the Bondo 
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bush including all tools for init iat ion, and women were raped in the society's  
sacred bushes.  As a result, “there is no secret now, the rebels scattered all the 
secret objects and forced people like men and women to tell  what was happening 
in the secret  bushes – so they now know each other secrets” (INT16). 
But the women have tried to restore the glory of their Bondo society as much as 
possible. They had collected contributions to buy some of the necessary 
artefacts and made sacrifices at their shrine. In the year before my visi t,  they 
had been able for the first time to carry out an initiation ceremony. The women 
experienced this as “proof that  the ancestor spirit is present with us” (INT16). 
The Poro society of the men was suffering similar difficult ies, and although the 
men did not voice their grievances as strongly as the women, they also were in 
the process of restoring their society shrine.   
After the war children that were abducted by the RUF returned to the vil lage. 
According to my informants, happiness was the prevailing feeling among the 
community when they returned. Nonetheless, the children were thoroughly 
interrogated by chiefs before being treated with local medicine by herbalists:  
We were very happy. We welcomed them when they came and we were happy for 
them. For them to integrate well we interviewed them thoroughly about what 
they underwent when they were with the rebels.  If  they partook in eating human 
flesh or drinking human blood, or what else they did. So after investigating all 
that, we had medicine there, native treatment, herbalists who we call to treat 
them. Because some come with sore stomach, some with strong anaemia, some 
with puffy face or swollen body. (INT15) 
The children would be covered with a blanket while breathing in the steams of a 
heated herbal potion. Afterwards they were washed. The treatment would help 
children forget their bad memories and treat  illnesses they might be suffering 
from.  
Several  women recounted other ceremonies that they performed. These were to 
honour their oaths they had taken to perform a certain gesture if only they 
would see their kidnapped children again: 
Many things happened when we saw our children back, because of our oaths we 
made sacrifices, and Yakasei dance to show appreciation that their return came 
true. Some women scraped their heads,  to have bold heads as they made a vow 
to see the children again.  Then some of us offered a vow to see our children 
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again, those persons washed the feet of their children and drank the water. Some 
of the children had illnesses and rashes for which we boiled herbs. This was 
mostly limited to individual sacrifices and not village led. (INT16) 
 
Tula 
This village in Moyamba District is just over an hour drive and an additional ten 
minute walk from the district  headquarter town. Like many villages in this area 
it  was a stronghold for Kamajors, many of whom still  live in the village. With 
three churches and one mosque on a population of just over 200 inhabitants, the 
major religions hold firm ground. But this region of the ethnic Kpaa Mende is  
also known for its  traditions and ceremonies (E2, E7).   
Women in the village  described to me in detail the ancestral place at a lake 
outside the village where annual ceremonies used to take place before the war.  
There is a place here, about half a mile from here, a high hill  and there is a lake 
there. We used to go there,  whenever we wanted to worship we would collect  
rice, rum, animals and there were mask devils and we danced there all time and 
eat and drink. When the priest chief  would be ready, we would cook food, put it  
in a dish and pray over it  in our own way and then we pushed the food out onto 
the lake, and at some point it  would sink, which meant that the ancestors 
accepted i t .  It  was f irst the men, and then the women did the same. (FG17) 
Since the war, these ceremonies have not been performed, however: “It is 
supposed to be initiated by the elders of the vil lage; but when we tell them that 
we have to do it ,  they tel l us to be quiet and ask us why we are so interested in 
going to the shrine”, the women narrated and  continued with their explanation: 
“It is  because of this religious interference, if  at  all  we are to come together 
and ask about the ceremony, the pastors and the preachers will tell us to go to 
the mosque and church and they preach to us, so we are also afraid.” For the 
interviewed women, such disregard of the community ancestors has had a 
serious impact on the community in terms of bad harvest or high child mortality 
as well as for the coming to terms with the war past , which is impossible in the 
absence of ancestral  support . As a result , the ancestors would send them dreams 
in which they requested that they be fed again. But the women felt powerless in 
the face of the elders’ refusal to carry through the rituals.  
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One of the youths described the kinds of symbolic dreams people were having:  
But as we have neglected that, since that time ancestors are talking to people in 
dreams, they say “we cannot help this town, when you do not feed us we cannot 
do anything for you. There is diamond in this town, we want to help, everything 
here is made out of  diamonds but until  you resume feeding us it  will not be 
exposed to you”. Because of  the intervention of  the religion this has not yet  
happened.  (FG19) 
The chief and two elders that I spoke to first said that they did not find it  all  
that  necessary to visi t the ancestors - “we are just giving our thanks and prayers 
to God. Because the things that happened, that we have peace now is somehow 
miraculous...  so, now we ask the Almighty God directly without considering our 
ancestors” (FG18). Later, when I raised the same issue again, the chief added a 
more pragmatic reason: “one of the reasons is because times are now difficult.  
Whenever you want to perform a ceremony you need a goat. And you need maybe 
also chickens.  To collect the money for these items is not an easy task. So for 
this reason,  some of  these things die out” (FG18). 
Despite not having organised a community-wide ceremony to make a sacrifice to 
the ancestors, there were some secular meetings at which war related grievances 
were directly addressed. Upon return, the abducted children had told the chiefs 
about their ordeals. The chiefs had then approached the community and pleaded 
for the acceptance of the returnees who were “our brothers and although they 
had done wrong they should be accepted” .  Also the male secret society 
functioned as a platform to settle war-related grievances, albeit for men only.  
The chief explained: Because we gather our people, talk to them to forgive those 
that have destroyed our land and our properties and so what we talked there, 
then it  is alright. Everybody accepted.  
Due to lack of resources and the destruction of the Bondo bush, the female 
society in the village had not yet managed to restore most of its activities since 
the end of the war. The women believed that this had led to miscarriages and 
still  births among the local women. The elders claimed that the Poro society had 
initiated new members once or twice since the ending of the war, although they 
acknowledged also their society bush had suffered from destruction that was 
hard to mend.  
[…]  you know, man-created something, man-made something, can be made 
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again. But with god-created things if  you spoil them, only god has to make it .  So 
if  most of these things have been destroyed, people can't continue their society 
business. (FG18) 
Although the village performs cleansings after the farming bush has been 
polluted due to intercourse, cleansing of the war rape victims did not take place 
and from a community point of view was not considered to be necessary. About 
the rape victims, the women told me that , “we are living peacefully, they [are]  
never neglected, we are working together. They were forced it  was not their 
fault.”  (FG17) 
 
Konga 
After almost two hours of driving through the forest from Port  Loko, we crossed 
a river by a provisional ferry. In the rainy season, the ferry is unable to cross 
the river, basically cutting the village off from the outside world. At one point 
during the war, rebels had been based near this village and the community had 
suffered numerous at tacks in which many people including the Paramount Chief 
were killed. The inability to perform a proper burial for him, and the perceived 
negative effects of that had resulted in a feeling of bit terness among its  
population. It  was clear from the interviews that before the war the village had 
had a very rich traditional  life and that the male and female societies had 
performed important  roles in maintaining both the ‘spiritual  health’ and social 
cohesion of the community. Before the war the entire community would come 
together once a year at a big stone in the thick forest surrounding the village to 
pray for good fortune and make a sacrifice. “The food can then be eaten there, 
as much as you want, but the left-overs need to remain in the bush” (FG12). My 
informants also pointed out several big trees around the village which used to be 
the locations of various shrines.   
The current Paramount Chief was a very old man who said to have fought in the 
British Navy during World War II.  Recently he had wounded his leg and he was 
no longer able to walk without support.  The women that I interviewed later 
believed the Paramount Chief ’s injury to have been caused by the unappeased 
spiri ts. The Paramount Chief frequently lost the thread of the interview and his 
council of elders, a group of five male family members in their 40s and 50s, had 
to step in. The elders voiced serious concerns about the lack of a fitting funeral 
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for the previous Paramount Chief and the heads of the local secret societies that 
had passed away during the war. Without a proper ceremonial  burial, they said, 
it  was impossible to properly install new people in these positions. But at this 
point , the vil lage lacked the money and the experts with the knowledge needed 
to perform these ceremonies. 
If you don’t have money, it  is difficult [.. .]  to talk about rituals. We would need 
red, white and black cloth. Wine,  rice, fowls, money and a cow... but at present a 
cow is charged with a lot of money, which makes it  di fficult.  At times, it  is 
insisted on the colour of the cow that is f itting the rituals. [Then the]  hiring of 
experts [from another chiefdom] . We also need to invite other tribal authorities 
from other locations and arrange their feeding. (FG12) 
This was confirmed by a young interviewee: 
As you know the war lasted for a very long time. […]  the native tools for the 
ceremonies are mostly kept in baskets. Most of these baskets were burnt down. 
They were seriously affected. You know there is no documentation like western 
medicine, when you lose something you write it  down. Traditions transfer orally, 
from one generation to another.  So if  this house owns the tradition of the 
community, you have people to come and be there to acquire the knowledge, so 
when most of these people were killed and those ceremonial baskets were burnt 
down, it  has an impact. Automatically after the war most of those traditions 
have faded. (INT30) 
The destruction of the traditional  practice and its  effect  on the community was 
mentioned in almost all the interviews. Although the excerpt below is from an 
interview with three women, as we were sitting on a veranda a larger group of 
people was listening in. Clearly emotional about the topic, one of the women 
spoke out: 
When the rebels came, they destroyed the shrines and now [we]  are getting the 
bad effect of it .  At f irst, we were productive in terms of agriculture, and also it  
was easy to make money. This is how they destroyed all the traditions during the 
war. Even in this vil lage we used to be happy here before the war. We had the 
bush, we used to go and perform ceremonies, and then the tribal heads used to 
go there and perform ceremonies. As a result of  the war they were killed.  (FG13) 
Her short outburst was followed by clapping and loud sounds of approval of the 
larger group of women listening in.  According to the women it was necessary to 
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“make sure that the spirits are appeased, and if you appease them they will 
listen to you and they will help you for sure. If  you fail to appease the spirits , 
you’ll never be successful no matter how hard you try.” Thus far the spirits had 
not been appeased, consequently there was a strong belief that  this had led to 
bad fortune – poor harvest and health – and that spirits were still  haunting the 
village and its people. Because of the poor agricultural production mothers felt 
they were forced to give their daughters to marry at a too early age. The elders 
believed likewise that the absence of the ceremonies had a bad influence:  
We could not offer any sacrifice up to this day as we don't have enough to eat. 
We believe that bad luck will  be after us until we can make this sacrif ice. We 
just manage our lives and don't have enough to offer. The reason why our farms 
are not producing sufficiently is because of this bad luck (FG12). 
The elders told me how “those spirits appear to us, scare us when we sleep, 
appear when you work alone on the road or bush” (FG12). One of the women 
claimed that she was at tacked by a spirit  while planting cassava on her farm. 
(FG13) 
A particular point that was made in the interview with the women was that  
before the war, they “used to have white people in the village who stayed with 
us here” .  The destruction of the sacred bushes around the vil lage by the rebels 
and especially the destruction of baskets, bowls and clay pots with sacred items 
belonging to the societies was seen as a reason that “white men” had not been 
seen again (FG13).  
Nonetheless, small  gathering and sacrifice was organised at the end of the war 
to remember those that had been killed:  “because it  was a tradition that if  a 
person dies you should offer a sacrifice.  But now many people were ki lled from 
the vil lage. Some were kil led in the town, some were around the town so it  was a 
collective not individual sacrifice. All the people came together for prayers” 
(INT30). 
But contrary to al l  the other villages,  the Paramount Chief and the elders 
claimed that it  was not an option to perform an incomplete ceremony. If  it  was 
not possible to perform it according to the tradit ion, they thought that  it  was 
better to leave it  undone:   
Money is  not sufficient  to perform the required sacrifices.  Not much has been 
performed, nothing at all in fact . It  is better to do nothing than to do it  half-
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heartedly.  (FG12) 
As part of the nation-wide symbolic reparation programme administered by 
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), a ceremony had taken place in 
the village a few months before my visit.  The secret  societies’ and religious 
heads had each received a set sum of money (Le100.000 ca. EUR 20) to perform 
their individual ceremonies, which would be followed by the community-wide 
sacrifice of a cow. For the society ceremonies the men collected an addit ional  
bag of rice and the Paramount Chief contributed a goat.  But in spite of that, it  
was not possible to perform all  necessary sacrifices according to the tradition: 
We should have observed five nights of drumming and dancing, we could only 
drum for a few hours. It  was not performed according to tradit ions .  (FG12) 
Neither the women were pleased with the way the symbolic reparations 
programme was performed. As described above, the local tradition requires that 
part of the sacrificed cow is shared among the people to eat  and part is left in 
the bush for the ancestors. However, people recalled that the meat of the cow 
that was used for the ‘NaCSA ceremony’ was taken back to Port Loko where the 
organisers had come from. Lacking the element of a joint  meal,  the ceremony 
lost an essential part of its purpose in the eyes of the villagers. As the women 
said:   
The [symbolic]  reparation exercise could not help us perform the required 
rituals. It  didn’t make any sense to us. (FG13) 
  
8.3 Discussion and analysis 
In what follows, I will tease out and discuss the ways in which the ceremonies 
and other local practices contributed to reconciliation. Specifically,  the themes 
of restoration of the relationships with the spiritual  world, community 
cohesion/reconciliation; reintegration of perpetrators and symbolic closure will 
be analysed.  
Restoration of the relationships with the spiritual world  
One of the main reasons for communities to organise ceremonies in the direct  
aftermath of the war was to restore relat ionships not only among the living but 
between the living and the ancestral spirits who have a critical role in the daily 
lives of individuals and communities. Most communities had not been able to 
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worship their ancestors while being on the run during the conflict, and wanted 
to pay their respect and announce their return through offering a sacrifice. My 
informants spoke in terms of offering the ancestors an apology or at least an 
explanation for their long absence. 
It  emerged from the interviews that  at least a minimal sacrifice had been made 
in all villages when people had returned. The “feeding of the ancestors to show 
that they have not been forgotten” (INT5) was common in communities across 
the country.   
Not only had the absence of sacrifices affected the relationship with the 
ancestors. During the war many moral codes and taboos – such as committing 
incest , having intercourse in the bush, killing etc - had been broken. Sarpong 
(1989) suggests that  since in much of Africa moral/social  codes including taboos 
come from God and the ancestors,  breaking them offends God and destroys 
peace. It  follows from this that “restoring peace in society is to find out what 
has gone wrong spiritually,  and through special ri tuals to restore the state of 
equilibrium” (p. 360 cited in Cutter 2009:45). This also holds true for Sierra 
Leone as evident in the above stories from the four villages. Combey writes 
about the village of Ngiema in Kailahun: “Particular taboos were broken during 
the war, and unless special rituals are performed, and the forests and bush 
around Ngiema purified, according to the instructions of the ancestors, hei
33
 will 
never be effective enough” (Combey 2010:334-5).    
According to the women in Konga village:  
Because the bush has not been cleansed after people having intercourse there, 
this has lead to bad harvest and to the youth dropping out of school.  (FG13) 
All communities that I visited had made some kind of initial offering to their 
ancestors, however, cleansing the communities of broken taboos such as rape 
and murder often require more elaborate ceremonies including the offering of 
larger animals such as cows or goats. Some of the villages had managed to do 
this directly after the war had ended, while others had to wait for several years 
to do so. In other cases, such as in the above Konga village, the loss of 
knowledge and artefacts made it impossible to perform these ceremonies. In 
those communities that  had still  not  performed a cleansing ceremony, many of 
                                                 
33
 Hei is a complex concept related to the presence of the highest deity and influences the fortune of the community, 
for an elaborate discussion see Combey 2010: 90-118. 
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my informants expressed the intention that  this would sti ll  be done. We have 
seen that in Bahun, villagers had started making offerings as they returned, and 
once more people had returned, a bull was sacrificed. But more ceremonies were 
deemed necessary to address the pollution of the bush. The need to address these 
outstanding rituals was frequently reiterated as their absence was felt  in 
everyday misfortunes. Indeed, the power of these sacrifices and ceremonies 
comes from the strong belief in their benefits. As Marcel Mauss (1972) argues in 
his classical work on magic: “a group’s beliefs and faith are the result of 
everyone’s needs and unanimous desires” (p. 154).  The relationship between 
cause (sacrifice) and effect (better harvest , health etc) “only occurs in the 
public opinion. If magic is not conceived in this way it will  only be seen as a 
chain of absurdit ies and errors” (ibid.:155). A very strong shared belief in the 
relationship between the sacrifice and the improved conditions emerged from 
the interviews as the following example i llustrates: 
Immediately after the war, when we were doing farming, we were not getting 
good yields. Until we performed the ceremony – but the year that we performed 
that ceremony, up to now there is rice. We are stil l  harvesting. Some people have 
even abandoned the rice.  We have good yield. (FG23) 
Once ceremonies are performed there is  no expectation of immediate relief or 
improvement. However, any positive development that does take place is 
perceived as a result of performing them, as the above examples from Bahun and 
Konga suggest . The belief that the community will reap the fruits of its efforts  
results in the courage and motivation to undertake activit ies such as farming. In 
this way, performing the right ceremonies can also have a cri tical impact on 
post-war reconstruction in the villages.   
When accidents and bad fortune are perceived as being the result of the absence 
of proper sacrifices,  it  can have a negative impact on local development. In a 
village in Moyamba District,  I spoke to a young man with a seriously injured 
arm. He had hurt himself by falling from a palm tree while harvesting it .  And he 
was not the first  one to get injured in this way; local  women pointed out that  
“because we have not visited the shrine, another three [people]  fell when 
climbing palm trees” (FG23) .  Because of these accidents, the chief had 
introduced a law banning all climbing of palm trees until a proper ceremony for 
the ancestors had been performed.  
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The post-war upsurge of NGO-led development initiatives created widespread 
expectations in communities across Sierra Leone. In spite of a lot of 
reconstruction in the villages happening by means of collaborative work and 
self-help, ‘NGO projects’ were often seen by the villagers as a panacea for the 
many problems their village was facing, in many ways attesting to a lack of 
trust  in the state’s ability to attend to the development needs of the 
communities. Being able to attract an NGO was therefore of great  concern to the 
villagers. And a perception that the ancestors played a crucial role in attracting 
assistance was wide spread. According to the chief in a vil lage in Port Loko 
District:  
What we did when we met is to ask the ancestors [. . .]  when they speak to people 
from outside, l ike NGOs and others, to assist  us so that we can rebuild our 
homes and get proper settings and make unity in the home.  (INT28)  
Women in a village in Koinadugu District on the other hand attributed the lack 
of attention from the international rel ief and development industry to the 
ancestral  wrath:   
The neglect of ancestors created poverty,  worse than before. It  has left us with 
bad fortune, the NGOs always pass by our village. We assume that is because of 
that.  ( INT18)  
In similar way, Honwana (1998) writes about Mozambique:  “Development was 
expected to arrive through NGOs, however, also results  of self-help were 
considered as being enabled by sacral approval” (p.17). The belief in their 
benefits and their necessity to achieve success makes the ceremonies an 
essential  part  in rebuilding and developing the communities and hence an 
important ‘resource’ the NGOs can work with.   
 
Community cohesion  
Apart from mending the relationship between the people in the village and their 
ancestors,  the ceremonies also served to restore the relat ionships among the 
living and foster community cohesion in many ways. As these ceremonies are 
based on practices that have often taken place in the villages for generations and 
are familiar and significant events to all participants, they serve to re-establish 
people’s bond to the locality and foster feelings of belonging and confirm the 
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‘familiar ’ values of the community. By practising these ceremonies, the 
communities “create  their social and moral world anew as they re-member it  
through ritual”  (Shaw 2002:268). As women in a village in Kailahun District put  
it:  
It makes us remember that we did this,  when our grandmothers and grandfathers 
usually worked with the tradition. So if  we are doing the same thing we just 
remember our forefathers, our parents who have been doing that tradition, so 
[…]  that's why we like it .  [It is  a]  common understanding. (FG25) 
The youth in Moyamba District spoke in a similar vein about the function of 
these ceremonies,  and emphasised how it tied generations in the community 
together: 
As a young man you work for your father and your father is an old man 
practising this tradition, then if  you say you condemn his tradition then there 
will be no reconciliation, unless we go to worship in our own way and then join 
our father in his worship  (FG24). 
Second, they help strengthen the relat ionships among the individuals and 
families in the community.  Building on Durkheim, Richards (2006) writes that 
“ri tes, as collective actions without practical purpose, generate social solidarity 
through emotional entrainment” (p. 652). This is il lustrated in the following 
account of the local  ceremony by a young man in Kailahun:  
During the dancing, if  somebody has hurt you before, during that time you hug 
yourselves, you eat  together and then the person that have done wrong will feel 
happy – that the brothers that I hurt stil l  love me, I should come back and live 
with them. (FG15)  
The ceremonies are also particularly powerful events that bring people together 
to share experience and initiate a process of social recovery.  Schirch believes 
that  “doing something together helps them [people doing it]  feel as one” 
(Schirch, 2005:139 in Sentama: 52-3).  That the ‘doing something together ’ was 
an important aspect  of the ceremonies is also clear from the way they were 
organised. As evident from some of the descriptions of village ceremonies 
above, most of them relied on contributions of food stuffs from community 
members: men often set out to hunt for bush meat and women arranged other 
food stuffs:  
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We said every household should prepare a meal, so that we could bring the food 
together, so that everybody could come around and lay their hands on this food. 
Men went out to hunt and women collected palm oil.[  . . .]  we gathered and all  
the village people came together, and we decided that we should cook a very big 
meal to pass the ceremony for the war that had happened. We didn’t  do it  
individually; we performed a collective ceremony in the village. Women, men, 
everybody went into the bush to hunt animals for that occasion. People came 
with rice, animals,  so we prepared the food for the ceremony, after which 
everybody observed and there was a happy mood. (FG3)  
The contribution of food stuffs (and cooperation to catch or produce it)  required 
for the ceremony relates to community cohesion in the sense of creating 
community spirit  through a joint effort . It  also has the integrative aspect , often 
involving the settled inhabitants as well as new strangers (often fighters that  
had stayed behind in their former stronghold). The importance of the ceremony 
is underlined by the emphasis put on communal work in the Sierra Leonean 
understanding of reconciliation. By accomplishing to organise a ceremony the 
community had proven to itself that it  was capable of achieving something 
through cooperation.  
Also on a more symbolic level, the actual sharing of food is in itself understood 
as a gesture of reconciliation (cf. Stark 2006). “Dipping your hands into the 
same bowl” symbolises “togetherness” (FG27). This seems to be a common 
understanding across the country. Discussing the ceremony with two women in 
Bahun, they told me that “ the eating together created unity and oneness” 
(INT16), while a chief in a village in Bo District said:  “How can we show that i t  
is finished? When we all  sit  down and eat together. That eating shows that the 
ex-combatants have been forgiven” (INT3). The importance of the shared meal 
is also illustrated by the negative perception of the externally driven ceremony 
in the above Konga village after which the offered cow was taken back by the 
NGO rather than shared among the community which in their view rendered the 
whole programme meaningless.   
 
Ex-combatant reintegration 
The ceremonies were also important avenues for reintegration and acceptance of 
former fighters. In one village in Kailahun District where villagers who fled 
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during the war found upon their return ex-RUF fighters living in their vil lage, a 
group of elders explained at some length how the ceremony had been a symbolic 
expression of both groups that they were ready to live in peace together: 
We did it  because we felt that even those that remained here (ex-combatants)  
and those who came (the original inhabitants that  had fled) ,  i f  we don’t do it  we 
would just be sitt ing and nobody would care for each other. That procedure was 
taken because it  is  a form that we can show that there is a reconciliation 
process: by revoking the ancestors,  by trying to revive some of these tradit ions 
that used to take place in the community here. By doing so we wanted to 
abandon all  those petty grievances, those that remained here, those that came, 
so that if  we do that it  is an appreciation for each other to please come. If  we 
had failed, those that had come want to revive the ceremonies and the ones that 
remained would have said no, it  would show that there was not going to be any 
peace. But when we came we told them, we don’t know exactly what happened, is 
it  that our ancestors were mad over us,  is that  why these things were 
happening? When we came we had to do it .  And when we did it ,  those that 
remained here and those that came, we were together. And the ancestors after 
we had done it ,  i t  was good for them. But if  we had just sat  down and nothing 
like that would happen our conscience would not be clear each time something 
would happen in this community. But because we are reviving these things we 
feel that we should live by them and we believe that when we do it  there is 
reconciliation taking place in the community. (FG27) 
Publicly confessing or explaining oneself does not seem to have been part of the 
local ceremonies as discussed in chapter 7.3.
34
 There is some evidence in the 
interviews suggesting that the returning ex-combatants ‘confessed’ in the secret  
society bushes but more commonly returning ex-combatants first  turned to the 
chief and the elders to gain permission to re-settle in the community. Indeed, the 
example of Moa above also indicates that sometimes the chief would plead for 
acceptance by the community on the ex-combatants’ behalf during a ceremony 
and the acceptance would be sealed by asking the ancestors for forgiveness for 
all the bad that was done. This was confirmed elsewhere:  
We called them [ex-combatants] , we went to the shrine,  we poured libation for 
them that these are our children, they have done some many deeds, bad deeds 
                                                 
34
As I did not really witness the ceremonies and their dynamics, it was impossible to establish whether there was any 
dissent at the time to organising these ceremonies. 
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but then they have come, now accept them. The ancestral spirits accept them, so 
let them be with us. (FG21) 
As such the coming together to perform the ceremony was an expression of 
desired reconciliation by all  participants.  The fact  in i tself that a ceremony was 
organised and the community participated showed an intention, a desire for a 
peaceful and better future. It  provided a platform to express the 
acknowledgement of the wrongs committed and of acceptance of the ex-
combatants without explici tly referring to their deeds. Discussing ceremonial 
cleansing of girl  child soldiers in northern Sierra Leone, Stark (2006) points to 
the ‘symbolic gesture’ that a ceremony is in itself: all  community members play 
their prescribed role and by part icipating demonstrate their will willingness to 
reconcile. Similarly, Honwana (2006) remarks on Mozambique: “Without 
directly addressing the issues, the rituals are also moments of family and 
community reconciliation and forgiveness from the wrong doings of the past” 
(p.9). According to an NGO worker that  I interviewed, being an active part of 
ceremonies by contributing or undergoing cleansings that  the community is 
expecting go a long way in showing that you want to fit  back in: 
If you want to stay in the community you have to go through those rituals. You 
see out there, they have no other alternative. All have committed a lot of  
atrocities in the community, if  people say this is what you have to do to stay 
with us in our community,  they have no way out, but to go through it or live on 
their own. It is a demand from the community.  (E13) 
Understandably, many villagers shared a feeling of discomfort and fear of the 
ex-combatants. But also the hesitation on the side of the ex-combatants to 
approach fellow community members with requests for forgiveness may have 
often been caused by fear of being rebutted.  By taking part in the ceremony they 
could show that they were also longing for peace. One RUF fighter in that same 
community in Kailahun told me: 
[..]  of course, it  was good. Before the ceremony we had the fear people would 
point fingers at us and say that we are not part of the community. But after the 
ceremony they saw that we are really seeking for peace and after the ceremony 
it was good and nobody pointed a finger at me. And there was peace after this 
time. (INT41) 
Ex-combatants that I spoke to stated their appreciation of the way in which this 
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happened as it  made it easier for them to approach other community members.   
This is not to say that a ceremony as a stroke of a magic wand can bring about 
reconciliation. Understandably,  the acceptance and reintegration of combatants 
(and especially adult ones) is a much more complex and delicate process as 
discussed in chapter 7, in which a ceremony can only play a part .  
The ceremony was not only aimed at those that were physically present at the 
ceremony but was also a plea to the ancestors to encourage the return of those 
community members that  were still  away.  
In his research into the healing of rape victims, Mats Utas (2009) observed in 
one village in the Kono District the elders asked the ancestors for forgiveness of 
the ex-combatants even before these had returned to the village. They also asked 
the ancestors to “invite the lost boys and girls of the community to come home.” 
Such a ceremony would show the relat ives of the combatants that whatever 
atrocities their family members had committed they have been forgiven (p. 42-
3).    
 
Closure  
A lot has been written about Sierra Leonean communities preferring to leave the 
past  behind and to ‘forgive and forget’ (see chapter 7, cf.  Shaw 2005, 2007; 
Kellsall 2005; Stovel 2008) rather than to publicly recounting the war violence. 
The ceremonies assisted in the process of social forgetting by symbolically 
drawing a line in the sand. The following statement is  illustrat ive: 
So if we have come and we have performed the ceremony like that, to say let us 
experience reconciliation among ourselves. So that one is over and we do not 
see the need to accuse anyone and say 'you did this, you did this' .  (FG28) 
Sometimes it  was during the ceremony that closure was formalised by banning 
the war from the public conversation, by installing bylaws that would forbid 
‘finger-pointing’ or ‘name-calling’ as discussed above. Performing the ceremony 
could thus be seen as representing a symbolic break with the past . The war was 
to be left behind and the focus should be on making a better future.   
 
8.4 Reconciliation and secret societies 
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As it  was close to impossible for me as a non-initiate to find out into great 
detail what had taken place in the secret society bushes in relation to 
reconciliation after the conflict, what follows are a few observations and 
glimpses into why certain things were performed there and how they assisted the 
local  reconciliation process. While people did not reveal  anything specific about 
what exactly was going on in the secret  society bush, it  was evident from the 
interviews that they had an important role to play in reconcil iation and that their 
destruction affected people’s l ives. 
As mentioned earlier, the reestablishment of the social and political order based 
on chiefly authority and secret societies seems to have been one of the priorities 
for many Sierra Leoneans living in the rural areas. Arguably,  after the profound 
breakdown of established norms and the trauma caused by violence and 
displacement, the return to the familiar social order represented an attractive 
choice for many of the people who suffered during the war (cf. Fanthorpe 2007). 
It  provided a source of stability in the uncertain post-war times,  and contributed 
to restoring community cohesion. A woman in a vil lage in Koinadugu District  
emphasised: “[the bondo society]  keeps us together”  (INT18). However,  due to 
more urgent priorities such as housing and daily subsistence, the communities 
could not afford the costs and efforts associated with restoring secret society 
bushes, replacing lost artefacts and finding new initiators.  The comments in the 
Moa village above about these conflicting priorities (INT48, INT49) were 
echoed in many other villages such as by these elders in Koinadugu District: 
When the war came the sacred bushes were demolished or spoiled, like some of 
the women were taken by the rebels and raped or wounded in their bush. When 
those things happen we have to ‘pull Sara’, make sacrifice. We want to do our 
sacrifices, we intend to, but our first concern is to make a living and find 
something to eat .  ( INT17) 
In spite of the damage, the secret societies seem to have served an important 
role in restoring community life back to normal. Firstly, the secret societies and 
their secluded bushes had offered a space for people to voice grievances and 
settle grievances or confess crimes (cf. above INT47, INT49, or FG18). As these 
interviews suggest, i t  was not uncommon for ‘confessions’ to take place in the 
secret society bush: Some of us confessed. Especially if  you are a member of a 
society - if  you have not confessed, as a member of a society,  there are certain 
boundaries that you cannot cross, it  wil l  tell on you. So some of us confessed, 
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we poured l ibation for them, then we rub it on the ground, on their forehead and 
their chest.  (FG22) 
The initiation into the secret societies of the ex-combatants may have also 
served as one of the means of their reintegration. In a vil lage in Moyamba 
District, the RUF captured many children from a local school. Those boys that 
returned had to undergo cleansing and initiation in the society bush upon their 
return. They spent a week there before returning to the village (FG24). A head 
of a child reintegration organization similarly confirmed to Stovel (2007) that 
initiation into the society can be seen as an important  expression of community 
acceptance (p. 185).  In a vil lage in Kailahun, the initiation of ex-combatants 
that  hailed from elsewhere into the local Poro society was seen by the ‘stranger ’ 
as well as the local  community as a strong indication of their successful local 
integration (INT41, INT42).  While young men in a village in Moyamba District  
told me that they were glad to have been initiated in the society because 
‘culture’ was really important for them (FG24), in a nearby village I was also 
told of involuntary initiation into the secret  societies (FG21).    
In many places that I visited the war had left an entire generation uninitiated.  
“For many Sierra Leoneans, both rural and urban dwell ing, resuming initiations 
represents a major step towards post-war recovery” (Fanthorpe 2007). According 
to Coulter,  “the ceremony is not only a social event but has become a key event 
in reconfiguring social relations after a decade of civil  war” (Coulter 2008 
quoted in Leigh: 29). Re-starting Bondo initiation was considered an important 
indicator of the success of restoration of the secret  society life (and implicitly 
also the village life). Indeed, as women in Bahun proudly emphasised, the fact  
that  they had recently been able to initiate new girls  into Bondo again was a 
“proof that the ancestor spiri t  is present with us” (INT16). Richards (2004) also 
points out the importance of the secret  societies in returning back village life to 
normality especially in relat ion to marriage, “[t]he initiation of boys can wait, 
but girls [ . . .]  are considered un-marriageable until initiated,  and so parents will 
prioritize resources for a girl’s ini tiation as soon as household income rises 
above the threshold of bare subsistence” (p.  9).  
 
8.5 Individual sacrifice and cleansing 
The data suggests that  washing or cleansing of individuals exists in many 
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communities across the country and that  they come in different forms and have 
quite distinct purposes.  The focus here is on rituals performed for individuals 
for the benefit of their reintegration into their community.
35
 One informant at a 
child reintegration agency estimated that cleansings of returning child ex-
combatants took place in about 40% of the cases,  without a distinct geographical 
pattern (E9). 
Traditionally the washing of individuals relates to the restoration of the 
relationship with the spiritual world and is based on the belief that the bad 
fortune or bad deeds of one individual – if  not addressed through cleansing – 
can affect the entire community (Combey 2009:153). Many of the atrocities 
committed or suffered during the war – especially rape or intercourse in the 
bush, but also violence – could pollute the community.  Many of those associated 
with the fighting forces underwent cleansings upon their return. An NGO 
worker, part of a focus group in Kailahun, remarked: 
[...]  the ex-combatants who have not taken part in those traditional ceremonies 
are sti ll  believed to be those that are far away from us and still  have the curse 
and don’t have our blessings to be with us in the communities. So some because 
of these reasons don’t have the mind, they are not open enough to come and join 
us, because they have not taken part in the ceremonies.  (E19) 
One of his colleagues added: 
[…]  if those cleansings were not performed before they came to resettle, then 
the citizens might think i f  anything evil befalls them, this is happening because 
we have not done the ceremonies.(E19) 
Most of the cleansing rituals took place on family level or in the secret society 
bush. The elders in the village of Senehun described how the returning child 
soldiers were taken to secluded place: 
Immediately when we returned from the war –some of our children had been 
abducted, they had been carried away –when they had returned we gathered 
everybody. Those that returned, we took them to a camp and we hired these 
Muslim men to perform rituals to cleanse them, because some of them were 
behaving abnormally. We performed rituals with herbs, leaves and other ri tuals 
to help them regain their status.  (FG22) 
                                                 
35
 The ceremonies performed upon the return of these girls are distinct from the treatment that some of them have 
gone through later, such as visiting herbalists etc. (cf. Utas 2009, Stark 2006)  
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The ceremonies took various forms in the different communities. Gbla (2003) 
describes a cleansing ceremony carried out for a 15 year old ex-RUF returnee in 
northern Sierra Leone, “the elders in his family.. .  took the boy to the bush 
where a hut had been built  using grass.. .  On entering the hut, Amadu [the ex-
combatant] was asked to undress himself,  that is, to take off the clothes he used 
to put on while with the RUF. The hut and the clothes were then set alight while 
an adult relative helped out the boy quickly. The burning of the hut and the 
clothes and everything else that the boy brought from the war symbolically 
represents his sudden break from an evil  past . Immediately thereafter, a chicken 
was sacrificed to the spiri ts of the dead and the blood smeared around the ritual 
place” (p. 188). 
During my stay in Kabala, I worked with a translator/assistant that had been 
involved in the return and reintegration of children associated with the fighting 
forces. Through him I was able to interview seven informants (six women and 
one man) that had been abducted by the RUF and who underwent cleansing 
ceremonies upon their return home.
36
 
My parents made a sacrifice in the form of cooked rice and cold water in a pan 
with a number of kola nuts in it .  You put your hands over the water and say your 
desires and express happiness over what has been received. And after that  
everyone will come and dip their hands into the water and take out a kola nut 
until all nuts are gone. Some of the water will be drunk and some sprinkled at 
the doorstep as a sign of happiness that the ordeal is  over and also that no 
further disaster or bad omen should happen to the family again. (INT8) 
When I came, my big sister washed my feet and drank the water and my elder 
brother brought other family members and they all came and washed my face 
and hands,  the whole body and drank the water. And another man came and 
offered prayers in the Muslim way.  ( INT10) 
They later described the effect  of these different ceremonies:  
I felt  happy after it  was done. That sacrifice is very important for everybody. 
When you do it ,  i t  helps a lot , it  goes a long way. It  gives you an amount of 
protection and an amount of peace of mind. (INT8) 
Because of my experience in the bush, it  was only constant prayer and sacrifices 
                                                 
36
 These girls did not receive any assistance upon their return home, however some of their stories resemble those 
described by Stark (2006) of girls that were in program of the Christian Children's Fund.  
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that cooled down my mind. There is nothing like an impression of people 
reminding me of the past and the sacrifices offered helped me.  ( INT10) 
The ceremonies first had an impact on the women as individuals. They made 
them feel better about themselves and more accepted and welcome. However, 
when I asked them about what they thought has helped them most in leaving the 
past behind, none of them immediately referred to the ceremonies but rather to 
the material assistance that they have received:  
My sister's husband helped me in getting into petty trading – and so I could sell 
and have some small  source of l iving.  ( INT10) 
Not just the spiritual transformation provided by the ceremonies, prayer and 
sacrifice but also this work was an opportunity for her to feel worthwhile and 
move on with her life as well as reintegrate into the community. It  allowed her 
to ‘fit  in’ which is a vital component of successful reintegration and 
reconciliation as discussed in chapter 6.   
The cleansing also symbolised acceptance of the girls by their families and well 
as by the wider community.  Because “for the people to be able to receive the 
children wholeheartedly...  acts l ike washing feet , joint dancing, drumming...  
shows that people forgave and are wil ling to accept those kids”  (E24, cf. Stark 
2006, Williamson et al. 2002). Furthermore, part of these rituals served to 
“thank the ancestors and God” for the safe return of the child (Shaw 2002:6-7). 
Shaw describes how parents drink the water used to wash their children's  feet  as 
a way to create “a new physical bond between parent and child” (ibid.). At least  
in some cases, parents were also honouring an oath they have taken as described 
above in the case of Bahun. Uncertain about the fate and whereabouts of their 
children parents would take an oath promising to perform - upon the safe return 
of their children - a humbling task, such as drinking the mentioned water or 
scraping their head (INT16). Similarly,  among the Kpaa Mende in Moyamba 
District, parents of returned children would dress up in rags (Alie 2008:142).   
Traditional  cleansing ceremonies were also widely used across the country as 
part of the reintegration programmes for child ex-combatants carried out by 
national and international  agencies and NGOs like UNICEF, International 
Rescue Committee, Caritas Makeni, Children Associated with War and others.
37
 
                                                 
37
 These programmes included many other aspects too like community sensitization, Interim Care Centres, school or 
skills training, counselling etc. See Williamson (2006). 
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Although many cleansing ceremonies were part of larger externally-driven 
interventions, which may raise suspicion that a demand for them may be 
outside-driven, much evidence confirms that it  is not the case. The communities 
where Caritas Makeni worked themselves requested the rituals to be part of the 
reintegration programmes (E25). Similarly, Stark's study found that carrying out 
the cleansing ceremonies for the girls  was either desired by the girls themselves 
or by their families,  with the decision mostly supported by both parties. (Stark 
2006:213). Also another study confirms that  the rituals and ceremonies were in 
some cases arranged by the families and communities themselves with the NGOs 




8.6 Fambul Tok 
Although my research focuses on community ceremonies that took place without 
major external support, I found it  necessary to take a closer look into the 
ceremonies supported by the local NGO Fambul Tok. After shortly describing 
the ceremonies that  I have witnessed I will move on to discuss how participants 
fel t it  had contributed to local reconciliation. I will particularly focus on the 
three pillars of the programme; confessions/truth-telling, the restoration of 
traditions and development. 
‘Fambul Tok’ means ‘family talk’ in Krio and represents a symbolic expression 
of the effort to involve all the members of the local communities across the 
country - victims, perpetrators or witnesses - to participate in rebuilding mutual 
trust and respect and draw everyone “back into the Sierra Leone family” 
(Fambul Tok 2008). This is to be achieved through traditional ceremonies that 
the communities themselves will identify as appropriate. Groups of villages in 
each chiefdom set up reconciliation committees - in which not only elders and 
rel igious leaders but also women and youth have a representative. These design 
and prepare the reconciliation ceremony based of their specific local practice. 
According to its founder John Caulker, the programme was created in response 
to the l imited ability of the national top-down initiatives l ike the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to reach the communities outside the major district  
centres (E22). 
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Fambul Tok launched its work in Kailahun District in 2008. In the village in 
Kissy-Kama chiefdom that I visited back then, the ceremony started with a joint 
meal of traditional rice and cassava leaf for everyone. A bonfire was then lit  and 
the chiefs started the ceremony. This was followed by the truth-telling event - a 
young man told a story of the death of his family members after they had been 
discovered in their hide-out in the bush. He then pointed at another man who he 
knew had been responsible for committing these murders. The perpetrator then 
came forward to face the victim and the community.  He admitted to the killings,  
apologized and asked for forgiveness, which he was given and the men shook 
hands.  Other vict ims and perpetrators shared their story that evening. After that , 
a possessed diviner spoke to the ancestral  spirits about sacrifices they needed to 
be appeased. The next morning, people were singing and dancing accompanied 
by drummers, awaiting in a celebratory atmosphere the elders, chiefs and the 
Paramount Chief who slowly gathered in the village to take a goat and kola nuts 
to a sacred place to offer them to the ancestors (to where no women or children 
were allowed to follow them). The ceremony was then concluded with another 
joint meal. 
The second ceremony which I witnessed during my second visit in 2010 in 
Upper Bambara chiefdom, also in Kailahun District , started with a speech by the 
Paramount Chief who came along with Fambul Tok. He explained the gathered 
audience that “if a perpetrator has not confessed he will  fear to join in 
communal work. By encouraging confession, this project will bring 
development”.  The truth-telling part was moderated by a local man that had 
been a Kamajor during the war.  In total 14 people ‘confessed’ during the 
evening. The grievances recounted included murder,  rape, theft , arson, 
abduction and forced labour and all crimes were equally committed by SLA, 
RUF and Kamajors.  The truth-telling session was at times interrupted by a 
performance of a mask-devil which continued until the early hours of the 
morning. The devil  – supported by a group of drummers – was recounting 
stories, making jokes and singing. In the morning the community was 
entertained by the masked-devil. A masked Bondo dancer was going from door 
to door asking for small gifts.  She was followed by a score of women that were 
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While the particulari ties of each ceremony were determined locally,  each had a 
‘truth-telling’ element. As presented in the above chapter,  nowhere in my 
interviews in other villages was a need for such a truth-telling event expressed. 
The returning combatants had ‘confessed’ to the chiefs who in turn had 
encouraged the community to forgive the returning ‘brothers’.    
Most of the voluntary ‘confessions’ during the ceremonies that I witnessed came 
from victims rather than from perpetrators. If  the accused perpetrators were 
present they were then expected to apologise by kneeling in front of the victim. 
Many of them came forward hesitantly. Most peculiar was the recounting by one 
victim of how she was gang raped by a number of Kamajors in the village. She 
said some of the Kamajors were still  living there, and accused the moderator, 
who had been standing next to her, as being one of them. Much to the awe of the 
gathered crowd, he hesitantly admitted to the crime, apologised and knelt down 
to be forgiven.
 
A few days later I spoke to him about this episode: 
Me: During the ceremony, you were identified as perpetrator, right? 
Man: Yes, you can be a wrong-doer and forget, but of course the person you 
harm does not forget  so easily. I could not recall that I did that. But somebody 
reminded me. (INT54) 
Those perpetrators that did come forward voluntarily mostly faced the chiefs, or 
specifically the Paramount Chief when confessing to their abuses in spite of 
being reminded by some of the Fambul Tok staff to address the whole 
community.  Subsequently the chief would urge the victim and the community at  
large to accept the apology. From my interviews it emerges that personal 
forgiving was still  s trongly encouraged by the elders,  one of the victims that 
was appealed to forgive said: 
Since I have known the person [that hurt me]  and I have been told by the elders 
to forgive, we have forgiven. We can start a fresh page so we can work as one. 
(INT50)  
The statements of victims who accepted apologies – or were asked by the chief 
to do so – resembled narratives of consenting acceptance discussed in chapter 7. 
A woman whose father was killed and had identified the killers on the night of 
the ceremony later told me:   
In the case of my father being shot dead, a confession does not bring him back 
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[...]  whether I accept it  or not,  it  has been done, so what is my choice? What 
has been done cannot been undone, we have no option, nowhere to go, we need 
to live with them. If  I  would refuse to talk to those perpetrators it  would not 
heal the wound.  We are accepting it .  (INT51)  
The town speaker, whose house had been burnt , had a similar attitude although 
he hoped that his willingness to forgive would encourage the culprit to assist 
him:   
Now it has happened, and I know the person [that did it] . My house has been 
burned, I don’t feel too good. Now that I was appealed to, there is nothing I can 
do.  That man cannot rebuild my house,  there is nothing I can do. It is just a 
matter of forgiving him. Maybe one day the man will  assist me in a job .  (INT50)  
It  seems, however, the some of the perpetrators who ‘confessed’ experienced a 
feeling of relief. The hesitant confessor told me a few days later:   
[ . . .]  here you have the situation that you have wronged somebody and although 
some people have forgotten some have not. But when you speak about [it]  
publicly and apologise people will forgive, god himself  will forgive.  Now I am 
free from sins.  (INT54)  
The same feelings resonated in the other villages that organised a Fambul Tok 
ceremony before my arrival.  In a village in Moyamba District, I asked one 
informant that  confessed during a Fambul Tok ceremony, why he had not done 
so during a previous ceremony that had taken place in the vil lage directly after 
the war:  
I did not do it  at first during our own celebration because everybody was having 
hot temper, so if  I did there would be another problem. Therefore I kept to 
myself .  And this Fambul Tok gave me the feeling of security – to explain all that  
I did. (FG22) 
After observing the TRC hearings in Bombali , Shaw (2010) noted that offenders 
often did not take any personal responsibility for their actions. This was also the 
case in the two Fambul Tok ceremonies.   The Kamajor who ‘confessed’ to the 
community apologized:  
[...]  once you handle a gun, you don’t know your father, you don’t know your 
mother, so forgive me.  
Similarly, three young boys that had been abducted by the RUF and had returned 
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to burn the village school and mosque narrated their abduction and how they 
were forced by a commander to destroy their village.  
Arguably, the Fambul Tok ceremony ‘confessions’ very much resemble those at 
the TRC as described in the ethnographic accounts of the hearings (cf. Shaw 
2010; Kelsall  2005). As Kelsall concluded after visiting the Tonkolili  TRC 
hearings: “truth, of the forensic, legal-positivist, or cathart ic, emotional-
confessional variety,  is not easy to elicit ,  especially in the context where such 
practices are not part of the cultural mainstream” (Kelsall 2005:390). Rather 
they are a display of the change of the speakers’ hearts (Shaw 2010:129). 
Similarly, Stovel commenting on a Fambul Tok ceremony in a village in 
Kailahun District pointed out the ‘theatrical’ element of the ‘confessions’, 
which barely went beyond the most basic facts (cited in Park 2010b:114). 
 
Restoration of tradit ions 
As discussed above, the war did a lot of damage to the local traditional practice. 
In many places a whole generation grew up away from their ancestral lands,  
missing out on annual sacrifices and init iations.  On return, there was often little 
money to restore shrines or buy animals for sacrifice.  Fambul Tok states that 
many of these practices “have not been employed by local communities since 
before the war” (Fambul Tok 2009).  But despite these challenges and 
limitat ions, the present study found abundant evidence that many communities 
managed to organise some kind of ceremony or sacrifice,  even if only minimal.   
Fambul Tok seems to have given some of the villages an opportunity to make the 
‘proper ’ sacrifice. The elders in a village in Kailahun District spoke about the 
revival of their tradit ions:   
When we came back from the war, we cooked chicken and spoke to the ancestors 
at the village shrine as was our custom. We also cleansed the bushes to ask for 
forgiveness of the ancestors. We started with restoring ourselves, but later 
Fambul Tok helped to restore our tradition. (INT37) 
Elsewhere in the country the story was similar. In a vil lage in Moyamba 
District, people recalled:  Before Fambul Tok we [.. .]  talked to the ancestors, 
later we offered bread, pound bread, we offered that and told the ancestors that 
we should have done something more than that, but the chance is not there, so 
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let them hold on to that and when the means come we do it  properly.  (FG22)  
Later, when Fambul Tok came, “we repeated the same thing but it  was done 
properly that time. The first time was on a small scale just to satisfy [the 
ancestors] . But when Fambul Tok came we had to satisfy everybody. […]  We 
bought two goats, men one goat, women one goat, satin one piece for the men, 
one piece for the women, we bought so many things. We danced throughout the 
night. We bought drinks. And all the time people were dancing. It was the same 
day that the women went to their shrine,  the men also went to their shrine, we 
returned with a dance and then we went to the tomb” (FG24).  
The support that Fambul Tok has provided has given communities an impulse to 
revive yet larger parts of their traditional practice than they achieved on their 
own previously.     
 
Development 
Local development is one of the outcomes by which Fambul Tok measures the 
success of its programme. The programme helps communities establish 
community farms - “an old tradition, but one that has been dormant since before 
the war” (Fambul Tok 2009). In several  places,  people indeed confirmed that 
Fambul Tok had encouraged them to take up communal projects again .  A group 
of women readily related the recent development and the cooperation that had 
helped bring about the reconcil iat ion to the Fambul Tok ceremony that had taken 
place: 
Me: How did the Fambul Tok ceremony help to bring you together? 
Woman: It helped bringing peace and unity and made us farm and build 
together.  (…) Before the Fambul Tok ceremony, poverty, hunger,  and lack of 
houses made people hosti le, which resulted in finger-pointing to perpetrators: 
‘you came from Liberia, you brought the war ’,  and so on. 
Me: But how did the ceremony contribute to the fact that there are houses and 
less hunger now? 
Woman: Our unity is  bringing progress. We can work together now. (FG26) 
From her statement,  it  seems that stimulating communal projects went a long 
way in both bringing people closer together and bringing development.   Indeed, 
Fambul Tok annual report is abound with similar and more detailed stories of 
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people setting up farms together and reconstructing communal building (Fambul 
Tok International 2010). 
 
Discussion and analysis 
Most of the nation-wide reconciliation and reintegration initiatives – including 
the symbolic reparations programme rolled out by NaCSA in 2009 - failed to 
reach out to the most remote communities and failed to help communities 
address many of their conciliatory needs:  
When we returned from Guinea the DDR programme started but didn’t reach us. 
Fambul Tok reached here and explained us how reconciliation and forgiveness 
would bring progress. Although this is  where the war started, only Fambul Tok 
reached this end; NaCSA and the DDR programme never reached us here.  
(INT37) 
Indeed, in many communities throughout the country I encountered a bitter 
disappointment about national programmes such as the TRC, SCSL, DDR and 
NaCSA not delivering any assistance to people to rebuild their lives. People 
placed their hopes on external assistance in one way or another, but had mixed 
experiences with NGOs, which often came to sensitise them about issues such as 
governance, human rights or female genital  mutilation rather than bringing 
‘development’ of the kind they were hoping for.  The genuine attention from 
Fambul Tok was an exception both in terms of the sustainable development it  
aimed to bring and i ts sensitivity to the local culture. For Caulker,  it  is the fact  
that  the ceremonies are “locally determined and organised” that lies behind their 
success (quoted in Graybill  2010:46). 
On the basis of suggestions by the local NGO Manifesto ‘99 (2002) to include 
traditional aspects in the TRC hearings it  was hoped that “some indigenous 
mechanisms or processes [would be]  set in place in communities that could 
continue the healing process. Sadly, that  did not happen” (E2).  The TRC only 
made use of rituals in the closing ceremonies of its district hearings. While 
Kelsall (2005) noted the tangible effect of the ritual closing of the Tonkolili  
TRC hearings, he also acknowledges that  “in time, […], the reconciliation spell 
woven by the hearings may unravel” (p.391). Similar doubts could be cast  on 
the long term effects of the Fambul Tok ceremonies.  In an ethnographic study 
into the reintegration of an RUF ex-combatant after a ceremony, Taylor-Smith 
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Larsen (2011) noted that  victims often expect that the ‘confessor ’ will  visit them 
afterwards “to peacefully settle whatever scores they have” (p.45). When I 
returned a few days later to the village where I witnessed a ceremony, it  seemed 
some victims and perpetrators had already made an effort: 
Kamajor: Last night [the vict im]  cooked for me and gave it  to me, which was a 
symbol of reconciliation that the past was forgotten. 
Me: Should not you be the one to compensate? 
Kamajor: I have the intention but I want to surprise the lady later. I have the 
intention to do i t  later on when I have the means in the form of a goose, or 
cassava or a pineapple.  (INT52) 
Although this is expected, it  is probably beyond the power of an external party 
to influence that interpersonal reconcil iat ion like that will actually happen. This 
being said, Fambul Tok aims to positively influence the community beyond the 
evening of the ceremony by supporting communal projects that bring both 
development and opportunities for ex-combatants to show that they are actively 
contributing to rebuilding the community.   
In most cases,  the crimes of the ‘confessors’ were already known to the 
community,  making the confessions somewhat redundant in the narrow sense of 
truth-telling. Rather than publicly narrating details of their crimes and taking 
responsibility for them, the ex-combatants told stories that resembled 
‘confessions’ discussed above, recounting being forced, drugged or abducted. 
But taking part in the ceremony signalled that the perpetrators were changed 
people. The public acknowledgement of the crime and a plea for forgiveness 
asked directly from the victims may be at least  in some cases finally bringing 
the apology that so many people claimed was necessary for reconciliation but 
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9. Conclusion 
Reconciliation is a long and complex process. It  is not automatic or 
straightforward. There is  also not just one single way of bringing communities 
back together after violent conflict. Some strategies succeed in one community 
while they run into difficulties in others, even if the circumstances may on the 
surface appear similar. Over the past years, there has been growing evidence 
that the tools designed by the international community and the national elite to 
bring or to facilitate accountability and reconciliation often have very litt le 
impact on the local communities. Focusing their efforts and funds on the SCSL 
and the TRC, the parallel operations of which earned Sierra Leone the label of a 
‘transitional justice laboratory’,  the international community paid lit tle 
attention to exploring and supporting processes that would reflect local  
priorities and conciliatory needs.  Outside the official mechanisms, people in the 
villages across the country employed a wealth of local practices of 
reintegration, reconciliation and healing, including ceremonies and other forms 
of ritual . These responses were often improvised and adapted versions of 
established ceremonies, the meanings of which were familiar to those 
participating in them. They were performed to invite villagers, including ex-
combatants, back into the community, restore relationships with the ancestors 
and foster coexistence and ‘unity’. These different tradit ional  practices have 
been an important resource for the people in their efforts  to remake social 
relationships and restore community cohesion in the direct  aftermath of the war. 
This present thesis explored these very efforts and experiences. It  studied the 
reconciliation and restoration of relationships at village level in Sierra Leone 
through the perspectives of those who live them. The dynamics between the 
perpetrators, victims, chiefs and other bystanders varied from village to village, 
and it is not possible to draw any broad conclusions from the brief encounters 
that I had with them. As one of my informants remarked: “Human beings are 
very complex machines; we are dynamic, and sometimes we can be happy, 
sometimes we cannot be happy. When you are happy you can forget about i t ,  
when you are in distress you cannot. God created human beings and through our 
complexity we can sometimes forget about it” (INT55). People in the village are 
bound to look differently at the past, feel differently about accepting the ex-
combatants, or deal  differently with their own wounds, losses and memories. 
Talking about community reconcil iat ion will always obscure some of these 
 
 149  
individual experiences. It  also must be noted that with 18 villages, the sample is  
limited. Nonetheless,  with these acknowledged limitations the research allows to 
come to several wider observations and to give preliminary answers to the 
questions posed in the introduction. 
Giving any final answers to the question of local understanding of reconcil iation 
is particularly complicated. Individually,  reconcil iat ion is usually expressed as 
having ‘kol at’, while ‘wan word’ connotes a collective ‘kol at’.  Both notions 
refer to functioning social relationships in the community.  The expressions of 
reconciliation are predominantly situated at the level of the community rather 
than rest ing with the individual.  It  is the capabili ty for collective action, often 
referred to as ‘unity’ that  is  decisive for local  assessment of whether 
reconciliation has been successful or not.   
The apparent harmony of this widely declared ‘unity’ in the villages is of a 
specific nature. Rather than a result of joint decisions, or a consonance of 
opinions, it  is an expression of the fact  that the social order, upon which the 
village is organized, has been restored. It  suggests that everybody accepted their 
place back in the social hierarchy of the community.  It  is also in this light, that 
the seemingly easy reintegration of the ex-combatants in the villages must be 
understood. Supporting the findings of Shaw (2007, 2010), Stovel (2006),  
Boersch-Supan (2009),  Coulter (2009) and others, this research found that the 
ex-combatants were mainly judged on their present behaviour in the society 
rather than on giving explicit apologies or narrating a full account of their 
crimes. The latter indeed very rarely happened. People often mentioned that 
‘their ’ perpetrators were now reformed, meaning they participated in the 
community activities and performed their social roles. When they expressed 
distrust , it  was towards those ex-combatants who did not ‘come back home’ – 
those were viewed with suspicion, as unable or unwill ing to ‘change their heart’ 
and respect  the accepted social norms.  
The research also confirms that chiefly authorities played a critical role in both 
the reintegration and reconciliation processes as well as in the local cultural  
practices that often facilitated them. Chiefs often acted as ‘gatekeepers’ for the 
returning combatants, appealed to the communities to ‘forgive and forget’ and 
commonly enacted these appeals through bylaws banning any further labelling 
of the ex-combatants. While their prominent role in these processes may be 
viewed as problematic given these local leaders were implicated in causing the 
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war in the first place, it  is dubious that  the internationally sanctioned efforts 
have avoided this pitfall .  Shaw’s (2010) account of the TRC reconciliation 
ceremony in Bombali District Hearings presents a story not unlike to what was 
happening in the vil lages. She observed that during the closing ceremony, the 
ex-combatants performed an act of submission to senior elite men: “.. . the TRC 
reconciliation ceremony ritualized ex-combatants submission to chiefs, district 
officers, and rel igious leaders. (. . . ) this effectively meant reintegration into the 
very structures of power and exclusion that  contributed to the war in the first  
place” (ibid.:130).  
Social structures and structures of power are usually resistant  to fundamental 
and radical changes. Indeed, after the prolonged period of violence and 
upheaval, the return to the familiar social order seems to have been one of the 
greatest priorit ies and the restoration of the chiefly structures found support in 
the population. But while the chiefly structures have been restored and with 
them many of the injustices, exclusions and marginalization, this is  not  to say 
that everything just returned to its pre-war state. In a number of villages, the 
youth often navigated the conversation about the post-war conditions to the 
question of human rights and usually confirmed there had been improvements in 
their relationship with the chiefs and in the youth’s chances to make themselves 
heard. It  seemed that it  was rather the chiefs who bemoaned the post-war order 
in which fining and control of youth had become harder. 
Beyond the dynamics of reintegration and of (re)making of community cohesion 
and ‘unity’, the research also looked at the key aspects of achieving ‘kol at’ as 
they emerged from the narrative accounts. Forgiving (and forgetting) featured 
dominantly in the reconciliation discourse. But far from being expressions of 
inherent African characteristics and forgiving nature, it  is  better seen as a 
mixture of pragmatism and religious belief. Coming together, accepting the 
former combatants into the community’s midst was for many simply the best and 
often the only available option to secure peace. A strong religious belief 
inspired both the mercy for the ex-combatants as well as the hope for the divine 
justice to make the final  judgement on those who committed the atrocities.  
Rather than just  an expression of fatal ism, this reliance of deferred justice 
might be attributed the prolonged history of accumulated injustices and to a 
higher priority given to more immediate daily concerns (cf. Shaw 2009, 
Boersch-Supan 2009).  
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Lastly,  to achieve ‘kol at’ or forgetting, one must be able to rebuild his or her  
life. But the reparations programme has arguably been a fai lure. According to 
official numbers, 20.000 people received a reparations payment by April 2010. 
While the TRC planned to do more, there were no funds available (VOA News, 
April 23, 2010). Indeed, people in the villages bemoaned the serious flaws and 
corruption in the registration process and the one-off payments of the 
reparations that hardly improved their situation. Many people thus located the 
persist ing gaps in their own and their communities’ abili ty to truly move on and 
to ‘forget the war ’ in the material  hardship they still  are facing as a consequence 
of the war. This has important implications for the way people reflect on the 
work of the transitional  justice institutions, as will  be discussed below.  
As to the second question, the research confirmed that local ceremonies and 
other ritual expressions of reconciliat ion and healing played an important  role in 
the communities’ efforts  to address their conciliatory needs in the aftermath of 
the war. First , they served the aim of facilitating community cohesion and ex-
combatant reintegration. Second, just as they are supporting togetherness among 
the living, they also foster restoration of the relationships with the spiritual 
world and thus ensure the support of the ancestors. It  is through this symbolic 
reconnection with the ancestral spirits that  the past and present are re-linked 
after the war destruction and a better future is envisaged. This makes the 
ceremonies an important part of post-war reconciliat ion effort . Last, ceremonies 
were sometimes perceived as a particular moment in time that reconciliation had 
been declared and jointly endorsed. While representing the beginning of a long 
process rather than an achieved end state of reconcil iat ion,  they provided a 
symbolic closure, a break with the past. Indeed, as  “The ceremonies and 
sacrifice we performed have gone a long way in assisting us and in ensuring us 
that something like that war was not going to happen again...  It  is not 
automatic.  Not that  after a ceremony all  is done. It  will come over time and we 
have patience. But when we see the result we believe that it  comes because we 
performed all this.” (INT16) 
The major obstacles for the communities to perform the ceremonies seemed to 
have been of practical nature. In most communities, usually people blamed lack 
of money but others pointed to the permanent loss of the unique knowledge that 
disappeared with the death of the specialists in the war. The war has caused 
major damage to many sacred places, including ancestral shrines. But there 
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certainly seem to be more factors at play that  explain why in some communities 
ceremonies took place and in others people only lamented their absence and 
loss.  There seems to be a relationship between the declared unity in the village 
and performing ceremonies. As we have seen in the Moa vil lage, people proudly 
stated that despite the lack of money and food, everyone was encouraged to 
contribute at least  a cup of rice and young men were sent to hunt for animals to 
carry out the sacrifice and cook a joint meal: “We have done a small ceremony 
but we have a plan to do the proper one,  and whatever happens we must do it ,  so 
that we can continue to experience peace and unity among us” (INT48). On the 
contrary,  in Konga, the chief told me: “Money is not sufficient to perform the 
required sacrifices. Not much has been performed, nothing at all  in fact.  It  is 
better to do nothing than to do it  half-heartedly” (FG12). In the latter, my field 
notes also describe a prevailing heavy atmosphere of frustration and anger 
combined with despair and general destitution much unlike any other community 
I visited during my fieldwork. This suggests that the ability to perform any of 
the traditional ceremonies, instead of just bringing about unity and 
reconciliation could in fact already be an expression of the capacity of the 
community to come together for a joint goal . Given the prominent role the 
traditional chiefly authorities and elders play in most of the established 
processes of dispute resolution and reconciliation, the quality of leadership in 
adapting these mechanisms to dealing with the post-war challenges seems 
cri tical . 
Concerning the last question, the research examined the experience and 
reflection of the nationally-driven initiatives in the villages and their 
meaningfulness for the conciliatory and justice needs of their populations. It  
specifically focused on the trial of Charles Taylor, the only ongoing case of the 
SCSL at the t ime of the research. The SCSL has received a lot of attention from 
international donors, much in line with the contemporary preference for 
international criminal just ice in post-war countries. But the research shows a 
visible disconnection between the transit ional justice aims and the priorit ies and 
needs of the local  communities. On the surface,  it  seems that there is  certain 
degree of consonance between the both. Indeed, there were very few people who 
would want Charles Taylor to walk free. But justice featured scarcely in 
responses to the question of the purpose of the SCSL and the Taylor trial . Given 
the general awareness of Taylor ’s part in the conflict, people feared his return.  
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Their answers showed that much more than need for accountability, they had 
security concerns. People’s bad experience with the state institutions and the 
security apparatus means that their trust  in its  ability to prevent another war and 
provide their protection is very low. With Charles Taylor held far away, Sierra 
Leone is  for them a safer place.  But it  did not bring the victims much justice as 
the SCSL claimed. Its narrow focus on criminal prosecution does not satisfy the 
justice needs that most people declare. Mani’s (2002) distributive justice 
resonates much deeper among the local priorities. The structural injustices, 
economic and political disempowerment of much of the population and deep 
inequalities of distribution are st ill  present, just as they were before the war. 
And as discussed above, the inability to achieve ‘kol at’ attributed to the 
material hardship makes proclamations of justice and restoring dignity to the 
victims a very distant song. As the chief summarized it:  “A goat here is different 
than a white man's goat” (INT17). 
 
Final remarks 
It  makes sense to the local  communities to use what they ‘know’ to face the 
challenges presented by the need to foster coexistence after the war. The 
communities have shown strong resilience and the abili ty to restore 
relationships and reintegrate those who have harmed them, among others 
through means of local traditional practice. Often, i t  had to be adjusted – such 
as substituting the more expensive animals such as cows or goats for cheaper 
fowls or white flour - in order to satisfy the need for performing a ceremony for 
the restoration of the broken relationship with the ancestors and among each 
other. That said, in most of the vil lages,  people felt that more should be done 
and that lacking money to buy the necessary foodstuffs and replace missing 
artefacts could mean that some of this practice could be permanently ‘lost’. It  
also often meant, that this reconciliation happened on ‘old terms’ – with the pre-
war social  order with its injustices and marginalization of certain groups largely 
restored. In this respect, there is a space here where the outside assistance could 
be fruitfully used. But this can hardly be done without increased sensit ivity and 
understanding of the local conciliatory needs and preferences.   
It  also needs to be emphasised, that the ceremonies and other local practices of 
social recovery are not an easily transferable, universal formula for assisting the 
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achievement of reconciliation in all the communities across the country.  The 
situation in the villages that were the focus of my research is very different  
from the towns for example. Some of the most affected groups such as the 
amputees and war wounded, many of whom stay in specially constructed 
settlements usually outside major towns, are disconnected from their home 
communities but also from their social and spiritual networks that provide the 
background for the traditional practice. In my conversations in the amputee and 
war wounded settlement outside Port  Loko, people saw little value in 
performing any ceremonies to help them deal with their ordeals.  
It  would therefore be a mistake to present the traditional  reconciliation and 
cleansing ceremonies as a panacea for fostering a successful  reconciliation 
process. They after all are also part of the damaged social fabric and not a static 
tool ready to be used in mending the broken relationships and safeguarding 
unity and social renewal. But they are also rooted in the local communities’ 
history as well as understandings of what reconcil iat ion means and have shown 
a high degree of adaptabili ty to the contemporary needs of combatant 
reintegration and rebuilding relationships after the war. Overlooking them or 
barely instrumentalising them to turn them into an accessory of the externally-














 155  
 








Wara-Wara Yagala and 
Sengbe chiefdoms 
Kissi Teng, Kissi 
Kama, Luawa and 
Upper Bambara 
chiefdoms 








Valunia chiefdom Sowa chiefdom 
 
 156  
ANNEX 2 – List  of Interviews  
 
Code Participants Region Location Description 
INT1 1 South Bo Male/Kamajor 
INT2 2 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 1 Male + Female,  local  
advocacy group members 
INT3 1 South Sowa chiefdom Male/Village chief 
INT4 2 South Sowa chiefdom Male/Kamajor 
INT5 1 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 2 Female 
INT6 1 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male 
INT7 1 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/Kamajor 
INT8 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee  
INT9 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee 
INT10 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee 
INT11 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee 
INT12 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee 
INT13 1 North Kabala Female/RUF abductee 
INT14 1 North Kabala Male/RUF abductee 
INT15 2 North Sengbe chiefdom, vil lage 1 Male/Elders 
INT16 2 North Sengbe chiefdom, vil lage 1 Female 
INT17 2 North Sengbe chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/Elders 
INT18 2 North Sengbe chiefdom, vil lage 2 Female 
INT19 1 North Sengbe chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/Tradit ional healer 
INT20 1 North Port  Loko Male/Elder 
INT21 2 North Port  Loko Male/Elders 
INT22 1 North Port  Loko Female 
INT23 1 North Port  Loko Female 
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INT24 2 North Port  Loko Female 
INT25 1 North Port  Loko Male 
INT26 1 North Port  Loko Male 
INT27 1 North Maforki chiefdom Male/Elder 
INT28 1 North Maforki chiefdom Male/Chief 
INT29 2 North Maforki chiefdom Male/Youth 
INT30 1 North Sanda Magbolontor  chiefdom Male/Youth 
INT31 1 North Sanda Magbolontor  chiefdom Male 
INT32 1 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Male/Chief 
INT33 1 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Male/Kamajor 
INT34 1 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Female/Elder 
INT35 1 South Fakunya chiefdom Male/Chief 
INT36 1 East  Kissi  Teng chiefdom Male/Youth 
INT37 2 East  Kissi  Teng chiefdom Male/Elders 
INT38 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 1 Male/Youth 
INT39 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 1 Male/RUF 
INT40 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/RUF 
INT41 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/RUF 
INT42 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/Chief 
INT43 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male 
INT44 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Female 
INT45 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 2 Male/Elder 
INT46 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 3 Male/Imam 
INT47 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 3 Female/Youth 
INT48 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 3 Female/Elder 
INT49 1 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 3 Male/Kamajor 
INT50 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Male/Town speaker 
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INT51 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Female 
INT52 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Male 
INT53 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Male/RUF abductee 
INT54 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Male 
INT55 1 East  Upper Bambara chiefdom Female 
 
Code Participants Region Location Description 
FG1 10 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 1 Women 
FG2 8 South Valunia chiefdom, vil lage 1 Men 
FG3 3 South Sowa chiefdom Women 
FG4 4 South Sowa chiefdom Young men 
FG5 5 North Sengbe, vil lage 1 Young men 
FG6 6 North Sengbe, vil lage 2 Young men 
FG7 5 North Wara-Wara Yagala,  vi l lage 1 Men 
FG8 6 North Wara-Wara Yagala,  vi l lage 1 Women 
FG9 12 North Port  Loko Young men 
FG10 5 North Maforki chiefdom Men/Elders 
FG11 8 North Maforki chiefdom Women 
FG12 6 North Sanda Magbolontor  chiefdom Men/Elders 
FG13 3 North Sanda Magbolontor  chiefdom Women 
FG14 4 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Men/Elders 
FG15 5 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Young men 
FG16 6 South Kaiyamba chiefdom Women 
FG17 7 South Kongbora chiefdom Women 
FG18 4 South Kongbora chiefdom Men/Elders 
FG19 5 South Kongbora chiefdom Young men 
FG20 5 South Fakunya chiefdom Women 
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FG21 6 South Fakunya chiefdom Young men 
FG22 3 South Kamajei  chiefdom Men/Elders 
FG23 5 South Kamajei  chiefdom Women 
FG24 4 South Kamajei  chiefdom Young men 
FG25 5 East  Kailahun Women  
FG26 5 East  Kissi  Teng chiefdom Women 
FG27 4 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 1 Men 
FG28 4 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 1 Women 
FG29 4 East  Luawa chiefdom, vil lage 3 Men/Elders 
FG30 10 North Port  Loko Amputee Focus Group 
 
Code Participants Province Location Description 
E1 1 South Bo Head of local  
peacebuilding NGO  
E2 1 West Freetown Academic at  Fourah Bay 
College 
E3 2 West Freetown Leaders of local  youth 
association 
E4 1 West Freetown Head of local  
peacebuilding NGO 
E5 1 West Freetown Reverent 
E6 1 West Freetown Local head of  an 
international 
developmental  NGO 
E7 1 West Freetown Head of a  local  
peacebuilding NGO 
E8 1 West Freetown Head of women’s NGO 
E9 1 West Freetown Child Care officer 
International NGO 
E10 1 West Freetown Head of local  human 
rights advocacy group 
E11 1 West Freetown Head of local  
peacebuilding NGO 
E12 1 West Freetown Head of local  
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peacebuilding NGO 
E13 1 West Freetown Head of local  child care 
NGO 
E14 1 North Port  Loko District  head of a 
governmental  
organization 
E15 1 North Port  Loko Social  worker at  an 
international NGO 
E16 1 South Moyamba CDF Defence Lawyer 
E17 1 East  Kailahun Reverent 
E18 1 East  Kailahun Officer at  a local  
peacebuilding NGO 
E19 10 East  Kailahun Focus Group of officers 
of an international NGO 
E20 1 East  Daru Local town councilor 
Expert Interviews 2008 
E21 1 West Freetown Head of local  
peacebuilding NGO, 2008 
E22 1 West Freetown Head of local  human 
rights advocacy group,  
2008 
E23 1 West Freetown Academic at  Fourah Bay 
College, 2008 
E24 1 West Freetown Head of international 
developmental  NGO, 2008 
E25 1 West Freetown Officer at  local  
peacebuilding NGO, 2008 
E26 1 West Freetown Laura Stovel,  2008 
E27 1 West Freetown Academic at  Fourah Bay 
College, 2008 
E28 1 West Freetown Local head of  
international 
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ANNEX 4 – Community shrine in Moa 
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ANNEX 5 – Fambul Tok ceremony 
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